THE PATH OF PROOFS

Pramāṇapaddhati of Śrī Jayatīrtha

English rendering by
Shrinivasa Varakhedi

Dvaita Philosophy Resource Centre

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A Monograph on the Dvaita Epistemology

English rendering by
Shrinivasa Varakhedi

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Dedicated to
Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa,
my revered Gurus,
and my beloved father and mother,
in the memory of
my loving wife
Smt Samana

Foreword

Manipal University Press (MUP) is the second offspring of MAHE Trust, Manipal University being the firstborn. The objectives of MUP include publishing scholarly, academic outputs such as textbooks, monographs, chronicles, conference proceedings etc. The translation of Śrī Jayatīrtha's Pramānapaddhati by Dr Shrinivasa Varakhedi is the first offering of the University Press.

The Dvaita Philosophy Resource Centre set up under the aegis of Manipal Centre for European Studies has taken up the challenging task of translating some of the seminal works of Dvaita philosophers with an intention of disseminating this knowledge. The University and University Press are privileged to take up these works, being geographically located in the heartland of Dvaita. The Centre has been commissioned to translate two more works, which should be completed soon.

Dr Neeta Inamdar, Head, Manipal Centre for European Studies has been singularly responsible for bringing out this epistemological work. MUP places on record its sense of gratitude for her organized effort to get the book completed on time. Mr Vinod Kamath, Asst Professor, Dept of Printing Technology, MIT; Mr Chandrashekar Prabhu and Mr K Suresh of Manipal University were involved intimately in the formation of the University Press and also the first publication. My sincere thanks to all of them.

Dr H Vinod Bhat
Pro Vice Chancellor
Manipal University (MU), Manipal

Preface

Epistemology of the Dvaita school of thought is fully presented in this short monograph with the title Pramāṇapaddhati[1] - The Path of Proofs, authored by Śrī Jayatīrtha. Epistemology, the science of knowledge deals with the origin and nature of cognitive events and their means. Every school of thought in Indian philosophy has developed its own theories in this branch of philosophy. The Dvaita school, being one of the major realistic schools among the Vedānta schools created a new system of epistemology that was worked out by Ācārya Madhva, the founder of the Dvaita school especially in Pramāṇalakṣaṇa and Anuvyākhyāna. In order to make it available to the novice, Śrī Jayatīrtha, who composed many commentaries on the works of Ācārya Madhva, wrote this independent monograph that covers all aspects of the Dvaita epistemology.

Epistemology of realism

The Dvaita school of thought promoted by Ācārya Madhva, which flourished in thirteenth century AD near Udupi in Karnataka, is a realistic school that believes in the reality of this phenomenon- world and in the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu. This tenet of realism requires a different epistemological set up that starts from a basic premise or axiom, which is "I exist". All philosophical inquiries originate from a living being – a spirit or a soul cognized as "I". This is the first reality that does not require any proof other than the self. All inquiries will find an end by final evaluation of the testimony. This concept of testimony is called *Sākṣī* in the Dvaita philosophy, which is the root of all quests and the final judge of all verifications. The rest are external means of knowledge. The Dvaita school has developed a unique paradigm for knowledge and its means. There are three types of knowledge: perceptual, inferential and verbal. The first one being generated by means of six senses that constitute prominent and independent proof, and later categories belonging to non-perception cognitive proofs that are considered to be dependent on perception, yet powerful instruments to achieve knowledge. Thus, this work is divided into three major chapters called perception, inference and verbal testimony, as a compendious yet full treatment of the Dvaita epistemology

1 The word "proof" is employed here to cover the complete sense of *Pramāṇa* intended by the Dvaita philosophers that includes "knowledge" as well as the "instruments" of the same. The reader is requested to be careful here while getting this idea in the pure technical sense proposed in the Dvaita epistemology; not in the sense of what it means in the west or in the strict sense of 'proof' in mathematics. In mathematics, the proof is applicable only in the case of rational knowledge with respect to the formal and necessary truth which can be proved, but in philosophy, the proof (evidence or testimony) can be utilized in the case of empirical knowledge where factual or material truth that can only be verified. Here in this context, "proof" means a congregate notion that includes factual knowledge and its instruments.

in smaller captions. It is true that its discussion on the stand points of other schools on various topics and their criticism are not in detailed form, yet this is precisely what is to be expected here since the work is designed for the novice. Moreover, the simple and captivating statements in *Sūtra* style employed here would ignite the interest in reader to conduct further study in detail.

Study of Pramāṇas and spiritual attainment

The goal of Indian tradition of philosophies is enlightenment of the self and the realization of ultimate truth. This is attainable only on obtaining proper instruments of realization. Knowledge constitutes realization. The path of a person's spiritual endeavour is completely dependent on the instruments he chooses. Proper instruments lead him towards the goal in the right direction[2]. Hence, identifying and understanding the nature of the knowledge and its instruments are necessary. However, these efforts to study *Pramāṇas* seem to be a pure academic pursuit, this kind of precise settlement of the nature of *Pramāṇas* and a detailed study of their characteristics are prescribed by Ācārya Madhva as a powerful and initial step in the spiritual path. This kind of inquiry is not kept outside of the spiritual enterprise. For the same reason, Ācārya Madhva has given special attention to elaborate discussion of the *Pramāṇas* and after having defined and classified the *Pramāṇas*, he has thrown light on the defects of the notions about the *Pramāṇas* proposed by other opponents in his various works. This whole and complete system of the Dvaita epistemology has a noted place among neo Indian philosophical dialectics, for its unique and original notions and technically sound presentations. This status was possible only by the contributions of Śrī Jayatīrtha, who brought this to light through his extraordinary expositions.

Pramāṇa – what it is?

The central theme *Pramāṇa* is borrowed from the *Śāstric* and common world as well. This notion includes knowledge and its instruments. The definition must cover the entire concept without leaving any component. Hence, *Pramāṇa* is defined as *Yathārtham*. *Pramāṇa* is that, which apprehends an object as it is. *Pramāṇa* is classified into two categories; *Kevalapramāṇa,* the primary proof and *Anupramāṇa,* the secondary proof. Knowledge apprehends its object directly by its nature, whereas, instruments like sense organs do get the objects through the knowledge they generate. Apprehension is the nature of cognition. Knowledge is the central point of this inquiry of *Pramāṇa*. Other factors of *Pramā*, the knowledge are *Pramātā*, *Prameya* and *Pramāṇa*.

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2 See page no. 104, Chapter III.

Pramā, the knowledge: The act of knowing yields to knowledge, which is true by itself. It can be the quality of self or the modification of *Manas*, the mind. The agent of the act of knowing is Pramātā, the knower. The knower or sentient agent lives, thinks, and has ability to understand through his senses. The entire range of phenomenal existence with objects physical or psychical is termed as *Prameya, the* knowable object. It literally means that, which deserves to be known. It is admitted as an axiom that there is nothing in this world that is not knowable[3].

The other phenomena of cognition are *Samśaya*, the doubt and *Viparyaya*, the error or misapprehension. A detailed account of the five factors that play a role in the generation of doubt, according to various schools has been considered to be the best instance of the rigor of highly intellectual pursuit of the author. The author reduces the number of factors to one, saying that the only one factor i.e., common property could be the cause for doubt leaving out all four viz. distinct property, debate, etc. In a very short but complete note on error, the author mentions all the theories of various schools of Indian thoughts, reviews them and makes the stand of the Dvaita school clear[4].

Another important aspect that is described here is gradation in knowledge. On the ground of philosophy of Ācārya Madhva, Śrī Jayatīrtha describes several types of knowledge, which differ in extent, range, intensity and clarity. These types are arranged by him in a descending order that suits to the ontological gradation of spirits admitted in the Dvaita philosophy starting from perfect super-divine knowledge to imperfect human knowledge.

Sākṣī – the referee of cognitive game

One of the foremost notions of the Dvaita epistemology is *Sākṣī*. *Sākṣī* is nothing but a conceptually proposed organ of the self. It is the final word in the judgment on the reliability of cognition. The very existence of the self and its qualities, *Manas* and its modifications, internal objects like joy, sorrow etc., along with absolute time and space are comprehended by *Sākṣī*. It always causes self-luminous and ever-true cognitions. With respect to the directly known objects, the *Sākṣī* does not get any doubt at any point of time. All tests of reliability of cognitive events end with the judgment of *Sākṣī*. Hence, it occupies the place of referee in the cognitive game. Final judgment regarding the truth or falsity of any cognition is a function of *Sākṣī*[5].

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3 See page no. 5, Chapter I.

4 See page no. 5, Chapter I.

5 See page no. 19, Chapter I.

Śrī Jayatīrtha then goes in to the details of the three instruments of knowledge - *Pratyakṣa*, the sense perception, *Anumāna*, the inference, and *Āgama*, the verbal authority.

On the truthfulness of recollection

According to the Dvaita school, *Smṛti*, the recollection or memory is also a true cognition. Moreover, it is categorized under the category of experience against Naiyyāyika's contention, who does not admit it as an experience. Some philosophers hold that memory cannot be true because, it apprehends the object with reference to its past status, which is not present while the memory takes place. This means, there is no coherence between the time and location of memory and the time and location with reference to which the object is revealed in memory. This objection is rejected by the author. Minimum requirement of the truth of a cognition is the correspondence of time, location and aspects of the object apprehended in the cognition with reference to the same in reality. In the case of experience other than memory, the correspondence is needed in the time of experience. However, in case of the memory, it is not. It is sufficient if the time and location of the object referred to the memory agree with the time and location of the object, when it was first comprehended. Thus, memory cognition can be considered as true in case the content of the same that corresponds to reality during experience. Similarly, memory is not caused by the impressions of previous experience. Impressions just provide the content. *Manas,* the internal sense organ causes memory cognition. Otherwise, from where does memory draw the pastness of the moment, which was present during the experience that caused the impression? Hence, memory can be considered as an experience caused by *Manas*[6].

Definition of definitions

At the outset, Pramāṇapaddhati discusses the characteristics of a definition. A property or characteristic that is found in all instances of the *definitum* and is found nowhere else is termed a perfect definition. A subtle point that is to be noted here is that, the Dvaita philosophy does not accept a common property that is present in more than one entity. For, the concept of *Jāti,* the universal category is not acceptable to Dvaitins. It is therefore absurd to say that a property called cowness is present in all cows, which is false. In fact, each cow has got its own cowness. They do share similar properties, but not the same. It is on account of similarity of these properties that we can say these similar properties constitute the definition of the given group of entities[7].

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6 See page no. 20, Chapter I.

7 See page no. 1, Chapter I.

Inference and concomitance relation

Anumāna literally means such knowledge that follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object caused by a previous knowledge of some sign or mark to the object. Hence, *Anumāna* is defined as knowledge of some mark or sign function, which will be the knowledge of some other object that pervades the mark. This relation of pervasion between sign and its counterpart is called universal or invariable relation or concomitance in short. This is the logical ground for the entire process of inference. A fact between two relatives is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. Contrariwise, a fact is said to be pervaded by another when it is always accompanied by the other. It follows from this, that *Vyāpaka*, the pervader is present everywhere *Vyāpya,* the pervaded is present. In this sense, smoke is pervaded by fire since fire is present in all places where smoke is present. But, all fiery objects are not smoky e.g., the red-hot iron ball has fire but not smoke. The interesting point proposed by Śrī Jayatīrtha here is that, this concomitance relation is not just possible between two entities that are located in the same place, but also between the entities present in different places and times. To establish this position, he gives many instances like the rains on the hilltop and flood at the foot. He then proposes a novel thesis on *Vyāpti, the* relation with a variety of sub-classifications that are unique in the entire history of Indian philosophy. This portion of the text is a remarkable contribution of Śrī Jayatīrtha[8].

Reorganization of fallacies

Fallacies in inferential process that yield to invalid inference are paid deeper attention in all epistemological systems. However, the fallacies of debate constitute a different category. Some of them have concern with the elements of inference. In total, all these together constitute *Nigrahasthāna,* the point of holding that concludes the whole debate by declaring one person as defeated. This literature domain of Indian epistemology runs into thousands of pages. The number goes to twenty-two *Nigrahas,* five fallacies of reason and hundreds of sub-classifications. In order to make it very simple and comprehensive, Śrī Jayatīrtha proposes a new scheme of *Nigrahasthāna* that includes *Hetvābhāsas,* the fallacies of reasons. This new scheme with only six members covers the entire range of fallacies that are classified with respect to *Pratijñā,* the proposition, *Hetu,* the reason, and *Udāharaṇa,* the example. Thus, unlike Nyāya theory of fallacies, these fallacies do not get applied to reason alone. For e.g., *Bādha,* the sublation,

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8 See page no. 31-35, Chapter II.

that is negation of the thesis of proponent can be applied to the proposition and not to the reason. Thus, this is another significant contribution of Śrī Jayatīrtha[9].

Word of authority

Agama is defined as defect-less speech. The eternal and imperishable word is the Vedas. Other than the Vedas, that is human-composition is also an authority if it is free from defects. In this section on *Āgama,* the neo theory of connotation of synthesized meaning *Anvitābhidhānavāda* is briefed. According to it, the meaning of a sentence is not merely the aggregate of the separate meaning of its constituent words. Rather, it is a complete meaning and is connected to other parts, which are conveyed by words. Thus, the entire Dvaita epistemology is presented with an introduction to whole new realms of theories in this small monograph by Śrī Jayatīrtha[10].

Śrī Jayatīrtha – the author

Śrī Jayatīrtha, who is familiar with his title name Ṭīkācārya in Dvaita traditionis held in high esteem and placed immediately next only to Ācārya Madhva. It is Śrī Jayatīrtha who is responsible for shaping the Dvaita school of thought in a systematic manner. Otherwise, the Dvaita school would not have enjoyed the present status of a complete philosophy among other prominent Darśanas like Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. This fact is admitted not only by the stalwarts like Vyāsatīrtha and others within the tradition, but also by the eminent thinkers of opponent schools[11].

Śrī Jayatīrtha lived a very short lifespan of 45 years. His period as a monk was between 1365 to 1388 AD, after about seven decades after the disappearance of Śrī Madhva. Before Jayatīrtha, prominent disciples of Ācārya Madhva have also commented on the major works of Madhva. However, the methodology of exposition followed by them was not sufficient to place the Dvaita school in the position given to a complete system of Vedānta in all aspects during that period. Śrī Jayatīrtha achieved this through his commentaries on Madhva's complete dialectical works. The original works of Madhva are very short and crisp in style. Madhva's arguments against opponent thought, though logical and supported by sufficient proof, were subject to criticism by contemporary philosophers due to lack of proper understanding. Moreover, many questions discussed in the contemporary works of other schools were not dealt within the fashion followed by them.

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9 Ananta Krishna Shastry in his Introduction to Advaitatatvasudha published in 1960's.

10 See page no. 94, Chapter III.

11 B N K Sharma in the History of Dvaita school of Vedanta and its literature pp. no. 246.

The *Bhāṣya* on Brahmasūtras by Madhva, authored in an unusual style, could not be understood in a conventional way of interpretation of Brahmasūtras as it is done in other schools. Śrī Jayatīrtha attempted to construct the *Adhikaraṇas* in the traditionally admitted manner, drawing the ideas from Madhva's work.

He was also a pioneer in developing a complete methodology to establish the categories and concepts of the Dvaita Vedānta that was followed by all the subsequent writers of the Dvaita system. He examined all theories proposed by thinkers who lived prior to him. His way of interpretation is considered very unique in the whole of Indian commentary literature. No wonder, that Madhva's words were not interpreted by anyone else after Jayatīrtha as he left little room for other interpretations. He interpreted many lines of Madhva in several ways and sometimes the number of interpretations reached even up to twenty-five.

Vyāsatīrtha, one of the great Indian philosophers who composed three unparalleled works – *Nyāyāmṛtam, Tātparyacandrikā* and *Tarkatāṇḍavam* – admires the commenting skill of Jayatīrtha in the following way.

citraiḥ padaiśca gambhīraiḥ vākyairmānairakhaṇḍitaiḥ |
gurubhāvaṃ vyañjayantī bhāti śrījayatīrthavāk ||

"The composition of Jayatīrtha flourishes greatly as it exhibits the heavily condensed inner meaning of the words of Guru Madhva with words and sentences that are dignified, decorous, tested and uncondemned."

Life and works of Jayatīrtha

Though many stories are heard about Jayatīrtha through some biographies and other sources in the tradition, little is known about him authentically. Dr B N K Sharma, an authentic writer of Dvaita history in recent times rejected all these stories as merely myths. However, it is recorded beyond doubt that he belonged to a Maharashtra Mandalik Brāhmaṇ family by name Deshapande that ruled Mangalavedhe region. Untill the time he met Śrī Aksobhyatīrtha on the banks of Bhima river, he was a young boy with lot of interest in sports, horse-riding etc. At twenty, a turning point came in his life that brought a significant change in his life. He became a Sanyāsī after being initiated by his Guru Akṣobhyatīrtha. Akṣobhyatīrtha; who was a direct disciple of Śrī Madhva was the last person in the lineage initiated by Madhva. He was in search of a disciple, who would take the great responsibility of keeping the tradition intact.

Śrī Jayatīrtha was trained in about only four years in Vedānta teachings. After the demise of his Guru, Jayatīrtha devoted his lifetime completely for authoring commentaries on Madhva's works, which was the necessity of those days. His brilliant mind realized during the studies that there was a great need for

commentaries on Madhva's writings. He not only fulfilled this need, but also filled the gaps by drawing the missing links. He lived a short life of 25 years after his Sanyāsa. Again, after his studies he had hardly two decades for actual work. Despite this short period, enormous literature that he created became the strong foundation for Madhva philosophy. Even today, Nyāyasudhā – his *magnum opus* is considered as the encyclopaedia of the Dvaita Vedānta, without the study of which, no student can become a Vidvān. Such is the greatness of Jayatīrtha and his works. About twenty two works are ascribed to Jayatīrtha. Many of them have been studied in the traditional system of learning for centuries. His independent works like Pramāṇapaddhati and Vādāvalī are not only regarded as standard textbooks in Dvaita studies, but also considered as authentic works like *Sūtras* in the dialectic literature. Thus, Jayatīrtha occupies a special space in the Dvaita dialectical literature. All the three works Nyāyamṛtam, Tātparyacandrikā and Tarkatāṇḍavam of Vyāsatīrtha a prominent dialectician of India, whose impact on Dvaita-Advaita dialogue continued for centuries, were complementary to the works of Jayatīrtha.

Commentaries on ten *Prakaraṇa Granthas* (monographs) of Ācārya Madhva; Nyāyasudha – a commentary on Anuvyākhyāna of Madhva, which is again a commentary on Brahmasūtras; A *Ṭīkā* on Brahmasūtrabhāṣya; *Ṭīkā* on Ṛgbhāṣya and on some Upaniṣadbhāṣya, Two *Ṭīkās* on Gītābhāṣya and Gītātātparyanirṇaya and some independent works constitute the totality of works of Jayatīrtha.

Jayatīrtha – a commentator par excellence

If we go through the commentary literature in Indian systems including *Sāhitya Śāstra* etc., we find several commentators like Abhinavagupta on Ānandavardhana, Mallinātha on Kālidāsa, Vācaspati on Śamkara, Deśika on Rāmānuja, and Gadādhara on Dīdhiti among others. Compared to these stalwarts, Jayatīrtha emerges exceptionally analytical. The uniqueness of his position lies in his deep scholarship, style of exposition, lucid language, and commitment to the original author, placing opposite perspectives with strong arguments, finding equally strong arguments for a final position, logically sound statements, appropriate and comprehensive line of thinking, and methods of examining different views. For him, a commentary needed to be followed with the following methodology.

The exposition is of several types; giving information about untold points, reconciliation of points scattered here and there, consolidating points sometimes justifying the proposed subject matter, and sometimes establishing the same by refuting opponent views. In all these aspects, Jayatīrtha has achieved remarkable success. One important feature that is visible to every reader of his commentary is expounding the definitions or concepts proposed by Madhva in the classical language and style that is called *Pariṣkāra*. One such example is the definition of

Bhakti, given by Madhva in simple words, has rendered in a formal sentence by Jayatīrtha –

Words of Madhva:

māhātmya jñāna pūrvastu sudṛḍhaḥ sarvatodhikaḥ |
sneho bhaktiriti proktaḥ tayā muktiḥ na cānyathā ||

Explanation of Jayatīrtha:

parameśvarabhaktiḥ nāma niravadhika ananta anavadya kalyāṇaguṇajñāna-pūrvakaḥ svātmātmīyasamastavastubhyo-spi adhikaḥ antarāyasahastreṇāpi apratibaddhaḥ nirantarapremapravāhaḥ ||

In his Pramāṇapaddhati, many definitions including definition of *Pramāṇa* in a formal language are his original contributions. For e.g., *yāthārthyam - yathāvast hitajñeyaviṣayīkāritvam*[12].

Jayatīrtha has exhibited extraordinary commentary skill in explaining a sentence of Madhva in many ways. There are hundreds of such examples available in his works. In Nyāyasudhā, simple looking text: *pratyakṣavacca pramāṇyam svata eva āgamasya hi* is shown having answers to seven different *Pūrvapakṣas.* In another case, a line of Madhva in Anuvyākhyāna, *vailakṣaṇyaṃ sataścāpi* is expanded to meet twelve alternative explanations of *Sadasatvailakṣaṇyam.* Similarly, with one statement *vijñātasya anyathā jñānam,* Jayatīrtha refutes all five different theories of error. While doing that, he uses one single word *vyabhicārataḥ* to overthrow twenty objections.

Dvaita tradition admires the trio of Ācāryas – Madhva as the founder Ācārya, Jayatīrtha as the commentator Ācārya - *Ṭīkācārya*, and Vyasatīrtha as Ācārya of *Dvaitavādakathā*, the Dvaita dialects. The tenets of the Dvaita Vedānta propounded by Ācārya Madhva became concrete with the efforts of Jayatīrtha. Ācārya Madhva laid the foundation, Ācārya Jayatīrtha built on these ideas, and finally Vyasatīrtha and others painted and decorated the whole Dvaita system. It was certainly established by Jayatīrtha with all relevant *Śāstric* tools and techniques. Hence, he is regarded as one of the Acharya-trio of Dvaita tradition.

Concluding remarks

The increasing interest of the new generation in philosophical studies and non-availability of sufficient study material especially in the branch of epistemology, a branch full of technicalities, made it appear desirable to me and my academic companions to prepare fresh editions of *Śāstric* monographs that deal with basics of epistemology through English translation. When a proposal to translate the Dvaita monograph was offered to me by Dvaita Philosophy Resource Centre, Manipal University, I happily accepted it in spite of my personal difficulties and

constraints. I chose my favourite work Pramāṇapaddhati for translation in English. Many editions and a couple of English translations of Pramāṇapaddhati have been already published. However, since they belong to the early days of Anglo-Indian scholarship, and are not easily accessible to the younger generation, this fresh translation is attempted.

Language evolves with time. Hence, fresh translations of classics and technical works are always well received by readers. Many interested students lack adequate knowledge of the technical jargon of Sanskrit that is employed in *Śāstric* works to understand them. To overcome this barrier, a direct and mirror translation could be an appropriate tool, which helps students to paraphrase the lines in order to interpret them on their own. Sometimes detailed translations may mislead the readers, or may not get the appreciation of serious readers as they are based on interpretations of the translator. To be authentic and truthful to the original text, the mirror translation method is adopted here in this edition. English sentence construction, because of its syntactical nature, is a mirror reflection of the Indian language text. Hence, this type of translation is called mirror translation.

However, as readers may find it difficult to understand the concepts without sufficient background to the theories, it is suggested that the beginner reads the book with the guidance of a scholar and uses the translation for the purpose of self-study. This detailed introduction would enable the reader to enter into the subject matter of the treatise. Any shortcomings of this edition due to inadequate detailed notes will be set right in the forthcoming editions.

Prof Shrinivasa Varakhedi, MA, PhD
Bengaluru

October 10, 2011
(*Vijaya Daśamī – Madhva Jayantī*)

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I am indebted to the Head of the Dvaita Philosophy Resource Centre (DPRC), Dr Neeta Inamdar, whose keenness and determined follow up actions made this work possible. I am at loss of words to express my feelings of gratitude to her. I am confident that within a short time, the Dvaita Philosophy Resource Centre of Manipal University would gain international reputation in the field of philosophical research in her leadership. I am also thankful to Srinivasa Kumar N Acharya, lecturer in DPRC for his painstaking support in bringing out this book.

None of my academic endeavours finds a conclusion without a final word by my scholarly friend Prof V N K Pandurangi. His support has improved the quality of this translation. I am grateful to him. I also express my gratitude to Mr Praveen Shetty, who proofread the work with utmost care.

My sincere thanks are due to the Chancellor, the Pro Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor of Manipal University. I am also grateful to Pro Vice Chancellor Dr H Vinod Bhat and Registrar Dr G K Prabhu of Manipal University for their support. I owe success of my academic achievements to my gurus – His Holiness Sri Vishvesha Tirtha Svamiji of Sri Pejavara Matha, Udupi and Maha-mahopadhyaya Prof Prahlada Char D, former Vice Chancellor of Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha (Deemed University), Tirupati. Last but not least, I express my respectful gratitude to my parents Sri Hanumanta Varakhedi and Smt Bharati Varakhedi and heartfelt love to my beautiful daughter Medhavini. Of course, words of thanking are due to my sisters and other relatives whose unstinted support has ever been a source of strength for me. I offer this work to Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa in memory of my beloved wife, the departed angelic companion in the spiritual path of my life.

I ever remain thankful to the readers whose satisfaction makes this endeavour a success. You are the persons to whom this work is offered.

Prof Shrinivasa Varakhedi, MA, PhD

Contents

। अथ प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः ।

Atha Pratyakṣa-Paricchedaḥ

Chapter I Perception

Invocation

प्रणम्य चरणाम्भोजयुगलं कमलापतेः ।
प्रमाणपद्धतिं कुर्मो बालानां बोधसिद्धये ।।

praṇamya caraṇāmbhojayugalaṃ kamalāpateḥ |
pramāṇapaddhatiṃ kurmo bālānāṃ bodhasiddhaye ||

Having bowed down at the lotus-feet-duo of the Lord of Kamalā, we compile the work Pramāṇapaddhati, the Path of Proofs for the understanding of the novice.

Introduction to the monograph

यद्यपि भगवत्पादैरेव प्रमाणलक्षणादिकम् अभिहितम् । तथाऽपि गम्भीरया वाचा विक्षिप्य वर्णितं न मन्दैः शक्यते, सुखेन बोद्धुमिति तदर्थमिदं प्रकरणम् आरभ्यते ।

yadyapi bhagavatpādaireva pramāṇalakṣaṇādikam abhihitam | tathāऽpi gambhīrayā vācā vikṣipya varṇitaṃ na mandaiḥ śakyate, sukhena boddhumiti tadarthamidaṃ prakaraṇam ārabhyate |

In fact, the great Śrī Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpāda, who is known as Ācārya Śrī Madhva has given the definition of proofs in various places in his works. However, because of his profound style and the scattered nature of the topics discussed, a novice cannot easily comprehend the concepts through the original works. Hence, this monograph is composed.

Lakṣaṇa - the definition of *Pramāṇa*

यो धर्मो लक्ष्ये व्याप्त्या वर्तते, न वर्तते च अन्यत्र, स धर्मो लक्षणमित्युच्यते । यथा गोः सास्नादिमत्त्वम् । तद्धि गोषु सर्वत्र अस्ति, नास्ति च अगोषु ।

yo dharmo lakṣye vyāptyā vartate, na vartate ca anyatra, sa dharmo lakṣaṇam ityucyate | yathā goḥ sāsnādimattvam | taddhi goṣu sarvatra asti, nāsti ca agoṣu |

The distinctive attribute or property called characteristic, which is present invariably covering all the instances of the object to be defined and is not found anywhere else than in the defined, is called *Lakṣaṇa,* the definition. The characteristic attribute of a cow is the possession of 'dewlap' of the cow. This distinctive feature is present in every cow, and not present in non-cows.

Alakṣaṇa - the defective or unqualified definition

अन्यथाभूतं तु अलक्षणम् । तत् त्रिविधम् । असम्भवि, यल्लक्ष्ये सर्वथा न वर्तते । यथा गोः एकशफत्वम् । अव्यापकं, यल्लक्ष्यैकदेशे वर्तमानमपि तदेकदेशान्तरे न वर्तते । यथा गोः शबलत्वम् । अतिव्यापकं, यल्लक्ष्यादन्यत्रापि वर्तते । यथा विषाणित्वम् ।

anyathābhūtaṃ tu alakṣaṇam | tat trividham | asambhavi, yallakṣye sarvathā na vartate | yathā goḥ ekaśaphatvam | avyāpakaṃ, yallakṣyaikadeśe vartamānam-api tadekadeśāntare na vartate | yathā goḥ śabalatvam | ativyāpakaṃ, yallakṣy-ādanyatrāpi vartate | yathā viṣāṇitvam |

The property, unlike proper definition is a defective one. It is of three types:

a) The defining attribute, which is not present in any instance of the object to be defined is termed as *Asambhavi,* the unfit, e.g., the definition of a cow as a single hoofed animal.
b) The defining attribute that is present in some instances of the objects and absent in others is *Avyāpaka,* the under-pervasive, e.g., the cow is an animal of tawny colour.
c) The defining attribute that is present in other objects besides the defined object is *Ativyāpaka,* the over-pervasive, e.g., definition of a cow as an animal having horns.

Purpose or functions of the definition

सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्ततया लक्ष्यावधारणं लक्षणज्ञानस्य प्रयोजनम् । 'अस्मिन् ग्रामे देवदत्तगृहम्' इति वार्तां श्रुतवतो हि तद्ग्रामस्थेषु सर्वेष्वपि गृहेषु देवदत्तगृहबुद्धिः प्रसक्ता । ततो 'यत्र पताका तत् देवदत्तगृहम्' इति तल्लक्षणज्ञाने सति, इदमेव, न अन्यत् इत्यवधारणं जायते ।

शब्दव्यवहारो वा लक्षणज्ञानस्य प्रयोजनम् । 'सास्नादिमान् गौः' इति लक्षणज्ञाने सति, यं यं सास्नादिमन्तं पिण्डं पश्यति, तं तं गोशब्दवाच्यं प्रत्येति ।

sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttatayā lakṣyāvadhāraṇaṃ lakṣaṇajñānasya prayojanam | 'asmin grāme devadattagṛham' iti vārtāṃ śrutavato hi tadgrāmastheṣu sarveṣvapi gṛheṣu devadattagṛhabuddhiḥ prasaktā| tato 'yatra patākā tat devadattagṛham' iti tallakṣaṇajñāne sati, idameva, na anyat ityavadhāraṇaṃ jāyate|

śabdavyavahāro vā lakṣaṇajñānasya prayojanam |'sāsnādimān gauḥ' iti lakṣaṇajñāne sati, yaṃ yaṃ sāsnādimantaṃ piṇḍaṃ paśyati, taṃ taṃ gośabda-vācyaṃ pratyeti |

One of the functions or purposes of the definition is to differentiate the defined object from other members of its own class *Sajātīya*, and from the members of other class *Vijātīya*, for e.g., a person knows that the house of Devadatta is in a particular village, and he searches for the house amongst the houses in the absence of knowledge of the specific sign, marking off house of Devadatta from the rest. When he comes to know that a flag is at the top of the house of Devadatta, he is enabled to distinguish the house.

Definition also enables to describe and distinguish the objects in terms of words for carrying out normal activities. A person who knows the characteristics of cow can identify the animal called "cow", when he perceives any animal possessing the same characteristics.

Lakṣya - the object to be defined

यावत् अन्यतो व्यावर्तनीयं, यावति चैकः शब्दो व्युत्पादनीयः, तदुच्यते लक्ष्यमिति ।

yāvat anyato vyāvartanīyaṃ, yāvati caikaḥ śabdo vyutpādanīyaḥ, taducyate lakṣyamiti |

Whatever the object that has to be differentiated from the others and whatever that has to be collectively communicated by a single word, is termed as *Lakṣya,* the object to be defined.

General definition of *Pramāṇa*

तत्रादौ तावत् प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् उच्यते । यथार्थं प्रमाणम् । प्रमाणमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः । यथार्थमिति लक्षणोक्तिः । एवम् उत्तरत्रापि ज्ञातव्यम् । अत्र यथाशब्दो अनतिक्रमे वर्तते । अर्थशब्दश्च अर्यते इति व्युत्पत्त्या ज्ञेयवाची । ज्ञेयमनतिक्रम्य वर्तमानं, यथावस्थितमेव ज्ञेयं यद्विषयीकरोति, न अन्यथा, तत् प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ।

ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वं च साक्षाद्वा, साक्षाज्ज्ञेयविषयीकारिसाधनत्वेन वा विवक्षितमिति न अनुप्रमाणेषु अव्याप्तिः । ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वेनैव प्रमातृप्रमेययोः व्यवच्छेदः । तयोः साक्षाज्ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वाभावात् । साक्षाज्ज्ञेयविषयीकारिकारणत्वेऽपि तत्साधनत्वाभावाच्च ।

tatrādau tāvat pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam ucyate | yathārthaṃ pramāṇam | pramāṇamiti lakṣyanirdeśaḥ | yathārthamiti lakṣaṇoktiḥ | evam uttaratrāpi jñātavyam | atra yathāśabdo anatikrame vartate | arthaśabdaśca aryate iti vyutpattyā jñeyavācī | jñeyamanatikramya vartamānaṃ, yathāvasthitameva jñeyaṃ yad-viṣayīkaroti, na anyathā, tat pramāṇamityarthaḥ |

jñeyaviṣaīkāritvaṃ ca sākṣādvā, sākṣājjñeyaviṣayīkārisādhanatvena vā vivakṣitam iti na anupramāṇeṣu avyāptiḥ | jñeyaviṣayīkāritvenaiva pramātṛprameyayoḥ vyavacchedaḥ | tayoḥ sākṣājjñeyaviṣayīkāritvābhāvāt | sākṣājjñeyaviṣayīkārikāraṇatvesִpi tatsādhanatvābhāvācca|

Here in the beginning, the general definition of *Pramāṇa* is stated. *Pramāṇa* is defined as *Yathārtha,* the true. The term *Pramāṇa* stands for the object defined, *Lakṣya*. The second term *Yathārtha* stands as its definition. Every statement of definitions in the following sections, should be understood in the same manner. Here, the word *Yathā* means 'that which does not go beyond'. *Artha* means the comprehensible object or reality by its etymological analysis, and *Aryate* that means 'it is known'. The definition of *Pramāṇa* is one that , does not go beyond the object or reality. In other words, the proof objectifies or grasps the content or reality as it is; not otherwise. *Pramāṇa* does correspond to the reality.

Pramāṇa includes not only the knowledge of reality, but also the instruments, which cause the knowledge. This amplified definition does not give any scope for the charge of *Avyāpti*, the non-pervasion, being leveled against the definition of *Pramāṇa* in respect of *Anupramāṇas* the instruments of knowledge for not covering them. Anticipated possible charge of *Ativyāpti*, the over-pervasion in *Pramātā,* the knower and *Prameya,* the reality against the definition of *Pramāṇa* is also avoided by the term objectification, which means grasping of the object. Both the knower and the knowable cannot grasp anything directly. The *Prameya* and *Pramātā* i.e., object of knowledge and the knower can be considered only as *Karaṇa,* the conditions for grasping power; not as its *Sādhana,* the instrument.

Note: *Sādhana* is the primary instrument whose absence would result in the non-production of the effect even in the presence of all other causal conditions, whereas, *Karaṇa* is just one of the conditions.

The knower, knowable and knowledge

प्रमावान् प्रमाता । प्रमाविषय: प्रमेयम् । यथार्थज्ञानं प्रमा । यथार्थग्रहणेन संशयविपर्यय-तत्साधनानां निरास: ।

pramāvān pramātā | pramāviṣayaḥ prameyam | yathārthajñānaṃ pramā | yathārthagrahaṇena saṃśayaviparyayatatsādhanānāṃ nirāsaḥ |

One who possesses *Pramā,* the knowledge is *Pramātā,* the knower. The object of knowledge is *Prameya,* the knowable. The true cognition is *Pramā.* The word *Yathārtha* the true is used to rule out over-pervasion in respect of *Saṃśaya,* the doubt, *Viparyaya,* the error and their instruments.

Saṃśaya - the doubt

अनवधारणज्ञानं संशय: । अनवधारणग्रहणं सम्यग्ज्ञान-विपर्ययव्युदासार्थम् । घटादिनिवृत्त्यर्थं ज्ञानमिति । तस्य निर्णायकाभावसहकृता: साधारणधर्म-असाधारणधर्म-विप्रतिपत्ति-उपलब्धि-अनुपलब्धय: पञ्च कारणानीति केचिदाहु: ।

anavadhāraṇajñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ | anavadhāraṇagrahaṇaṃ samyagjñāna-viparyayavyudāsārtham | ghaṭādinivṛttyarthaṃ jñānamiti | tasya nirṇāyakābhāvasahakṛtāḥ sādhāraṇadharma-asādhāraṇadharma-vipratipatti-upalabdhi-anupalabdhayaḥ pañca kāraṇānīti kecidāhuḥ |

Uncertain cognition is *Saṃśaya,* the doubt. The word uncertain is used here in order to rule out *Ativyāpti,* the over-pervasion with reference to knowledge or true cognition and *Viparyaya,* the error or false cognition. To rule out over-pervasion in respect of objects like pot, the word *Jñāna,* the cognition is used.

Doubt arises as a result of the indefiniteness or inconclusiveness (non-availability of any deciding factor) in the given set of factors. According to some, these factors are five: a) *Sādhāraṇadharma,* the common attribute or general property, b) *Asādhāraṇadharma,* the unique attribute, c) *Vipratipatti,* the conflicting testimony or controversy, d) *Upalabdhi, the* cognition, and e) *Anupalabdhi,* the non-cognition.

तद्यथा, स्थाणुपुरुषयो: साधारणम् ऊर्ध्वतालक्षणं धर्मं पुरोवर्तिनि उपलभ्य स्थाणुपुरुषौ स्मृत्वा, विशेषजिज्ञासायां स्थाणुत्वनिश्चायकं वक्रकोटरादिकं, पुरुषत्वनिश्चायकं शिर:पाण्यादिकं चानुपलभमानस्य डोलायमानं संशयज्ञानम् उत्पद्यते, 'किमयं स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषो वा' इति ।

tadyathā, sthāṇupuruṣayoḥ sādhāraṇam ūrdhvatālakṣaṇaṃ dharmaṃ purovartini upalabhya sthāṇupuruṣau smṛtvā, viśeṣajijñāsāyāṃ sthāṇutvaniścāyakaṃ vakrakoṭarādikaṃ, puruṣatvaniścāyakaṃ śiraḥpāṇyādikaṃ cānupalabhamānasya ḍolāyamānaṃ saṃśayajñānam-utpadyate, 'kimayaṃ sthāṇurvā, puruṣo vā' iti |

a) To understand how a general property causes the doubt, let us take an illustration of cognition event of a 'tall' object. The attribute, 'tallness' is a common characteristic of a post, as well as of a tall man. When a person sees a tall object at some distance, after grasping the common property 'tallness' in the object is seen, he will be reminded of both possibilities – post and man. Though he is desirous to come to a conclusion, neither he finds any decisive factor like bent-branch etc., in favour of post; nor he finds any sign of man like head-hands etc. At this stage, he happens to get the doubt in the form: "Is it a post or a person?" This is how a common property causes doubt.

शब्दे च आकाशविशेषगुणत्वम् असाधारणधर्मम् उपलभमानस्य निर्णायकम् अजानतः संशयो भवति, 'किं शब्दो नित्यो अनित्यो वा' इति ।

इन्द्रियेषु वैशेषिकसाङ्ख्ययोः भौतिकत्व–अभौतिकत्वविप्रतिपत्तिं पश्यतो निश्चायकमजानतः सन्देहो भवति, 'किमिन्द्रियाणि भौतिकानि उत अभौतिकानि' इति ।

śabde ca ākāśaviśeṣaguṇatvam asādhāraṇadharmam upalabhamānasya nirṇāyakam ajānataḥ saṃśayo bhāvati, 'kiṃ śabdo nityo anityo vā' iti |

indriyeṣu vaiśeṣikasāṅkhyayoḥ bhautikatvaabhautikatvavipratipattiṃ paśyato niścāyakamajānataḥ sandeho bhāvati, 'kimindriyāṇi bhautikāni uta abhautikāni'iti |

b) Illustration for the unique attribute is as follows: The specific distinguishing attribute of *Ākāśa* is *Śabda,* the sound. In the absence of other decisive attributes that are helpful in determining the nature of the object viz., its permanence (non-temporality) or impermanence (temporality), doubt arises as to; is sound permanent or impermanent?

c) Controversy gives rise to doubt: When we desire to know whether the senses are *Bhautika*, the material as the Vaiśeṣika opine or *Abhautika,* the non-material as the *Sāṅkhya* hold, the absence of decisive factors gives rise to doubt, if our senses are material or non-material?

कूपखननानन्तरं जलोपलब्धौ सत्यां, निश्चायकाभावे संशयो जायते, 'किं प्राक् सदेवोदकं कूपखननेन अभिव्यक्तमुपलभ्यते, उतासत् तेनोत्पन्नम्' इति ।

'अस्मिन् वटे पिशाचोऽस्ति' इति वार्तां श्रुतवतो वटसमीपं गतस्य, तत्र पिशाचानुपलब्धौ सत्यां निर्णायकाभावे संशयो भवति, 'किं विद्यमान एव पिशाचः अन्तर्धानशक्त्या नोपलभ्यते, किंवाऽविद्यमान एव' इति ।

kūpakhananānantaraṃ jalopalabdhau satyāṃ, niścāyakābhāve saṃśayo jāyate, 'kiṃ prāk sadevodakaṃ kūpakhananena abhivyaktamupalabhyate, utāsat tenotpannam' iti |

'asmin vaṭe piśācosssti' iti vārtāṃ śrutavato vaṭasamīpaṃ gatasya, tatra piśācānupalabdhau satyāṃ nirṇāyakābhāve saṃśayo bhāvati, 'kiṃ vidyamāna eva piśācaḥ antardhānaśaktyā nopalabhyate, kiṃvāsvidyamāna eva' iti |

d) Discovery gives rise to doubt: When a well is dug, water springs up, the percipient ponders as to whether the water already existed there and revealed itself to his perception, or whether water was produced afresh as a consequent to the digging operation.

e) Non-availability gives rise to doubt: A person comes to know that a certain demon dwells in a banyan tree but does not perceive the demon. The following doubt arises in his mind: Is the demon invisible or whether it does not dwell in the tree at all?

उपलब्धि–अनुपलब्ध्योः साधारणधर्मे एवान्तर्भावात् त्रीण्येव कारणानीत्यपरे । उपलब्धिर्हि सतामेव घटादीनां प्रदीपारोपणेन दृष्टा । असतां च कुलालादिव्यापारानन्तरमिति । तथाऽनुपलब्धिः सतामीश्वरादीनामसतां च शशविषणादीनां दृष्टा इति ।

upalabdhi-anupalabdhyoḥ sādhāraṇadharme evāntarbhāvāt trīṇyeva kāraṇāni ityapare | upalabdhirhi satāmeva ghaṭādīnāṃ pradīpāropaṇena dṛṣṭā | asatāṃ ca kulālādivyāpārānantaramiti | tathāsnupalabdhiḥ satāmīśvarādīnāmasatāṃ ca śaśaviṣaṇādīnāṃ dṛṣṭāiti |

Yet, others opine that the causes of doubt are the only first three aforesaid factors. The last two are included in *Sādhāraṇadharma,* the common attribute itself. The inclusion of *Upalabdhi* and *Anupalabdhi* under *Sādhāraṇadharma* arises thus: We cognize the prior existent *Satpadārtha,* the real objects like pot, cloth and other things with the help of lamp etc.; we cognize non-existent (unreal) objects after they are produced e.g., potters' pot. As we have *Upalabdhi* of the existent objects like pot and the prior non-existent objects like uncreated pots, *Upalabdhi* becomes a *Sādhāraṇadharma*, the common attribute.

About existent categories like God and time, we have no cognition. That is true also in case of non-existents like *Śaśaviṣāṇa,* the horns of a hare, or *Gaganāravinda,* a lotus in the sky. As non-cognition is found in both existent and non-existent things, *Anupalabdhi* also becomes the *Sādhāraṇadharma,* the common attribute of them all.

वयं तु ब्रूमः । असाधारणधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्योरपि साधारणधर्मे एवान्तर्भावः । असाधारणो हि धर्मो न स्वरूपेण संशयहेतुः । विशेषस्मरणकारणत्वाभावात् । किन्तु व्यावृत्तिमुखेनैव । तथा च नित्यव्यावृत्तत्वम नित्यस्य, अनित्यव्यावृत्तत्वं च नित्यस्य धर्मे इति साधारणे एव । न चैकेनैव साधारणधर्मेण भाव्यमिति नियमोऽस्ति । तथा तथा प्रतिपन्नत्वं तस्य तस्य धर्मे इति, विप्रतिपत्तिरपि साधारणी इति ।

vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ | asādhāraṇadharmavipratipattyorapi sādhāraṇadharme evā-ntarbhāvaḥ | asādhāraṇo hi dharmo na svarūpeṇa saṃśayahetuḥ | viś-eṣasmaraṇakāraṇatvābhāvāt | kintu vyāvṛttimukhenaiva | tathā ca nityavyā-vṛttatvamanityasya, anityavyāvṛttatvaṃ ca nityasya dharmaḥ iti sādhāraṇaḥ eva | na caikenaiva sādhāraṇadharmeṇa bhāvyamiti niyamosti | tathā tathā pratipannatvaṃ tasya tasya dharmaḥ iti, vipratipattirapi sādhāraṇīīti |

We (author) argue that, *Asādhāraṇadharma,* the unique property and *Vipratipatti,* the controversy are also to be brought under the category of *Sādhāraṇadharma,* the common property. It is as follows: *Asādhāraṇadharma* is not primarily instrumental in cropping up the two alternatives that give rise to doubt. It reminds us of the alternatives only through differentiation. The doubt about the permanence or impermanence of sound arises as a result of the two *Sādhāraṇadharmas* viz., *Nityavyāvṛttatva* and *Anityavyāvṛttatva. Nityavyāvṛttatva,* differentiating the eternal is *Sādhāraṇadharma*, because it is present in non-eternal objects e.g., pot, cloth, and it is found also in sound. *Anityavyāvṛttatva,* differentiating the non-eternal is also a *Sādhāraṇadharma*, for it is found in eternal objects like God and time, and also in sound. The doubt arises as follows: "Is sound *Anitya,* the non-eternal, because it has the quality *Nityavyāvṛttatva* 'differentiating the eternal' or is it eternal because it has the quality of differentiating *Anityavyāvṛttatva,* the non-eternal. Hence, two common properties cause doubt here. There is no restriction to the effect that only one *Sādhāraṇadharma* should give rise to a doubt.

Understanding things in different forms is also a common property, which is none other than *Vipratipatti, the* controversy. Hence, that is also considered *Sādhāraṇadharma.*

Viparyaya - the error

विपरीतनिश्चयो विपर्ययः । विपरीतेति सम्यङ्निश्चयव्युदासः । निश्चयः इति संशयज्ञानस्य । स च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाभासेभ्यो जायते । यथा शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमित्यादि ।

viparītaniścayo viparyayaḥ | viparīteti samyaṅniścayavyudāsaḥ | niścayaḥ iti saṃśayajñānasya | sa ca pratyakṣānumānāgamābhāsebhyo jāyate | yathā śuktikāyām idaṃ rajatamityādi |

Viparyaya, the error is when one understands something as otherwise. To avoid correct understanding, the term 'otherwise' is added. Here understanding is certainty. Hence, 'doubt' is avoided. This error arises from deficient senses, invalid reasoning, and incorrect sentences. Misunderstanding of a shell as "this is silver" etc., is an illustration of an error.

Refutation of other theories of error

अयथार्थज्ञानमेव नास्तीति प्राभाकरादयः । तन्न । अनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । 'एतावन्तं कालमहं शुक्तिकामेव रजतत्वेन प्रतिपन्नोऽस्मि' इत्युत्तरकाले परामर्शाच्च । प्रतीतं च रजतं देशान्तरे सदेवेति वैशेषिकादयः।ज्ञानस्वरूपमेवेति विज्ञानवादिनः । तत्रैव तात्कालिकमुत्पन्नं सदिति भास्करः । न सत्, न असत्, न सदसत्, किन्तु अनिवर्चनीय मेवेति मायावादिनः । 'असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभात्' इत्युत्तरकालीनानुभवाच्छुक्तिरेव अत्यन्तासद्रजतात्मना प्रतिभातीत्याचार्याः ।

ayathārthajñānameva nāstīti prābhākarādayaḥ | tanna | anubhāvasiddhatvāt | 'etāvantaṃ kālamahaṃ śuktikāmeva rajatatvena pratipanno'smi' ityuttarakāle parāmarśācca | pratītaṃ ca rajataṃ deśāntare sadeveti vaiśeṣikādayaḥ | jñānasvarūpameveti vijñānavādinaḥ | tatraiva tātkālikamutpannaṃ saditi bhāskaraḥ | na sannāsanna sadasat kintvanirvacanīyameveti māyāvādinaḥ | 'asadeva rajataṃ pratyabhāt' ityuttarakālīnānubhavācchuktireva atyantāsad-rajatātmanā pratibhātītyācāryāḥ |

The opinion of Prābhākaras is that, there is no false or erronious cognition at all. That is not true. For, false cognition is experienced by one and all. We have post-knowledge experience that "I had an illusion till now of the shell as silver". The silver cognized is existent somewhere. This is how the Vaiśeṣikas hold. Vijñānavādis, the subjective idealists describe silver as a form of idea or as mental conception. Bhāskara is of the opinion that the silver cognized is a temporary one originated there itself and that, it is real. The Māyāvādīs are of the opinion that the silver cognized is niether *Sat, the* real, nor *Asat,* the unreal, also not simultaneously *Sadasat,* the real and unreal, but it is *Anirvacanīya*, the

indeterminable, in terms of the real or the unreal. The silver cognized is absolutely non-existent and unreal – says Ācārya Śrī Madhva based on the testimony of the post-experience i.e., sublating cognition that 'it was not silver at all'. In other words, totally 'unreal silver was cognized'.

Refutation of other categories of cognition

अनध्यवसायः स्वप्नश्च अयथार्थज्ञानान्तरमस्तीति वैशेषिकाः । 'किं संज्ञकोऽयं वृक्ष' इत्यनध्यवसायः। स तु कोटीनाम् अतिबाहुल्यात् अनिर्दिष्टकोटिकः संशयः एव । वटादिव्यावृत्तिं पश्यतोऽपि पनसे, यत् 'किं संज्ञकोऽयं वृक्ष' इत्युत्पद्यते, तज्ज्ञानमेव न भवति । किन्तु संज्ञाविषयं जिज्ञासामात्रम् । स्वप्नेऽपि गजादिदर्शनं चेद्यथार्थमेव । मानसवासनाजन्यत्वात् गजादीनाम् । तेषु यद् बाह्यत्वज्ञानं, सः विपर्ययः एव । बाह्यालीप्रदेशे 'पुरुषेणानेन भवितव्यम्' इत्यूहापरनामकं सम्भावनाज्ञानम् अप्यन्यतरकोटिप्रापकप्राचुर्यनिमित्तोऽन्यतरकोटिप्रधानः संशयः एव ।

anadhyavasāyaḥ svapnaścayathārthajñānāntaramastīti vaiśeṣikāḥ | 'kiṃ saṃjñakosyaṃ vṛkṣaḥ' ityanadhyavasāyaḥ| sa tu koṭīnām atibāhulyāt anirdiṣṭakoṭikaḥ saṃśayaḥ eva | vaṭādivyāvṛttiṃ paśyatospi panase, yat 'kiṃ saṃjñakosyaṃ vṛkṣa' ityutpadyate, tajjñānameva na bhāvati | kintu saṃ-jñāviṣayaṃ jijñāsāmātram | svapnespi gajādidarśanaṃ cedyathārthameva | mānasavāsanājanyatvāt gajādīnām | teṣu yad bāhyatvajñānaṃ, saḥ viparyayaḥ eva | bāhyālīpradeśe 'puruṣeṇānena bhavitavyam' ityūhāparanāmakaṃ sam-bhāvanājñānam apyanyatarakoṭiprāpakaprācuryanimittosnyatarakoṭipradhānaḥ saṃśayaḥ eva |

The Vaiśeṣikas mention two more types of erronious cognition: a) *Anadhvasāya,* the indefinite understanding; b) *Svapna,* the dream.

However, these are not illusions. Indefinite cognition is nothing but a doubt. As it takes the form of a person while entering into a garden, desires to know the name of a particular tree and wonders what the name of a particular tree is. This type of cognition is considered as a case coming under doubt itself. For possibilities, there are a number of alternatives suggested though they all are not articulated. If we assume that the enquirer knows the names of all other trees except the one before him, which happens to be the jackfruit tree, the assumption reduces itself to a case, where we need to be reminded of the name of a particular tree. This is not at all a knowledge situation, but a desire to know the name.

In dream, the cognition of elephants etc., is a 'true-cognition'. Dream-objects are real for they are produced out of the impressions in the mind. What is unreal in a dream experience is not the object perceived, but the identification of it with the external reality to which it apparently corresponds. Some others mention another type of knowledge called *Ūhā,* the surmise. It takes the following form: We may

sometimes surmise that there must be a human being outside, when we happen to hear sound in the veranda of our house. This is classified as another form of doubt; for here, one of the alternatives is definite, when weighed against the rest.

Tarka - the counter-factual reasoning

तर्कोऽनुमानमेवेति वक्ष्यामः ।

tarko'numānameveti vakṣyāmaḥ |

We would argue in the section of inference that *Tarka,* the counter-factual reasoning is nothing but *Anumāna,* the reasoning.

Smṛti - the recollection is also *Pramāṇa*

स्मृतावतिव्यापकं प्रमाणलक्षणमिति चेन्न । तस्या अपि प्रमाणत्वेन लोकवेदयोः संव्यवहारात् ।

smṛtāvativyāpakaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇamiti cenna | tasyā api pramāṇatvena loka-vedayoḥ saṃvyavahārāt |

It is not correct to counter that the definition of *Pramāṇa,* the truth is over-pervasive in *Smṛti,* the recollection. In fact, *Smṛti* is also considered as a kind of *Pramāṇa* in the Vedas as well as in other testimonies.

Refutation of definition of *Pramāṇa* of Mīmāṃsaka

अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम् । स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानमनुभूतिरिति प्राभाकराणां लक्षणम् । संशय-विपर्ययव्यापकत्वात् स्मृतौ, वेदादिषु च यथार्थज्ञानसाधनेष्वव्यापकत्वाच्च अयुक्तम् । ज्ञातताप्राकट्यापरपर्यायवाच्यस्य प्रमेयाश्रितस्य प्रकाशविशेषस्य साधनं क्रियाज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति भाट्टानां लक्षणमप्ययुक्तम् । ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तायां ज्ञाततायां प्रमाणाभावेनासम्भवितत्वात् । अतीतादिविषयज्ञानानामाश्रयाभावेन तज्जनकत्वायोगाच्च, वेदादिष्वव्याप्तेश्च । अनधिगततथा-भूतार्थज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति तेषामेव लक्षणान्तरमप्ययुक्तं, स्मृतौ वेदादिषु चाव्याप्तेः ।

anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam | smṛtivyatiriktaṃ jñānamanubhūtiriti prābhākarāṇāṃ lakṣaṇam | saṃśayaviparyayavyāpakatvāt smṛtau, vedādiṣu ca yathārtha-jñānasādhaneṣvavyāpakatvāccaayuktam | jñātatāprākaṭyāparaparyāyavācyasya prameyāśritasya prakāśaviśeṣasya sādhanaṃ kriyājñānaṃ pramāṇamiti bhāṭṭānāṃ lakṣaṇamapyayuktam | jñānavyatiriktāyāṃ jñātatāyāṃ pramā-ṇābhāvenāsam-bhavitatvāt | atītādiviṣayajñānānāmāśrayābhāvena taj-janakatvāyogācca, vedā-diṣvavyāpteśca | anadhigatatathābhūtārthajñānaṃ pramāṇamiti teṣāmeva lakṣa-ṇāntaramapyayuktaṃ, smṛtau vedādiṣu cāvyāpteḥ |

Prābhākara defines *Pramāṇa* as follows: Experience is *Pramā,* the knowledge or true cognition; and experience is cognition other than recollection. This definition is over-pervasive in 'doubt' and 'error'; if they are also kinds of experiences. The definition is also under-pervasive; for, it excludes memory and Vedas from its scope. The Bhāṭṭa school defines *Pramāṇa* as an action of knowledge, which is instrumental in enabling things to be perceived with the generation of *Prakāśaviśeṣa,* the special luminosity property of being known that is present in the object known. This definition is criticized as follows: The special luminosity other than knowledge event, which the Bhāṭṭas admit does not have any evidence. Moreover, the cognitions of past and future objects cannot generate such a special property, as there are no object-locations to generate. The definition of the Bhāṭṭas does not cover Veda too. Hence, this definition is not a proper one.

They have formulated another definition of *Pramāṇa* as follows: The true cognition of unforeseen or unknown object is *Pramāṇa.* This definition also does not hold good. For, it does not cover *Smṛti* and Veda. *Smṛti,* the recollection is a cognition that grasps known objects only, and Vedas do not come under the category of knowledge, as they are *Śabda.*

Criticism of definition of *Pramāṇa* of Nyāya

सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणमिति नैयायिकादयः । तदप्यसत् । यथार्थज्ञानेऽव्याप्तेः । प्रमाव्याप्तं प्रमाणमित्युदयनः । तदपि सर्वस्यापि प्रमेयस्य ईश्वरप्रमाव्याप्तत्वेनातिव्यापकत्वात् अयुक्तम् । साधनाश्रययोरन्यतरत्वे सति, प्रमाव्याप्तत्वं विवक्षितमिति चेन्न । आश्रयग्रहणवैयर्थ्यात् । ईश्वरस्यापि प्रामाण्यसिध्यर्थं तदिति चेन्न । कर्तरि प्रमाणशब्दस्याननुशासनात् । यथार्थज्ञानेष्वव्याप्तेश्च । तस्माद्याथार्थ्यमेव प्रमाणलक्षणं युक्तम् ।

samyaganubhāvasādhanaṃ pramāṇamiti naiyāyikādayaḥ | tadapyasat | ya-thārthajñāneṣvyāpteḥ | pramāvyāptaṃ pramāṇamityudayanaḥ | tadapi sarvasyāpi prameyasya īśvarapramāvyāptatvenātivyāpakatvāt ayuktam | sā-dhanāśrayayoranyataratve sati, pramāvyāptatvaṃ vivakṣitamiti cenna | āś-rayagrahaṇavaiyarthyāt | īśvarasyāpi prāmāṇyasidhyarthaṃ taditi cenna | kar-tari pramāṇaśabdasyānanuśāsanāt | yathārthajñāneṣvavyāpteśca | tasmādy-āthārthyameva pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ yuktam |

Naiyyākas say that *Pramāṇa* is an instrument of true experience. That is not correct, as this definition does not cover the true cognition itself, which is not an instrument.

According to Udayana, *Pramāṇa* is a thing, which is pervaded by *Pramā*, the true experience. This definition is not correct either, for it is too wide by extra coverage of all *Prameyas*, the objects that are pervaded by the knowledge of God. In case the definition is altered by adding an adjective that being either duo of instrument or locus for knowledge is *Pramāṇa*, still it does not hold well as the term 'locus' is useless. In case it is to confirm the truthfulness of God, it is not proper, as nowhere is a knower termed by the word *Pramāṇa*. Moreover, it excludes knowledge, which is *Pramāṇa*. For knowledge is neither an instrument for knowledge, nor is it a locus. Therefore, being true or in correspondence with the reality is the proper definition of *Pramāṇa*.

Division of *Pramāṇa*

द्विविधं प्रमाणं, केवलम् अनुप्रमाणं चेति ।

dvividhaṃ pramāṇaṃ, kevalamanupramāṇaṃ ceti |

Pramāṇa is of two kinds – viz. *Kevalapramāṇa, the* primary proof and *Anupramāṇa*, the secondary proof.

Kevalapramāṇa – a detailed account

तत्र यथार्थज्ञानं केवलप्रमाणम् । यथार्थमिति संशयादिव्युदासः । ज्ञानमिति प्रत्यक्षस्य । लिङ्गज्ञानं वाक्यज्ञानं च, लिङ्गिनि वाक्यार्थे चानुप्रमाणमपि, लिङ्गे वाक्ये च केवलप्रमाणमिति नातिव्याप्तिः। इदं च साक्षाज्ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वात् केवलम् इत्युच्यते ।

tatra yathārthajñānaṃ kevalapramāṇam | yathārthamiti saṃśayādivyudāsaḥ | jñānamiti pratyakṣasya | liṅgajñānaṃ vākyajñānaṃ ca, liṅgini vākyārthe cā-nupramāṇamapi, liṅge vākye ca kevalapramāṇamiti nātivyāptiḥ | idaṃ ca sā-kṣājjñeyaviṣayīkāritvāt kevalam ityucyate |

True cognition or knowledge is called *Kevalapramāṇa*. The term 'true' is used to avoid doubt etc., and 'cognition' is used to exclude the senses, the instruments..

The cognition of reason and the cognition of sentence are of course instruments in the generation of conclusion of *Sādhya*, the probandum, and in the generation of verbal cognition. Hence, they are *Anupramāṇas*. However, in respect of reason and sentential meaning, they are *Kevalapramāṇas*, the primary evidences only. Therefore, there will not be any scope for over-pervasion for the definition of *Kevalapramāṇa* in *Anupramāṇa*. This is called *Kevalapramāṇa* as it directly cognizes the objects.

तच्च चतुर्विधम् । ईश्वरज्ञानं, लक्ष्मीज्ञानं, योगिज्ञानं, अयोगिज्ञानं चेति । तत्र सर्वार्थविषयकमीश्वरज्ञन। नियमेन यथार्थम् । तत्स्वरूपमनादिनित्यम् । स्वतन्त्रम् । निरतिशयस्पष्टं च ।

tacca caturvidham | īśvarajñānaṃ, lakṣmījñānaṃ, yogījñānaṃ, ayogījñānaṃ ceti | tatra sarvārthaviṣayakamīśvarajñanam | niyamena yathārtham | tatsvarūpam-anādinityam | svatantram | niratiśayaspaṣṭaṃ ca |

This *Kevalapramāṇa* is of four kinds; a) knowledge of Īśvara the God b) knowledge of Lakṣmī c) knowledge of Yogīs and d) knowledge of non-Yogīs.

The knowledge of God objectifies everything. It is always true. It is God's nature and has no beginning and no end. It is independent and self-subsisting and it is remarkably clear.

ईश्वरे त्वसार्वत्रिकम्, अन्यत्रानालोचनेऽपि सर्वविषयं लक्ष्मीज्ञानम् । तदपि नियमेन यथार्थम् । तत्स्वरूपमनादि नित्यं च । ईश्वरैकाधीनम् । तदपेक्षया स्पष्टत्वे न्यूनम् । स्पष्टत्वं चापरोक्षत्ववज्ज्ञानगत एव विशेषो, न विषयौपाधिकः ।

īśvare tvasārvatrikam, anyatrānālocaneśpi sarvaviṣayaṃ lakṣmījñānam | tadapi niyamena yathārtham | tatsvarūpamanādi nityaṃ ca | īśvaraikādhīnam | tada-pekṣayā spaṣṭatve nyūnam | spaṣṭatvaṃ cāparokṣatvavajjñānagata eva viśeṣo, na viṣayaupādhikaḥ |

Knowledge of Lakṣmī is limited in the case of God, but captures everything other than God without any special attention. This is always true. It is of the self-form and has neither the beginning nor the end. This is dependent only on God. It is not as clear as the knowledge of God. The clarity is a property of knowledge like being direct-perception is not conditioned by objects.

योगप्रभावलब्धातिशयं योगिज्ञानम् । तत् त्रिविधम् । ऋजुयोगिज्ञानं, तात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानं अतात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानं चेति । ऋजवो नाम ब्रह्मत्वयोग्या जीवाः । ईश्वरादन्यत्र आलोचने सर्वविषयं तज्ज्ञानम् । ईश्वरे तु असार्वत्रिकमेव । तद् द्विविधम् । स्वरूपं, मनोवृत्तिरूपं चेति । तत्र स्वरूपम् अनादिनित्यम् । योगप्रभावादामुक्तेः व्यक्त्यतिशयोपेतम् । मुक्तावेकप्रकारम् । वृत्तिज्ञानं तु प्रवाहतोऽनादि । योगानुगृहीतप्रत्यक्षादिजन्यम् । मुक्तौ तु नास्त्येव । द्वयमपि नियमेन यथार्थम् । ईश्वरे तु अन्यजीवेभ्योऽधिकविषयम् ।

yogaprabhāvalabdhātiśayaṃ yogījñānam | tat trividham | ṛjuyogījñānaṃ, tāttvikayogījñānaṃ atāttvikayogījñānaṃ ceti | ṛjavo nāma brahmatvayogyā jīvāḥ | īśvarādanyatra ālocane sarvaviṣayaṃ tajjñānam | īśvare tu asārvatrikameva | tad dvividham | svarūpaṃ,

manovṛttirūpaṃ ceti | tatra svarūpam anādinityam | yogaprabhāvādāmukteḥ vyaktyatiśayopetam | muktāvekaprakāram | vṛttijñānaṃ tu pravāhatoऽnādi | yogānugṛhītapratyakṣādijanyam | muktau tu nāstyeva | dvayamapi niyamena yathārtham | īśvare tu anyajīvebhyoऽdhikaviṣayam |

The knowledge of Yogī is caused by the power of *Yoga*. It is of three kinds; knowledge of Ṛjuyogī, knowledge of Tātvikayogī and knowledge of Atātvikayogī. Ṛjuyogīs are those souls who are eligible to attain the post of Caturmukha Brahmā. Their knowledge is capable of covering everything with some attention. However, it is limited to the knowledge of God.

Knowledge of Yogīs is of two kinds; nature of self (internal) and modification of mind (external). The first category is eternal. Due to the power of *Yoga*, it gets evolved till the final release of bondage. In the state of salvation, it is constant. The latter kind of knowledge (mind-modification) has no beginning like the current of a river. It arises by the perceptive senses with the aid of yogic power. It ceases to be in the state of salvation. Both kinds are true always. They know more about God than the other souls.

तदतिरिक्ताः तत्त्वाभिमानिनो देवाः तात्त्विकाः । अनादित्वे सति, ईश्वरादन्यत्रालोचनेऽपि असर्वविषयं तज्ज्ञानम् । तदपि स्वरूपं, बाह्यं चेति द्विविधम् । तस्यानादित्वं पूर्ववत् । स्वरूपं यथार्थमेव । बाह्यं कदाचिदयथार्थमपि ।

tadatiriktāstattvābhimānino devāḥ tāttvikāḥ | anāditve sati, īśvarādanyatr-ālocaneऽpi asarvaviṣayaṃ tajjñānam | tadapi svarūpaṃ, bāhyaṃ ceti dvividham | tasyānāditvaṃ pūrvavat | svarūpaṃ yathārthameva | bāhyaṃ kadācid ayathārthamapi |

The Tatvābhimāni deities other than these Ṛjus are called Tātvikas. Their knowledge has no beginning, but limited even in the case other than God when contemplated. It is of two kinds; internal and external. Internal is of self-nature and eternal. It is always true. However, the external (mind-modification) knowledge, which is temporal, may sometimes go wrong (false).

तद्व्यतिरिक्ता देवादयो योगिनोऽतात्त्विकाः । सादित्वे सति ईश्वरादन्यत्र, अल्पाज्ञानयुक्तं तज्ज्ञानम् । तदपि पूर्ववद् द्विविधम् । तत्र स्वरूपस्य सादित्वं व्यक्त्यपेक्षया । अन्यस्य प्रवाहोत्पत्त्यपेक्षया। याथार्थ्यनियमादि पूर्ववत् ।

tadvyatiriktā devādayo yogīnoऽtāttvikāḥ | sāditve sati īśvarādanyatra, alpājñ-ānayuktaṃ tajjñānam | tadapi pūrvavad dvividham | tatra svarūpasya sāditvaṃ vyaktyapekṣayā | anyasya pravāhotpattyapekṣayā | yāthārthyaniyamādi pūrva-vat |

The deities and others other than these are Tātvikayogīs are Atātvikayogīs. Their knowledge has a beginning; it comprehends objects other than God with little ignorance. It is also of two types as in previous cases. Though the self-knowledge is eternal, the beginning is admitted with respect to the manifestation of the same. The second type of knowledge is continuous like the flow of river. This can be sometimes false as well.

तद्व्यतिरिक्ता जीवा अयोगिनः । ईश्वरादन्यत्र अज्ञानप्रचुरं तज्ज्ञानम् । तदपि पूर्ववत् द्विविधम् । उत्पत्तिविनाशवच्च । अयोगिनोऽपि त्रिविधाः । मुक्तियोग्याः, नित्यसंसारिणः, तमोयोग्याश्चेति । तत्र मुक्तियोग्यानां स्वरूपज्ञानं यथार्थमेव । नित्यसंसारिणां तु मिश्रम् । अन्येषामयथार्थमेव । बाह्यं तु त्रयाणामप्युभयविधमिति ।

tadvyatiriktā jīvā ayogīnaḥ | īśvarādanyatra ajñānapracuraṃ tajjñānam | tadapi pūrvavat dvividham | utpattivināśavacca | ayogīnospi trividhāḥ | muktiyogyāḥ, nityasaṃsāriṇaḥ, tamoyogyāśceti | tatra muktiyogyānāṃ svarūpajñānaṃ yathārthameva | nityasaṃsāriṇāṃ tu miśram | anyeṣāmayathārthameva | bāhyaṃ tu trayāṇāmapyubhayavidhamiti |

The souls other than Tātvika and Atātvika Yogīs are non-Yogīs. Their cognition is dominated by ignorance even in case of objects other than God. It is also of two kinds. It has creation and destruction. These non-Yogīs are of three kinds; *Muktiyogya*, the fit for salvation, *Nityasamsārī*, the ever-bounded, and *Tamoyogya*, the fit for dark-hell. Among them, those fit for salvation would possess true-self-knowledge. Understanding of ever-bounded souls would be mixed in nature. The cognition of the rest is completely false. This is the state of internal cognition. The external cognition of all these three categories is of mixed nature – sometimes true and sometimes false.

Refutation of other classification of knowledge

इन्द्रियजं लिङ्गजं स्मृतिरार्षं चेति चतुर्विधं यथार्थज्ञानमिति वैशेषिकाः । तदसत् । नित्यस्यागजन्यस्य चासङ्ग्रहात् । स्मृतेरिन्द्रियजत्वेन, आर्षस्य योगिज्ञानत्वेन च पृथग्ग्रहणायोगाच्च।

indriyajaṃ liṅgajaṃ smṛtirārṣaṃ ceti caturvidhaṃ yathārthajñānamiti vaiśeṣikāḥ | tadasat | nityasyāgamajanyasya cāsaṅgrahāt | smṛterindriyajatvena, ārṣasya yogījñānatvena ca pṛthaggrahaṇāyogācca |

The Vaiśeṣikas admit that knowledge is of four kinds; perception (cognition generated by sense organs), inference (cognition by reasoning), recollection and the supernormal perception (cognition by yogic power). This stand does not hold

good. For, the cognition generated by Vedas is not counted here. The recollection is nothing but an experience generated by senses. Similar is the case of the last one.

Definition of *Anupramāṇa*

यथार्थज्ञानसाधनमनुप्रमाणम् । यथार्थमित्येवोक्ते केवलेऽतिव्याप्तिः । ज्ञानत्येिवोक्ते तत्र, संशयादौ च। प्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिश्च । साधनमित्येवोक्ते कुठारादवतिव्याप्तिः । यथार्थज्ञानमित्युक्ते केवलेऽतिव्याप्तिः, प्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिश्च । यथार्थसाधनमित्युक्ते प्रत्यक्षसाधनेऽतिव्याप्तिः । ज्ञानसाधनमित्युक्ते संशयादिसाधनेऽतिव्याप्तिः । यथार्थज्ञानकारणमित्युक्ते प्रमात्रादावतिव्याप्तिरिति सर्वं सार्थकम् । यज्जातीयानन्तरं नियमेन कार्योत्पत्तिस्तदत्र साधनं विवक्षितम् । अतो न यादृच्छिकसंवादिष्वतिव्याप्तिः ।

yathārthajñānasādhanamanupramāṇam | yathārthamityevokte kevalesti-vyāptiḥ | jñānamityevokte tatra, saṃśayādau ca | pratyakṣesvyāptiśca | sādhanamityevokte kuṭhārādavativyāptiḥ | yathārthajñānamityukte kevales tivyāptiḥ, pratyakṣesvyāptiśca | yathārthasādhanamityukte pratyakṣasādhanes tivyāptiḥ | jñānasādhanamityukte saṃśayādisādhanestivyāptiḥ | yathārtha-jñānakāraṇamityukte pramātrādāvativyāptiriti sarvaṃ sārthakam | yajjātīyā-nantaraṃ niyamena kāryotpattistadatra sādhanaṃ vivakṣitam | ato na yādṛcchikasaṃvādiṣvativyāptiḥ |

The *Anupramāṇa,* the secondary proof is defined as instrument of true cognition or knowledge. In the definition *yathārthajñānasādhanam*, the word *Yathārtha,* the true will not suffice as the definition will be over-pervasive in *Kevalapramāṇa,* the primary proof. If the word cognition is considered as simple definition, then, the definition goes in undue cognition like doubt etc., and the definition does not cover the instruments for cognition. The instruments like axe etc. might also be pervaded in case definition is limited to a single word instrument. If it is altered by addition of the word – *Yathārtha,* the true, the definition becomes the instrument for true cognition. Then, the definition is over-pervasive in the instruments of perception. In case we define it as *yathārthajñāna* meaning the true cognition, it will not cover the instruments of knowledge that are to be defined and will cover the primary true perception, which is not to be defined. If it is defined as instrument of cognition, it will be over pervasive in instruments of doubt etc. Even if we define it as *yathārthajñānakaraṇam* meaning the cause of true cognition, it will lead to over-pervasion again in the knower and objects. Hence, no word in the said definition is useless. Here, in the definition *yathārthajñānasādhanam,* the instrument for true cognition, the word *Sādhanam,* the instrument is used in a technical sense as follows: *Sādhana* is a special type of cause without which

the effect will not come into existence and whose presence or function invariably leads to the production of the effect. This definition of *Sādhana* rules out the problem of over-pervasion in accidental validity.

Justification for usage of the word *Pramāṇa*

ननु त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिति वक्तव्यम् । ल्युटोऽधिकरणेऽप्यनुशासनात् । सत्यम् । तथाऽपि प्रमाणशब्दस्याधिकरणे प्रयोगाभावात् तदसङ्ग्रहः । तथाऽपि प्रमाणशब्दः भावसाधनः करणसाधनश्चेत्यनेकार्थः । तत्र किमनुगतलक्षणकथनेनेति । उच्यते । नायमक्षादिशब्दवत् अत्यन्तभिन्नार्थः। किन्तु धात्वर्थानुगमस्तूभयत्र समः इति, एकार्थत्वम् आश्रित्य, अनुगतलक्षणोक्तिरित्यदोषः ।

nanu trividhaṃ pramāṇamiti vaktavyam | lyuṭoऽdhikaraṇeऽpyanuśāsanāt | satyam| tathāऽpi pramāṇaśabdasyādhikaraṇe prayogābhāvāt tadasaṅgrahaḥ | tathāऽpi pramāṇaśabdaḥ bhāvasādhanaḥ karaṇasādhanaścetyanekārthaḥ | tatra kimanugatalakṣaṇakathaneneti | ucyate | nāyamakṣādiśabdavadatyantabhinnārthaḥ | kintu dhātvarthānugamastūbhayatra samaḥ iti, ekārthatvam āśritya, anugatalakṣaṇoktirityadoṣaḥ |

Objection: You must admit that there are three types of *Pramāṇas* and not two as mentioned earlier, for, the *Lyuṭ* suffix in the word *Pramāṇam*, takes three different meanings. The meanings of the root are; a) *Bhāva,* the cognition, b) *Karaṇa,* the instrument and c) *Adhikaraṇa,* the substratum.

Response: Yes, the usage evidences only two meanings of the term as here it is not used in the sense of substratum, though grammar approves the third meaning of the term. Hence, the third meaning substratum is not considered for classification.

Objection: However, as we stated, the term *Pramāṇa* has two meanings such as *Pramā,* the knowledge and *Pramāsādhana,* the instrument of knowledge. In this case, what is the use of stating a common definition?

Response: This term is not of two totally different, unrelated meanings like the term *Akṣa* having many distinct meanings. But, the meaning of the root is common in both the senses. Therefore, the common definition is presented on the basis of the common and single root meaning.

Classification of *Anupramāṇa*

त्रिविधमनुप्रमाणम् । प्रत्यक्षम्, अनुमानम्, आगमश्चेति ।

trividhamanupramāṇam | pratyakṣam, anumānam, āgamaśceti |

Anupramāṇa, the instrumental or secondary proof is of three kinds; *Pratyakṣa*, the sense organ, *Anumānam*, the reason or the inference, and *Śabda*, the verbal testimony.

Section on perception

Description of *Pratyakṣa*

तत्र निर्दोषार्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षम् । अर्थशब्देन इन्द्रियविषया गृह्यन्ते । तेषां दोषाः अतिदूरत्वम्, अतिसामीप्यं, सौक्ष्म्यं, व्यवधानं, समानद्रव्याभिघातः, अनभिव्यक्तत्वं, सादृश्यं चेत्यादयः । तेषु सत्सु क्वचिज्ज्ञानमेव न जायते । क्वचिद्विपरीतज्ञानमुत्पद्यते ।

tatra nirdoṣārthendriyasannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣam | arthaśabdenaindriyaviṣayā gṛhyante | teṣāṃ doṣāḥ atidūratvam, atisāmīpyaṃ, saukṣmyaṃ, vyavadhānaṃ, samānadravyābhighātaḥ, anabhivyaktatvaṃ, sādṛśyaṃ cetyādayaḥ | teṣu satsu kvacijjñānameva na jāyate | kvacidviparītajñānamutpadyate |

Pratyakṣa is defined as the contact of a defectless sense organ with a defectless object. The word 'object' in the definition denotes objects that can be perceived by the senses. The defects of the objects are as follows; being too distant, being in extreme proximity, being very minute, being obstructed, being indistinguishably mixed with similar objects, being non-manifested, and being similar to several objects and so on. These defects prevent us from knowing the object and sometimes give rise to distorted view of the object.

Two types of senses

इन्द्रियशब्देन ज्ञानेन्द्रियं गृह्यते । तद् द्विविधम् । प्रमातृस्वरूपं प्राकृतं चेति ।

indriyaśabdena jñānendriyaṃ gṛhyate | tad dvividham | pramātṛsvarūpaṃ prākṛtaṃ ceti |

In this context, *Indriya* means the sensory organ. This is of two types; one is *Svarūpa*, the internal sense of knower and the other being *Prākṛta*, the external sense.

Sākṣī – the seventh sense

तत्र स्वरूपेन्द्रियं साक्षी इत्युच्यते । तस्य विषया आत्मस्वरूपं, तद्धर्मा, अविद्या, मनः, तद्वृत्तयो, बाह्येन्द्रियज्ञानसुखाद्याः, कालः, अव्याकृताकाशश्चेत्याद्याः । स च स्वरूपज्ञानमभिव्यनक्ति ।

tatra svarūpendriyaṃ sākṣīityucyate | tasya viṣayā ātmasvarūpaṃ, tad-dharmā, avidyā, manaḥ, tadvṛttayo, bāhyendriyajñānasukhādyāḥ, kālaḥ, avyākṛt-ākāśaścetyādyāḥ | sa ca svarūpajñānamabhivyanakti |

There *Svarupendriya*, the inner-self-sense is called *Sākṣī*, the direct-knower, the self-conscious. The objects of *Sākṣī* are the very existence of self, its properties, and *Avidyā*, the nescience, *Manas*, the mind - the sixth sense, its modifications, external cognitions, and pleasure etc., qualities, time, space and so on. This *Sākṣī* manifests self-consciousness.

External senses

प्राकृतं षड्विधम् । घ्राण–रसन–चक्षुः–त्वक्–श्रोत्र–मनो–भेदात् । तत्र गन्धः, तद्विशेषाश्च घ्राणस्य विषयाः । रसः, तद्विशेषाश्च रसनस्य । महान्ति रूपवन्ति द्रव्याणि, केचिद् गुणाः, कर्माणि, जातयश्च चक्षुस्त्वचोः । वायुस्पर्शोऽपि त्वचो विषयः । शब्दः श्रोत्रस्य । एतेषां पञ्चानां मनोऽनधिष्ठितत्वं, काचकामलादयश्च दोषाः । मनसस्तु बाह्येन्द्रियाधिष्ठानेनैते सर्वे विषयाः । स्वातन्त्र्येण स्मरणसाधनं मनः । तस्य दोषा रागादयः ।

prākṛtaṃ ṣaḍvidham | ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣuḥ-tvak-śrotra-mano-bhedāt | tatra gandhaḥ, tadviśeṣāśca ghrāṇasya viṣayāḥ | rasaḥ, tadviśeṣāśca rasanasya | mahānti rūpavanti dravyāṇi, kecid guṇāḥ, karmāṇi, jātayaśca cakṣustvacoḥ | vāyusparśo'pi tvaco viṣayaḥ | śabdaḥ śrotrasya | eteṣāṃ pañcānāṃ mano'nadhiṣṭhitatvaṃ, kācakāmalādayaśca doṣāḥ | manasastu bāhyendriyādhiṣṭhānenaite sarve viṣayāḥ | svātantryeṇa smaraṇasādhanaṃ manaḥ | tasya doṣā rāgādayaḥ |

Prākṛtendriya, the external senses are six in number. They are the organs of smell, taste, touch, sight, sound, and the mind. The sense of smell inhales the different types of odours; the sense of taste, which tastes the six primary tastes, the sense of touch and sense of sight, which perceive the following objects, a) objects that have size and colour b) some qualities c) action and d) universals. The sense of touch feels the touch of air too. The sense of hearing grasps sound. The defects of the sense organs are; lack of contact between the senses and the mind and infection of the senses, such as jaundice to eye or similar ones to others. Mind perceives all the objects through the mediation of the sense organs. It causes the *Smṛti*, the recollection independently. Attachment, hatred etc., are the defects of the mind.

Debate on the validity of *Smṛti* - the recollection

ननु स्मृतेर्याथार्थ्यमेव नास्ति । न हि यदा यादृशोऽर्थः स्मर्यते, तदाऽसौ तादृशः । पूर्वावस्थाया निवृत्तत्वादिति चेन्न । यतो ज्ञानकाले वस्तुनस्तथात्वं याथार्थ्योपयुक्तं न भवति । किन्तु यद्देशकालसम्बन्धितया यद्वस्तु ज्ञानेन यादृशं गृह्यते, तद्देशकालयोस्तस्य तथात्वम् । स्मृतिश्च तत्र तदाऽसौ तादृश इति गृह्णाति । न च तत्र तदाऽसौ न तादृशः । ननु पूर्वानुभवजनितसंस्कारः स्मृतिकारणम् । स चानुभूतविषये एव स्मृतिजननस्येष्टे । न चानुभवेन निवृत्तपूर्वावस्थतयाऽर्थो

गृहीत: । तत्कथमनुभवसमानविषयसंस्कारजन्या स्मृतिरर्थे निवृत्तपूर्वावस्थतया विषयीकुर्यादिति । मैवम् ।

भवेदेतदेवं यदि संस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वं स्मृतेरभ्युपगच्छाम: । न चैवम् । मनोजन्या स्मृति:। संस्कारस्तु मनस: तदर्थसन्निकर्षरूप एव । यथा योगीन्द्रियाणां योगजो धर्म: । ततश्च संस्कारसहकृतं मनोऽननुभूतामपि निवृत्तपूर्वावस्थां विषयीकुर्वत्स्मरणं जनयेदिति को दोष:? वर्तमानम त्रविषयाण्यपीन्द्रियाणि सहकारिसामर्थ्यात् कालान्तरसम्बन्धितामपि गोचरयन्ति । यथा संस्कारसहकृतानि सोऽयमित्यतीतवर्तमानत्वविशिष्टविषयप्रत्यभिज्ञासाधनानि ।

nanu smṛteryāthārthyameva nāsti | na hi yadā yādṛśoऽrthaḥ smaryate, tadāऽsau tādṛśaḥ | pūrvāvasthāyā nivṛttatvāditi cenna | yato jñānakāle vastunastathātvaṃ yāthārthyopayuktaṃ na bhāvati | kintu yaddeśakālasambandhitayā yad-vastu jñānena yādṛśaṃ gṛhyate, taddeśakālayostasya tathātvam | smṛtiśca tatra tadāऽsau tādṛśa iti gṛhṇāti | na ca tatra tadāऽsau na tādṛśaḥ | nanu pūrvānubhāvajanitasaṃskāraḥ smṛtikāraṇam | sa cānubhūtaviṣaye eva smṛtijananasyeṣṭe | na cānubhavena nivṛttapūrvāvasthatayāऽrtho gṛhītaḥ | tatkathamanubhāvasamānaviṣayasaṃskārajanyā smṛtirarthe nivṛttapūrvāvasthatayā viṣayīkuryāditi | maivam|

bhavedetadevaṃ yadi saṃskāramātrajanyatvaṃ smṛterabhyupagacchāmaḥ | na caivam | manojanyā smṛtiḥ | saṃskārastu manasaḥ tadarthasannikarṣa-rūpa eva | yathā yogīndriyāṇāṃ yogajo dharmaḥ | tataśca saṃskārasahakṛtaṃ manoऽnanubhūtāmapi nivṛttapūrvāvasthāṃ viṣayīkurvatsmaraṇaṃ janayediti ko doṣaḥ? vartamānamātraviṣayāṇyapīndriyāṇi sahakārisāmarthyāt kālāntarasambandhitāmapi gocarayanti | yathā saṃskārasahakṛtāni soऽyamityatī tavartamānatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayapratyabhijñāsādhanāni |

Objection: It is argued that recollection is not true on the following grounds. When we recollect an object, it will not be qualified with the same spatial and temporal attributes as it was, while first cognized, for the simple reason, that the previous status of the object does not continue as the spatial and the temporal moments are no longer present during the recollection.

Response: This contention is rejected as follows. The truth of cognition is not conditioned by the status of the object during the moment of the cognition. The correspondence with reality with reference to the time and space of the cognition is not at all responsible for the truth of the cognition. But, the truth of the cognition is conditioned by the correspondence to reality with reference to time, space and attributes of the object, with reference to which it was cognized. The memory takes the object with reference to the time of the cognition in the

form that "the object was like that". Still, it is not the case that it was not what it was during the time of cognition.

Objection: Memory is caused by the impressions or traces of some previous experiences. Hence, only experienced events become objects of the memory. During the experience, the past status of the objects was not cognized. How is then the memory, which can only objectify the experienced state of the object, can grasp the past state of the object?

Response: Had we granted the fact that recollection is caused solely by the impressions of the past experience, this contention might have been admissible. Recollection or memory is caused by the mind; not by impressions. The impressions would just establish the contact between the mind and the objects. Analogy of the yogic power that helps the sense organs to cause the super-natural-experiences of the past and future can be taken here. Thus, it is acceptable for the mind with the aid of impressions to perceive the unforeseen state of the objects and cause the memory of the same. This might perceive the inexperienced state of the objects and causes the memory of the same. Though the sense organs are capable of grasping only present objects, they can even cognize the different time reference when they are supported by some special auxiliaries. For e.g., the sense of sight recognizes an object with reference to some experienced time and space, when it is aided by the memory traces.

Discussion on definition of perception

प्राकृतेन्द्रियाणि मनोवृत्तिज्ञानं जनयन्ति । तत्र सन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्ते घटपटसन्निकर्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः। इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्ते चक्षुराकाशसन्निकर्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः । अर्थसन्निकर्ष इत्युक्ते पूर्ववदतिव्याप्तिः । दुष्टार्थानां दुष्टेन्द्रियैर्वा सन्निकर्षं व्यावर्तयितुमुभयत्र निर्दोषग्रहणम् ।

prākṛtendriyāṇi manovṛttijñānaṃ janayanti | tatra sannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣamityukte ghaṭapaṭasannikarṣestivyāptiḥ | indriyasannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣamityukte cakṣurākāśa-sannikarṣestivyāptiḥ | arthasannikarṣa ityukte pūrvavadativyāptiḥ | duṣṭārthānāṃ duṣṭendriyairvā sannikarṣaṃ vyāvartayitumubhayatra nirdoṣagrahaṇam |

The external senses generate the cognition which is nothing but transformation of mind. Here in the definition of *Pratyakṣa,* the perception i.e., *Nirdoṣārthendriyasannikarṣa*, which means that the defect-less contact between senses and objects is the perception. If we define perception as merely contact, the definition will be over-pervasive in a contact, which exists between a pot and a cloth. If we define it as the contact of the sense organ, it will be wide in

respect of the contact of the eye and the space. If we define it as the contact of the object, it will be wide in respect of the contacts, that exist between pot and other objects. In order to secure the exclusions of the defective senses and defective objects the word *Nirdoṣa,* the defectless is used. The word *Nirdoṣa,* the defectless refers to both, the objects and sense organs that are free from any kind of defects.

Discussion on perception as an instrument

ननु प्रत्यक्षं करणविशेषः । करणस्य चावान्तरव्यापारेण भवितव्यम् । यथा छिदाकरणस्य परशोर्दारुसंयोगोऽवान्तरव्यापारः । सत्यम् । अत्रापीन्द्रियं करणधर्मि । तस्यार्थसन्निकर्षोऽवान्तरव्यापारः। तत्रावान्तरव्यापारप्राधान्यविवक्षयाऽर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते । क्वचित्तु धर्मिप्राधान्यविवक्षया स्वस्वविषयसन्निकृष्टमिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते । स्वरूपेन्द्रियस्यापि आत्मतद्धर्मैः विशेषशक्त्या सन्निकर्षोऽस्त्येव ।

nanu pratyakṣaṃ karaṇaviśeṣaḥ | karaṇasya cāvāntaravyāpāreṇa bhavitavyam | yathā chidākaraṇasya paraśordārusaṃyogosvāntaravyāpāraḥ | satyam| atrāpīndriyaṃ karaṇadharmi | tasyārthasannikarṣosvāntaravyāpāraḥ | tatrāvāntaravyāpāraprādhānyavivakṣayāsrthendriyasannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣam iti ucyate | kvacittu dharmiprādhānyavivakṣayā svasvaviṣayasannikṛṣṭamindriyaṃ pratyakṣamityucyate | svarūpendriyasyāpi ātmataddharmaiḥ viśeṣaśaktyā sannikarṣosstyeva |

Objection: *Pratyakṣa* is *Karaṇa* an instrument. Every instrument must have an operation, resulting in the production of an effect. For example, the axe that splits the wood is *Karaṇa*, an instrument for cutting. The contact that the axe establishes with the wood by force is called medieval operation that is called *Avantaravyāpāra.*

Response: In this process, the sense organ is the main instrument. The contact between the sense and the object is *Vyāpāra,* the function. The definition of perception as the defectless contact of a sense organ with a defectless object emphasizes this part of the function (*Vyāpāra*). The other definition of perception i.e., *Pratyakṣa* is the sense organ, which is in contact with the respective objects, *Akṣam Pratyakṣam* emphasises the *Karaṇa* the main instrument aspect of the perceptual process.

ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षं, लक्ष्मीप्रत्यक्षं, योगिप्रत्यक्षम्, अयोगिप्रत्यक्षं चेति चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्राद्यद्वयं स्वरूपेन्द्रियात्मकमेव । उत्तरद्वयं तु द्विविधेन्द्रियात्मकम् । विषयस्तु तत्तज्ज्ञानविषयवत् विवेक्तव्यः ।

īśvarapratyakṣaṃ, lakṣmīpratyakṣaṃ, yogīpratyakṣam, ayogīpratyakṣaṃ ceti caturvidhaṃ pratyakṣam | tatrādyadvayaṃ svarūpendriyātmakameva | uttaradvayaṃ tu dvividhendriyātmakam | viṣayastu tattajjñānaviṣayavat vivektavyaḥ|

Sense is of four kinds; a) *Īśvarīyapratyakṣa*, the perception of God b) *Lakṣmīpratyakṣa*, the perception of Lakṣmī c) *Yogipratyakṣa*, the yogic perception and d) *Ayogipratyakṣa*, the perception of non-Yogī. The perception of Īśvara and Lakṣmī are of the nature of their self (*Svarūpajñāna*). The latter two have both types of senses belong to their nature and otherwise. They can perceive objects within their range.

The types of outer senses

बाह्येन्द्रियं त्रिविधम् । दैवम्, आसुरं, मध्यमम् इति । तत्र यथार्थज्ञानप्रचुरं दैवम् । अयथार्थज्ञानप्रचुरम् आसुरम् । समज्ञानसाधनं तु मध्यमम् । स्वरूपेन्द्रियमप्युत्तमानां विषयस्वरूपे प्रकारे च यथार्थमेव । अधममध्यमानां तु स्वरूपमात्रे यथार्थमेव । प्रकारे त्वयथार्थं मिश्रं चेति ।

bāhyendriyaṃ trividham | daivam, āsuraṃ, madhyamamiti | tatra yathārtha-jñānapracuraṃ daivam | ayathārthajñānapracuramāsuram | samajñānasādhanaṃ tu madhyamam | svarūpendriyamapyuttamānāṃ viṣayasvarūpe prakāre ca yathā-rthameva | adhamamadhyamānāṃ tu svarūpamātre yathārthameva | prakāre tvayathārthaṃ miśraṃ ceti |

The external sense organs are of three kinds; a) *Daiva*, the divine; b) *Āsura*, the demonic and c) *Madhyama*, the medieval. The cognitions generated through *Daiva*, the divine sense organs are mostly true in nature. The *Āsura*, the demonic sense organs are invariably false in nature. The *Madhyama* sense is partly true and partly false. *Svarūpendriya*, the natural sense organ of the divine temperaments cognizes subjects correctly in both the aspects of the existence and the contents of the object. The other two temperaments cognize the form of an object as it is. The *Āsurendriyas* have no true-cognition of the contents of the object in any case. The *Mādhyama* sense organs have partly true and partly false cognition of the content.

Six types of contacts: Classification system of Naiyyāyikas

इन्द्रियार्थयोस्तु सन्निकर्षोऽपरोक्षज्ञानहेतुः षोढा भिद्यत इत्येके । तद्यथा । संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः समवेतसमवायो, विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति । तत्र चक्षुः-स्पर्शनयोः घटादिद्रव्यैः, मनसश्च आत्मना संयोगः । तेषां स्वविषयगत-गुणकर्मसामान्यैः संयुक्तसमवायः । तथा घ्राण-रसनयोः गन्ध-रसाभ्याम् । एतेषां स्वविषय-गुणकर्मगतसामान्यैः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः । श्रोत्रस्य शब्देन समवायः । तद्गतसामान्यैः समवेतसमवायः । एतेषाम् एतत्पञ्चविधसम्बन्धसम्बद्धार्थस्थ-अभावसमवायाभ्यां पञ्चविधो विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इति ।

indriyārthayostu sannikarṣoऽsparokṣajñānahetuḥ ṣoḍhā bhidyata ityeke | tadyathā | saṃyogaḥ, saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ, saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ, samavāyaḥ,

samavetasamavāyo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaśceti | tatra cakṣuḥ-sparśanayorghaṭādi dravyairmanasaścātmanā saṃyogaḥ | teṣāṃ svaviṣayagataguṇakarmasāmānyaiḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ | tathā ghrāṇa-rasanayorgandha-rasābhyām | eteṣāṃ svaviṣayaguṇakarmagatasāmānyaiḥ saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ | śrotrasya śabdena samavāyaḥ | tadgatasāmānyaiḥ samavetasamavāyaḥ | eteṣāmetatpa ñcavidhasambandhasambaddhārthasthābhāvasamavāyābhyāṃ pañcavidho viśe-ṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva iti |

There are six types of contacts through which senses establish with the object; a) *Samyoga*, the conjunction, b) *Samyuktasamavāya,* the conjunct-inherence, c) *Samyuktasamavetasamavāya*, the conjunct-inherent-inherence, d) *Samavāya,* the inherence, e) *Samavetasamavāya,* the inherent-inherence and f) *Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva,* the modified-modifierness.

Samyoga is the contact that exists between the following senses and the objects. The contact of the sense organs of touch and sight with objects like pot etc., and the contact of mind with *Ātmā,* the soul is of conjunction type. *Samyuktasamavāya,* the conjunct-inherence is the contact that exists between the sense organs of touch, sight and *Manas*, with attributes, movement, operation and the universal in an object. *Samyuktasamavetasamavāya* is the contact that relates the following senses and objects; taste and smell with tastes and odour of objects. It also relates *Manas*, sight, taste, smell, touch with *Sāmānya,* the universal abiding in the attribute of the object and the operations of the objects. *Samavāya* is the contact that exists between the sense of hearing and sound. *Samavetasamavāya* is the contact that exists between the sense of hearing and the universal in the sound. *Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* is of five types. This is the contact of the above-mentioned senses with the *Samavāya*, and the absence of objects.

तदसत् । गुणादीनां गुण्यादिभिरभेदेन समवायाभावात् । आत्मनस्तद्धर्माणां च साक्षिविषयत्वेन मनोविषयत्वाभावात् । वर्णात्मकस्य शब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वेनाकाशविशेषगुणत्वाभावात् । अतः सर्वे न्द्रियाणां स्वस्वविषयैः स्वस्वविषयप्रतियोगिकाभावेन च साक्षादेव रश्मिद्वारा सन्निकर्षः ।

tadasat | guṇādīnāṃ guṇyādibhirabhedena samavāyābhāvāt | ātmanas-taddharmāṇāṃ ca sākṣiviṣayatvena manoviṣayatvābhāvāt | varṇātmakasya śabd-asya dravyatvenākāśaviśeṣaguṇatvābhāvāt | ataḥ sarvendriyāṇāṃ svasvaviṣayaiḥ svasvaviṣayapratiyogikābhāvena ca sākṣādeva raśmidvārā sannikarṣaḥ |

This classification of Nyāya school is not tenable. The attribute and the substrate are identical. Hence, the conclusion is that *Samavāya* is not admitted to be a separate category. Much the less, there is no *Samavāya* relation as there are no

distinct relatives. In case of *Ātmā* and its qualities, they are grasped by *Sākṣī*, the seventh sense; not by the mind. The sound of letters is of the very nature of the substance and it is not a property of the space. Hence, in both cases of *Samavāya* or any such relation involving *Samavāya* it is not required to handle. Therefore, all the sense organs have only one type of contact with their respective objects and their absence, either in direct manner or through their rays. This contact could be *Samyoga*, the conjunction itself.

The indeterminate and determinate perceptions

निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदेन च द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षमित्याचक्षते । तत्र वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रावभासकं निर्विकल्पकम् । विशिष्टाकारगोचरं सविकल्पकम् । तत् अष्टविधम् ।

तत्र द्रव्यविकल्पो यथा दण्डीति ।
गुणविकल्पो यथा शुक्ल इति ।
क्रियाविकल्पो यथा गच्छतीति ।
जातिविकल्पो यथा गौरिति ।
विशेषविकल्पो यथा विशिष्टः परमाणुरिति ।
समवायिविकल्पो यथा पटसमवायवन्तस्तन्तव इति ।
नामविकल्पो यथा देवदत्त इति ।
अभावविकल्पो यथा घटाभाववद्भूतलमिति ।

nirvikalpakasavikalpakabhedena ca dvividhaṃ pratyakṣamityācakṣate | tatra vastusvarūpamātrāvabhāsakaṃ nirvikalpakam | viśiṣṭākāragocaraṃ savikalpakam | tat aṣṭavidham |

tatra dravyavikalpo yathā daṇḍīti|
guṇavikalpo yathā śukla iti |
kriyāvikalpo yathā gacchatīti |
jātivikalpo yathā gauriti |
viśeṣavikalpo yathā viśiṣṭaḥ paramāṇuriti |
samavāyivikalpo yathā paṭasamavāyavantastantava iti |
nāmavikalpo yathā devadatta iti |
abhāvavikalpo yathā ghaṭābhāvavadbhūtalamiti |

Some are of the opinion that there are two types of perceptions; indeterminate and determinate. The perception in which grasping only the existence of the thing without any aspects is indeterminate. The perception of a thing with its integrated qualities is called determinate perception. Determinate perception is described in eight ways; a) Determination of the substance e.g., perception of a man with a stick b) The determination of attribute e.g., the perception of

an object with white color c) The determination of action e.g., a walking man d) The determination of universal e.g., determination of cow-ness in cow e) The determination of particularity e.g., determination of unique atom f) The determination of inherence e.g., the relation between the cloth and thread g) The determination of the name of an object or person e.g., Devadatta and h) the determination of the non-existence or absence of an object e.g., perception of the absence of a pot on the floor.

एतदप्यसत् । विशेषसमवाययोरप्रामाणिकत्वात् । नाम्नः पश्चात्स्मरणेनाभावस्य च प्रतियोगिस्मरणाधीनज्ञानत्वेन तद्विकल्पस्य प्रथाक्षिसन्निकर्षानन्तरमेवोत्पत्त्यभावेऽपि द्रव्यादिविकल्पानांप्रथममेवोत्पत्तौ बाधकाभावेन निर्विकल्पकानुपपत्ते : ।

etadapyasat / viśeṣasamavāyayorapramāṇikatvāt / nāmnaḥ paścātsmaraṇenābhāvasya ca pratiyogīsmaraṇādhīnajñānatvena tadvikalpasya prathamākṣisan nikarṣānantaramevotpattyabhāvespi dravyādivikalpānāṃ prathamamevotpattau bādhakābhāvena nirvikalpakānupapatteḥ /

Since, *Viśeṣa*, the particularity and *Samavāya*, the inherence both are not admitted as real categories, the two types of perception with respect to them are not tenable. The name of an object and its absence are not cognized at the instance of the perception as the name is remembered after recognizing the face and absence is determined after getting its counter-relative i.e., absentee. However, there is no objection to the view that all other qualities are perceived at the very moment of the perception. Hence, indeterminate perception is declared untenable.

The use of perception

हान–उपादान–उपेक्षाबुद्धयः प्रत्यक्षस्य फलमिति केचिदाहुः । तदप्यसत् । तासामनुमानफलत्वात् । तथाहि । कण्टकादिस्वरूपमात्रं प्रदर्श्य प्रत्यक्षं निवर्तते । अथेदानीं पूर्वानुभूतस्य कण्टकादेरनिष्टसाधनत्वमनुभूतं स्मृत्वा, अस्य च कण्टकादित्वेन तदनुमिमानस्य हानबुद्धिरुपजायते । एवं कदलीफलादाविष्टसाधनत्वानुमानानन्तरमुपादानबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते । तृणादौ चौदासीन्यमनुमायोपेक्षाबुद्धिः प्रतिपद्यते । अतो विशिष्टविषयसाक्षात्कार एव प्रत्यक्षस्य फलमिति ।

hāna-upādāna-upekṣābuddhayaḥ pratyakṣasya phalamiti kecid-āhuḥ / tadapyasat / tāsāmanumānaphalatvāt / tathāhi / kaṇṭakādī-śvaraūpamātraṃ pradarśya pratyakṣaṃ nivartate / athedānīṃ pūrvānu-bhūtasya kaṇṭakāderani ṣṭasādhanatvamanubhūtaṃ smṛtvā, asya ca kaṇṭakāditvena tadanumimānasya hānabuddhirupajāyate / evaṃ kadalīphalādāviṣṭasādhanatvānumānānantar am upādānabuddhirutpadyate / tṛṇādau caudāsīnyamanumāyopekṣābuddhiḥ pratipadyate / ato viśiṣṭa-viṣayasākṣātkāra eva pratyakṣasya phalamiti /

Some maintain that perception has three forms of utilities; a) to reject the objects, b) to get the objects, c) to be indifferent to the objects. This view does not hold good for the aforesaid three uses as they are the functions of inference and not of the perception. Perception merely makes clear the presence and nature of an object. There it stops. For example, a person sees a thorn. In case he has some prior experience of any harm caused by any thorn like object running into the feet, he recollects the same at the sight of a thorn and infers that it causes pain. So, he avoids it. When an individual sees a banana, he desires it, because he has previously experienced its taste, and hence the desirability of the fruit is inferred. We learn to be indifferent to objects like grass because of its uselessness. All this is the result of inferential knowledge. The use of perception is merely the clear presentation of the attributes of an object.

End of the Chapter I Perception

|| इति श्रीमज्जयतीर्थपूज्यचरणविरचितप्रमाणपद्धतौ प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ||

|| iti śrīmajjayatīrthapūjyacaraṇaviracitapramāṇapaddhatau pratyakṣapariccheda samāptaḥ ||

Thus, ends Chapter I Perception in *Pramāṇapaddhati* authored by his holy-feet Śrī Jayatīrtha.

। अथ अनुमानपरिच्छेदः ।

Atha Anumāna-Paricchedaḥ

Chapter II Inference

The definition of inferential instrument

निर्दोषोपपत्तिः अनुमानम् । उपपत्तिः, व्याप्यं, युक्तिः, लिङ्गम्, इति पर्यायः । अविनाभावो व्याप्तिः। साहचर्यनियम इति यावत् । व्याप्तेः कर्म व्याप्यम् । तस्याः कर्तृ व्यापकम् । यथा धूमस्य अग्निना व्याप्तिः, अव्यभिचरितः सम्बन्धः । यत्र धूमः, तत्र अग्निरिति नियमात् । तत्र धूमो व्याप्यः। अग्निर्व्यापकः ।

nirdoṣopapattiḥ anumānam | upapattiḥ, vyāpyaṃ, yuktiḥ, liṅgam, iti paryāyaḥ | avinābhāvo vyāptiḥ | sāhacaryaniyama iti yāvat | vyāpteḥ karma vyāpyam | tasyāḥ kartṛ vyāpakam | yathā dhūmasya agninā vyāptiḥ avyabhicaritaḥ sa-mbandhaḥ | yatra dhūmaḥ, tatra agniriti niyamāt | tatra dhūmo vyāpyaḥ | agnirvyāpakaḥ |

The defect-free reasoning is called inference. The words a) *Upapattiḥ,* the reason b) *Vyāpyaṃ,* the pervaded c) *Yuktiḥ,* the justification and d) *Liṅgam,* the indicator are synonyms. Pervasion is an unconditional relation between two objects of which one is non-existent without the other. It is nothing but the invariable or necessary co-occurrence. The object of the act of pervasion is called "pervaded". The agent of the act of pervasion is called "pervasive" or "pervader". For example, the relation of smoke with the fire that is invariable is its pervasion, which is represented as wherever smoke is present, there must be fire. Here smoke is the a pervaded reason, and the fire is pervasive probandum.

The description of four types of properties

चतुष्टयी खलु धर्माणां गतिः । केचित् समवृत्तयो, यथा निषिद्धत्वपापसाधनत्वे । यत्र निषिद्धत्वं तत्र पापसाधनत्वं, यत्र पापसाधनत्वं तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति नियमात् । तत्र द्वयोरपि अन्योन्यं व्याप्यव्यापकभावः ।

catuṣṭayī khalu dharmāṇāṃ gatiḥ | kecit samavṛttayo, yathā niṣiddhatvapāpasādhanatve | yatra niṣiddhatvaṃ tatra pāpasādhanatvaṃ, yatra pāpasādhanatvaṃ tatra niṣiddhatvamiti niyamāt | tatra dvayorapi anyonyaṃ vyāpyavyāpakabhāvaḥ |

The properties are classified in four ways. Some are equilocus like 'being prohibited by the Vedas' and 'being cause for sin'. The acts that are prohibited by the Vedas are sins and the sins are prohibited by the Vedas. Thus, these two properties have mutual pervasion.

केचित् न्यूनाधिकवृत्तयः । यथा धूमवत्त्वाग्निमत्वे । तत्र न्यूनवृत्तिधूमवत्वं व्याप्यमेव । अधिकवृत्यग्निमत्वं व्यापकमेव ।

kecit nyūnādhikavṛttayaḥ | yathā dhūmavattvāgnimatve | tatra nyūnavṛttidhūmavatvaṃ vyāpyameva | adhikavṛtyagnimatvaṃ vyāpakameva |

Some properties have unequal locus. For example, wherever there is smoke there is fire, but, not vice versa. Among them, smoke is located in lesser places and hence it is (less-pervasive) 'pervaded'. The fire is located in more places than that of smoke and hence it is widely-pervasive.

केचित् परस्परपरिहारेणैव वर्तन्ते । यथा गोत्वाश्वत्वे । यतो यत्र गोत्वं, न तत्र सर्वथाऽश्वत्वम् । यत्र चाश्वत्वं, न तत्र सर्वथा गोत्वम् । तेषां नान्योन्यं व्याप्यव्यापकभावः । सम्बन्धस्यैव अभावात् ।

kecit parasparaparihāreṇaiva vartante | yathā gotvāśvatve | yato yatra gotvaṃ, na tatra sarvathāऽśvatvam | yatra cāśvatvaṃ, na tatra sarvathā gotvam | teṣāṃ nānyonyaṃ vyāpyavyāpakabhāvaḥ | sambandhasyaiva abhāvāt |

Some properties exclude each other. They do not share a common locus. For example, 'cow-ness' and 'horse-ness' never share a locus. For, whatever is cow, is not a horse and whatever is horse, is not a cow. They do not have any binding relation.

केचित् क्वचित् समाविष्टा अपि, क्वचित् परस्परपरिहारेणैव वर्तन्ते । यथा पाचकत्वपुरुषत्वे। तयोः पुरुषविशेषे समावेशेऽपि पाचकत्वं पुरुषत्वपरिहारेण, स्त्रीषु वर्तते । पुरुषत्वमपि पाचकत्वपरिहारेण अपचति पुरुषे वर्तते । तेऽपि नान्योन्यं व्याप्यव्यापकभाववन्तः । सत्यपि सम्बन्धे परस्परव्यभिचारित्वात् ।

kecit kvacit samāviṣṭā api, kvacit parasparaparihāreṇaiva vartante | yathā pācakatvapuruṣatve | tayoḥ puruṣaviśeṣe samoveśeऽpi pācakatvaṃ puruṣatvaparihāreṇa, strīṣu vartate | puruṣatvamapi pācakatvaparihāreṇa, apacati puruṣe

vartate | tespi nānyonyaṃ vyāpyavyāpakabhāvavantaḥ | satyapi sambandhe parasparavyabhicāritvāt |

Some properties, though share a common locus at times, are located in different places excluding each other in some other time. For e.g., being a cook and being a man. There may be a man who is a cook. But, there are cases of being a woman cook and a man being a non-cook. Such properties also do not have any concomitance relation. There may be relation due to shared location. Nevertheless, they exclude each other. Hence properties of last two categories do not have *Vyāpti.*

तत्र व्याप्यो धर्मो व्यापकप्रमितिसाधनं भवत् अनुमानम् इत्युच्यते । व्यापकश्च अनुमेयः इति ।

tatra vyāpyo dharmo vyāpakapramitisādhanaṃ bhavat anumānam ityucyate | vyāpakaśca anumeyaḥ iti |

Among these, the property that is pervaded becomes the instrument for the inference (the cognition of pervasive property) and hence is called a sign or the tool of inference. The property that pervades is 'inferred'.

Cognition of concomitance relation is necessary

ननु पर्वते वर्तमानो धूमः गृहान्तर्वर्तिनः पुरुषस्य किमित्यग्निप्रमां न जनयति ? उच्यते । न प्रत्यक्षवत् अनुमानम् अज्ञातकरणम् । किन्तु सम्यक् ज्ञातमेव । तथाऽपि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनो, देशान्तरं गतस्य, धूमप्रमितावपि कस्मात् नाग्निप्रमोदयः ।

nanu parvate vartamāno dhūmaḥ gṛhāntarvartinaḥ puruṣasya kimityagni-pramāṃ na janayati? ucyate | na pratyakṣavat anumānam ajñātakaraṇam | kintu samyak jñātameva | tathāspi nārikeladvīpavāsino, deśāntaraṃ gatasya, dhūmapramitāvapi kasmāt nāgnipramodayaḥ |

Objection: The smoke located on hills does not cause for inferential cognition of fire to the person staying in a house. Why?

Response: The inferential instrument is not a cause as the perceptual instrument that causes while being unknown. But, it causes while being perfectly known.

Objection: However, why the cognition of fire does not take place in a person of remote island, where both smoke and fire are totally absent, although he has the cognition of smoke, while he is out of his island.

उच्यते । तस्य धूमस्वरूपज्ञानेऽप्यग्निव्याप्ततया तज्ज्ञानाभावात् । ज्ञातव्याप्तिकस्यापि कुतः कदाचिदग्निप्रमाऽनुत्पत्तिः । व्याप्तिस्मरणाभावात् । व्याप्तिस्मरणवतः, पर्वते धूमं दृष्टवतोऽपि, कथं पर्वतादन्यत्राग्निप्रमाऽनुद्भवः । व्याप्तिप्रकारमपेक्ष्य लिङ्गज्ञानस्य लिङ्गिज्ञानजनकत्वनियमात् ।

ucyate | tasya dhūmasvarūpajñānespyagnivyāptatayā tajjñānābhāvāt | jñāta-vyāptikasyāpi kutaḥ, kadācidagnipramāsnutpattiḥ | vyāptismaraṇābhāvāt | vyāptismaraṇavataḥ, parvate dhūmaṃ dṛṣṭavatospi, kathaṃ parvatādanyatrā-gnipramāsnudbhavaḥ | vyāptiprakāramapekṣya liṅgajñānasya liṅgijñānajana-katvaniyamāt |

Response: Yes, though he has the cognition of smoke, since he is not aware of the relation between smoke and fire, he would not get the inferential conclusion.

Objection: Why the inferential conclusion does not come into being even when somebody knows the relation between smoke and fire?

Response: The invariable relation might not be recalled while observing the smoke.

Objection: Sometimes even after having seen the smoke and even after realizing invariable relation of the fire and smoke recalled, the person does not cognize the fire in a place other than the hills. What is the reason?

Response: The cognition of sign will cause for inferential cognition according to the aspect of invariable relation that the sign possesses. Hence, the fire is inferred as located only in hills as it was found to be located always in the same location where its sign 'smoke' exists.

Aspects of invariable relation

तथाहि । कयोश्चित् समानदेश-कालयोः व्याप्तिः । यथा रसस्य, रूपेण

tathāhi | kayościt samānadeśa-kālayoḥ vyāptiḥ | yathā rasasya, rūpeṇa |

Some properties will have invariable concomitance or universal relation with respect to their same loci and same time. For e.g., colour and taste are two properties in a fruit that have relation with each other always in the same place and same time. That means, wherever or whenever some particular colour is seen in a fruit, exactly the particular taste is inferred in the same fruit and at the same time.

कयोश्चित् समानदेशत्वेऽपि, भिन्नकालयोः । यथा धूमस्य, अग्निना ।

kayościt samānadeśatvespi, bhinnakālayoḥ | yathā dhūmasya, agninā |

Some properties, though they share the same loci, at different points of time, they get related. For e.g., smoke and fire. The fire is inferred in the same loci where smoke is seen; but while inferring that the fire is known to exist a moment before the smoke came into being.

कयोश्चित्समानकालत्वेपि, भिन्नदेशयो: । यथा कृत्तिकोदयस्य, रोहिण्युदयासत्त्या ।

kayościtsamānakālatvepi, bhinnadeśayoḥ / yathā kṛttikodayasya, rohiṇyuday-āsattyā /

Some properties though share the common time point for being, they get related in different places. The rise of *Kṛttikā* star, the Alcyone is related to proximity in appearance of *Rohiṇī* star, the Aldebaran in the other corner of the sky, though time of their coming to being is the same.

कयोश्चित् भिन्नदेश–कालयो: । यथाऽधोदेशे नदीपूरस्य, ऊर्ध्वदेशवृष्ट्या ।

kayościt bhinnadeśa-kālayoḥ / yathāsdhodeśe nadīpūrasya, ūrdhvadeśavṛṣṭyā /

Some are totally related in different places and at different points of time. The flood of a river in the low plains is pervaded by the rain in the upper hills. Here, both the place of their being and the time of their existence, are not the same.

कस्यचित् कादाचित्कस्य, समानदेशत्वेऽपि सार्वकालीनेन । यथा पतनस्य, गुरुत्वेन ।

kasyacit kādācitkasya, samānadeśatvespi sārvakālīnena / yathā patanasya, gu-rutvena /

Some temporary property, even though having shared the loci, is pervaded by a property that is permanent by nature. For e.g., the 'fall' of a fruit has the relation with weight. The weight is permanent property in the fruit. Both the action of falling down and the weight are located in the same loci i.e., the fruit. But, the action of falling down is a temporary phenomenon.

कस्यचित् समानदेशत्वेऽपि सार्वकालिकस्य, कादाचित्केन । यथा शरीरत्वस्य विनाशेन ।

kasyacit samānadeśatvespi sārvakālikasya, kādācitkena / yathā śarīratvasya vināśena/

Some permanent property will have relation with a temporary one in the shared loci. The 'being body' itself is a sign of its 'death'. The being body is a permanent property that exists in the body as long as the body exists. But, death is a temporary property as it happens at only one particular point of time.

कस्यचित् प्रदेशवर्तिनो, व्याप्यवर्तिना । यथा संयोगस्य, द्रव्यत्वेन ।

kasyacit pradeśavartino, vyāpyavartinā / yathā saṃyogasya, dravyatvena /

Some property that is partly present in one locus, has the universal relation with a property that is fully present in the same locus. The 'contact' is pervaded by 'being substance'. Because all substances will always be in contact with something, and the contact is located in a limited point and substanceness is in the whole.

कस्यचित् व्याप्यवर्तिनः, प्रदेशवर्तिना । यथा रूपस्य, संयोगेन ।

kasyacit vyāpyavartinaḥ, pradeśavartinā | yathā rūpasya, saṃyogena |

Some property being universally present has relation with the property that is present in part. The colour of a substance is present in the whole and the contact is in part. Both are related by the universal relation.

कयोश्चित् एकावयविवर्तिनोरपि, अवयवभेदेन । यथा तुलोन्नमन–अवनमनयोः इत्यादि ।

kayościt ekāvayavivartinorapi, avayavabhedena | yathā tulonnamanaavanama-nayoḥ ityādi |

Some properties belonging to the same whole are present in different parts and yet they are related with the universal relation. When one side of the weighing machine comes down, opposite side would go up. The actions 'going up' and 'coming down' are related.

तथा च व्याप्तिज्ञानतत्स्मरणसहितं लिङ्गस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानं, सम्यग्ज्ञातं वा लिङ्गं, व्याप्तिप्रकारानुसारेण समुचितदेशादौ लिङ्गिप्रमां जनयत् अनुमानमित्युक्तं भवति । अत एव लिङ्गिस्वरूपस्य ज्ञातत्वेऽपि देशविशेषादिसंसृष्टतया ज्ञापकत्वान् न अनुमानस्य वैयर्थ्यम् । ततश्चानुमानस्य द्वयं सामर्थ्यम् । व्याप्तिः, समुचितदेशादौ सिद्धिश्चेति । न तु पक्षधर्मतानियमः ।

tathā ca vyāptijñānatatsmaraṇasahitaṃ liṅgasya samyagjñānaṃ, samyagjñātaṃ vā liṅgaṃ, vyāptiprakārānusāreṇa samucitadeśādau liṅgipramāṃ janay-at anumānamityuktaṃ bhavati | ata eva liṅgisvarūpasya jñātatvespi deśaviśeṣādi-saṃsṛṣṭatayā jñāpakatvāt na anumānasya vaiyarthyam | tataścānumānasya dvayaṃ sāmarthyam | vyāptiḥ, samucitadeśādau siddhiśceti | na tu pakṣadhar-matāniyamaḥ |

Thus, this is the gist that the cognition of sign with the aid of recollection of universal relation or the sign well-cognized causes for the inferential cognition of its counterpart located in an appropriate time and location as per the aspect found in universal relation.

Therefore, even though the property to be inferred is already known to the person who cognized the universal relation, it is shown as having related to a particular place and time by the sign and its universal relation. Hence the inference is not useless.

With this, it is understood that the inferential tool should get two necessary requirements – the universal relation and presence in an appropriate locus and time. However, it need not have a shared locus. According to Naiyyāyika, the sign and the counterpart must be present in the same locus. This is not acceptable to Tatvavādin, the Dvaita philosopher.

The way of getting universal relation

ननु व्याप्तिज्ञानं केन प्रमाणेन जायते । यथायथं प्रत्यक्ष–अनुमान–आगमैरिति ब्रूमः । तत्र तावत् धूमस्य, अग्निना व्याप्तिः प्रत्यक्षगम्या । तथाहि । महानसादौ धूमाग्न्योः साहचर्यं पश्यतः पुरुषस्यैष विमर्शो जायते । किमत्रैवेतौ धूमाग्नी सहचरितौ, अन्यत्र देशान्तरे कालान्तरे च एतज्जातीयौ परस्परपरिहारेण वर्तेते, उतान्यतरः एवान्यतरपरिहारेण, किंवा सकलदेशकालयोः सहचरितावेवेति ? ततः भूयोभूयो धूमं पश्यन्, अग्निं पश्यति । अग्न्यभावे च धूमाभावम् । तथा धूमाभावेऽपि क्वचित् अग्निसद्भावम्

nanu vyāptijñānaṃ kena pramāṇena jāyate | yathāyathaṃ pratyakṣa-anumānāgamairiti brūmaḥ | tatra tāvat dhūmasya, agninā vyāptiḥ pratyakṣagamyā | tathāhi | mahānasādau dhūmāgnyoḥ sāhacaryaṃ paśyataḥ puruṣasyaiṣa vimarśo jāyate | kimatraivetau dhūmāgnī sahacaritau, anyatra deśāntare kālāntare ca etajjātīyau parasparaparihāreṇa vartete, utānyataraḥ evānyatara-parihāreṇa, kiṃvā sakaladeśakālayoḥ sahacaritāveveti? tataḥ bhūyobhūyo dhūmaṃ paśyan, agniṃ paśyati | agnyabhāve ca dhūmābhāvam | tathā dhūmābhāvespi kvacit agnisadbhāvam |

Objection: What is the proof or instrument to the knowledge of universal relation?

Response: All the three instruments of knowledge – perception, inference and word are the instruments according to the context. There, the universal relation of smoke with the fire is perceived by perceptional instrument. This is as follows. The person, who watches the co-existence of smoke and fire in places like kitchen gets some thought. a) Whether these two i.e., smoke and fire are present together only in this place and these two of the same class do stay excluding each other in some other places and time or b) one among them stays excluding the other? Or, c) whether in all places and times they reside together without excluding each other? Then, he observes repeatedly and whenever he perceives smoke, perceives fire.

ततः पुनरेष विचारो भवति । यथा बहुषु स्थलेषु धूमेन सहचरितोऽप्यग्निः, क्वचित्तं परित्यज्य वर्तते । तथा धूमो मत्परिचितस्थलेषु अग्निना सह वर्तमानोऽपि, क्वचित्तं परित्यज्य वर्तते । किं वा सर्वत्र तत्सहचरितः एव इति ? ततः पुनरेषा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते ।

tataḥ punareṣa vicāro bhavati | yathā bahuṣu sthaleṣu dhūmena sahacaritosp-yagniḥ, kvacittaṃ parityajya vartate | tathā dhūmo matparicitasthaleṣu agninā saha vartamānospi, kvacittaṃ parityajya vartate | kiṃ vā sarvatra tatsahacaritaḥ eva iti? tataḥ punareṣā buddhirutpadyate |

Thereafter again, he reflects on this. The fire accompanies smoke in many places but has presence without smoke in some other places. Similarly, the smoke is accompanied by fire in many places of my familiarity. But does it remain without fire in any place? Or, whether in all places it always accompanies the fire? Then he reflects on this subject again.

अग्नेर्धूमसम्बन्धेऽस्ति आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः उपाधिः । स च धूमव्यापकः । स्वयं व्यावर्तमानस्तं व्यावर्तितवान् । न पुनरग्निम् । तदव्यापकत्वात् । तथा धूमस्याग्निसम्बन्धे यदि कश्चिदुपाधिः स्यात्, तदा सोऽप्यग्निं व्यभिचरिष्यति । न चेत्, निर्निमित्तस्य सम्बन्धस्य धूमस्वभावत्वेन, न क्वापि तदभावो भविष्यतीत्येवं निश्चित्य महानसादौ उपाधिगवेषणे प्रवर्तते ।

agnerdhūmasambandhessti ārdrendhanasaṃyogaḥ upādhiḥ | sa ca dhūma-vyāpakaḥ | svayaṃ vyāvartamānastaṃ vyāvartitavān | na punaragnim | tadavyāpakatvāt | tathā dhūmasyāgnisambandhe yadi kaścidupādhiḥ syāt, tadā sospyagniṃ vyabhicariṣyati | na cet, nirnimittasya sambandhasya dhūma-svabhāvatvena, na kvāpi tadabhāvo bhaviṣyatītyevaṃ niścitya mahānasādau upādhigaveṣaṇe pravartate |

The contact of wet-wood is the condition for fire getting connection with the smoke. The smoke is possible only when fire comes into contact with the wet-wood. This condition is pervasive of smoke. It is everywhere in the instances of smoke. It could avoid smoke, when wet-wood is not in contact with the fire. When the wet-wood is not in contact with fire, smoke does not arise at all as it controls the smoke. Not vice versa. For it does pervade the fire. In case, a similar condition would have existed in the context of the relation of smoke with fire, then the smoke also could have separated from the fire. However, it is not the case. Hence, the relation between smoke and fire is unconditional. Therefore, this universal relation is the nature of smoke and hence, smoke never exists without fire. With this idea, he searches for such a condition in places like kitchen.

Resolution of universal relation

तत्र केचिद्धर्मा उभयव्यापकाः । यथा प्रमेयत्वम् । नैतत्सम्बन्धं विघटयितुमीशते ।

केचिदुभयाव्यापकाः। यथा महानसत्वम् । तेऽपि नैतत्संबन्धविघटनाय समर्थाः । केचिद्धूमव्यापका, अग्न्यव्यापकाः । यथा आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । तेऽपि अग्नेः, धूमवियोजने शक्ता अपि, न धूमस्य, अग्निवियोजने ।

tatra keciddharmā ubhayavyāpakāḥ | yathā prameyatvam | naitatsambandhaṃ vighaṭayitumīśate | kecidubhayāvyāpakāḥ | yathā mahānasatvam | tespi naitat-sambandhavighaṭanāya samarthāḥ | keciddhūmavyāpakā, agnyavyāpakāḥ | yathā ārdrendhanasaṃyogaḥ | tespi agneḥ, dhūmaviyojane śaktā api, na dhū-masya, agniviyojane |

There, one can find some properties like knowability that pervade both the smoke and fire. This property, which is omnipresent, cannot break the relation of smoke and fire. Some others are not at all pervasive of the other – such as 'kitchen-hood'. Such properties cannot harm this relation. Some properties are pervasive of smoke and not the fire – such as wet-wood-contact. They also can get fire away from smoke, but not the smoke away from the fire.

यस्तु अग्नेर्व्यापको, धूमस्य त्वव्यापकः, स स्वयं व्यावर्तमानः शक्ष्यति एतत्सबन्धं विघटयितुम् । स तु नास्त्येव । अनुपलम्भात् । अतीन्द्रियोपि प्रमाणान्तरेवेद्यः स्यात् । न च तत्प्रमाणम् उपलभ्यते । न च अप्रामाणिकः शङ्कामप्यधिरोहति । अतो नात्रोपाधिः अस्तीति निर्णीतवतः अविनाभावप्रमितिः उत्पद्यते ।

yastu agnervyāpako, dhūmasya tvavyāpakaḥ, sa svayaṃ vyāvartamānaḥ śakṣyati etatsabandhaṃ vighaṭayitum | sa tu nāstyeva | anupalambhāt | atī-ndriyopi pramāṇāntaravedyaḥ syāt | na ca tatpramāṇam upalabhyate | na ca aprāmāṇikaḥ śaṅkāmapyadhirohati | ato nātropādhiḥ astīti nirṇītavataḥ av- inābhāvapramitiḥ utpadyate |

The property that is pervasive of fire and non-pervasive of smoke can break this relation by taking smoke away from fire, while distancing itself from the smoke. No such property exists as it is never found. Even if somebody argues, it could be beyond the reach of senses, it must have been found by any other means of knowledge. No such proof is found. The unreal thing can never raise a doubt. Therefore, when he comes to the conclusion that there is no condition to the relation of smoke to fire, he gets the invariable concomitance or universal relation between smoke and fire.

Three ways of realizing universal relation

ननु एवं सति न प्रत्यक्षं व्याप्तिग्राहकम् । मैवम् । यतः साहचर्यग्राहिणः प्रत्यक्षस्य भूयोदर्शन–व्यभिचारादर्शन–उपाध्यभावनिश्चयाः सहकारिणः । न च सहकारिभेदेऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञायामिव प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ।

nanu evaṃ sati na pratyakṣaṃ vyāptigrāhakam | maivam | yataḥ sāhacarya-grāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣasya bhūyodarśana-vyabhicārādarśana-upādhyabhāvaniścayāḥ sahakāriṇaḥ | na ca sahakāribhedespi pratyabhijñāyāmiva pramāṇāntaratvam |

Objection: Then, a question may arise that the perception is not the means of getting universal relation.

Response: This is not so. For, the perception, that objectifies the coexistence of two objects is supported by the repetitive observation, absence of *Vyabhicāra*, the straying reason and judgment of absence of any kind of conditions. Recognition is caused by the respective sense organ with the aid of memory trace; yet, it is considered as perception. Therefore, this repetitive cognition does not constitute a separate proof as in the case of recogntion.

वर्तमानसन्निकृष्टमात्रग्राहि–प्रत्यक्षं कथमतीताद्यास्पदं व्याप्तिं गृह्णीयादिति चेन्न । सहकारिसामर्थ्येन करणानां शक्त्यन्तराविर्भावस्य बहुलमुपलम्भात् । किञ्च प्रतीतस्य धूमस्याग्निसम्बन्धे स्वाभाविकतया निश्चिते, यद्यन्यत्रापि धूमः स्यात् तर्हि तस्याप्येवम्, इत्येवं व्याप्तिग्रहो भवतीत्यतः काऽत्रानुपपत्तिः । एतेन प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयोः व्याप्तिं गृह्णतः, सार्वज्ञप्रसङ्ग इत्यपि परास्तम् ।

vartamānasannikṛṣṭamātragrāhi-pratyakṣaṃ kathamatītādyāspadāṃ vyāptiṃ gṛhṇīyāditi cenna | sahakārisāmarthyena karaṇānāṃ śaktyantarāvirbhāvasya bahulamupalambhāt | kiñca pratītasya dhūmasyāgnisambandhe svābhāvikatayā niścite, yadyanyatrāpi dhūmaḥ syāt tarhi tasyāpyevam, ityevaṃ vyāptigraho bhavatītyataḥ kāstrānupapattiḥ | etena prameyatvābhidheyatvayoḥ vyāptiṃ gṛhṇataḥ, sārvajñaprasaṅga ityapi parāstam |

Objection: Usually perception takes only those things that are present and are in contact with sense organs. How does it get the universal relation between the two things that belong to past and future?

Response: It is not a problem. For, we have seen many cases, where the power of aids makes instruments get extraordinary power in order to cause the result in a different manner.

Moreover, if the present smoke is perceived to have been unconditionally related to fire, then, one can easily arrive at the conclusion that, in case any such smoke exists anywhere, that is also naturally pervaded by fire. What kind of objection can be raised here? With this solution, the objection i.e. "if knowability and expressability are known to be universally related then everybody might become omniscient", arose with respect to the universal relation of knowability and expressability gets rejected.

कुत एतत्सर्वं कल्प्यत इति चेत् । कार्यदर्शनादेव । अस्ति तावत् धूमदर्शनानन्तरम् अग्निज्ञानम् । न च तदयथार्थम् । संवादित्वात् । न चान्यदर्शनेन अन्यज्ञानं निर्निमित्तं भवितुमर्हति । अतिप्रसङ्गात् न च व्याप्तिप्रमां, समुचितदेशत्वप्रमां चापहाय, निमित्तान्तरमस्तीति कार्यमेव एतत्कल्पयति । यथा खलु शिलाशकलादावनुपलब्धामपि क्षितिसलिलादिसहकारिसमुदद्भूतां बीजस्य शक्तिम्, अङ्कुरदर्शनं कल्पयतीति । अनुमानगम्यां तु व्याप्तिमुत्तरत्रोदाहरिष्यामः । न च तस्याप्यनुमानस्य व्याप्त्यपेक्षायाम् अनवस्था । अन्ततः प्रत्यक्षागममूलत्वात् । 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यो', 'गौर्न पदा स्पृष्टव्या' इत्यागमगम्या व्याप्तिः । न चात्र कश्चित्क्षुद्रोपद्रवो, नापि दृष्टान्तापेक्षेति ।

kuta etatsarvaṃ kalpyata iti cet | kāryadarśanādeva | asti tāvat dhūma-darśanānantaram agnijñānam | na ca tadayathārtham | saṃvāditvāt | na cānyadarśanena anyajñānaṃ nirnimittaṃ bhavitumarhati | atiprasaṅgāt | na ca vyāptipramāṃ, samucitadeśatvapramāṃ cāpahāya, nimittāntaramastīti kāryameva etatkalpayati | yathā khalu śilāśakalādāvanupalabdhāmapi kṣitisal ilādisahakārisamudbhūtāṃ bījasya śaktim, aṅkuradarśanaṃ kalpayatīti | anu-mānagamyāṃ tu vyāptimuttaratrodāhariṣyāmaḥ | na ca tasyāpyanumānasya vyāptyapekṣāyām anavasthā | antataḥ pratyakṣāgamamūlatvāt | 'brāhmaṇo na hantavyo', 'gaurna padā spraṣṭavyā' ityāgamagamyā vyāptiḥ | na cātra kaścitkṣudropadravo, nāpi dṛṣṭāntāpekṣeti |

Objection: Why is all this process imagined?

Response: Simple, the result must be preceded by a proper cause. This is as follows: Everybody agrees that, after perceiving smoke in a place, one concludes that there exists fire. The cognition is not false. Later we find that it corresponds to the reality. It is not possible to get cognition of an object after getting another unless there is a connection. If it is, it would lead to uncertainty. While the knowledge of universal relation and the sign being present in a proper location are found to be competent causes, nothing else is found. Hence, the result itself leads to this chain of causal connections. It is similar to the way a little sprout indicates the power in its seed when it is placed in soil and watered. This power was not found when the seed is placed in a piece of rock in similar circumstances.

We would explain later about the universal relation that is objectified by the inference. It is not the case that, if the universal relation is taken by an inference and that also needs another universal relation and then it will never end, but will lead to endless regression. For, ultimately it is rooted either in perception or in the language.

"Brāhmaṇa shall not be killed", "cow shall not be touched by foot" etc., are the laws that are prescribed by Vedic testimony. Here, neither there would be any unnecessary objection nor it requires any example.

Classification of inference

त्रिविधमनुमानम् । कार्यानुमानं, कारणानुमानं, अकार्यकारणानुमानं चेति । तत्राद्यं यथा । धूमः अग्नेः । द्वितीयं यथा । विशिष्टमेघोन्नतिः वृष्टेः । इयांस्तु विशेषः । कार्यं कारणमात्रम् अनुमापयति । कारणं तु समग्रमेव कार्यमिति । तृतीयं यथा । रसो रुपस्येति ।

trividhamanumānam | kāryānumānaṃ, kāraṇānumānaṃ, akāryakāraṇānumānaṃ ceti | tatrādyaṃ yathā | dhūmaḥ agneḥ | dvitīyaṃ yathā | viśiṣṭameghonnatiḥ vṛṣṭeḥ | iyāṃstu viśeṣaḥ | kāryaṃ kāraṇamātram anumāpayati | kāraṇaṃ tu samagrameva kāryamiti | tṛtīyaṃ yathā | raso rūpasyeti |

Inference is of three types; inferring of cause from effect, inferring of effect from the totality of cause, and the inferring of one object from the other without any causal connection. The first one is illustrated with the example of inference of fire (cause) by smoke (effect). The second can be explained with the illustration of the inference of rain from dense clouds. One special point to be noted here is that, the effect is sufficient to infer any of the causes, whereas, the totality of cause is necessary to infer the effect. The illustration for the third type of inference is the inference of taste by colour as in the case of mango, where the yellow colour is the sign for the sweet taste.

Classification of inference on the basis of causal connection

पुनर्द्विविधम् । दृष्टं, सामान्यतो दृष्टं चेति । तत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थानुमापकं दृष्टम् । यथा धूमोऽग्नेः । प्रत्यक्षायोग्यार्थानुमापकं सामान्यतो दृष्टम् । यथा रूपादिज्ञानं, चक्षुरादेः । अथवा, यथाभूतयोः व्याप्तिग्रहणं, तथाभूतयोरेव लिङ्गलिङ्गिभावे दृष्टम् । यथा धूमाग्न्योः । व्याप्यव्यापकयोरन्यादृशत्वेऽपि तत्सामान्याकारानुगमेन लिङ्गलिङ्गिभावे, सामान्यतो दृष्टम् । यथा कृषीवलस्य कर्षाणादिप्रवृत्तेः धान्यादि फलवत्वदर्शनेन, यज्ञादेः स्वर्गादिफलानुमानम् । प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तित्वफलवत्त्वसामान्यानुग मात्।

punardvividham | dṛṣṭaṃ, sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ceti | tatra pratyakṣayogyārthānumāpakaṃ dṛṣṭam | yathā dhūmo'gneḥ | pratyakṣā-yogyārthānumāpakaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣtam | yathā rūpādijñānaṃ, cakṣu-rādeḥ | athavā, yathābhūtayoḥ vyāptigrahaṇaṃ, tathābhūtayoreva liṅga-liṅgibhāve dṛṣṭam | yathā dhūmāgnyoḥ | vyāpyavyāpakayoranyādṛśatve'pi tatsāmānyākārānugamena liṅgaliṅgibhāve, sāmānyato dṛṣṭam | yathā kṛṣīvalasya karṣāṇādipravṛtteḥ dhānyādi phalava-tvadarśanena, yajñādeḥ sva-rgādiphalānumānam | prekṣāvatpravṛttitvaphalavat-tvasāmānyānugamāt |

Yet another classification of inference could be of two types; perceived inference and generally perceived inference. There, the inference that is capable of inferring

perceivable objects is of first type e.g., inference of fire with the help of smoke. The second type of inference is of nonperceptible objects like organ of sight for visual perception. Or, it can be interpreted in another way; that inference belongs to the first category i.e., *Dṛṣṭa,* where the objects are taken in inferential process in the same aspect as they are taken in the cognition of pervasion. In the case of smoke and fire, the pervasion is apprehended between smoke and fire within natural aspects. However, in the second category of inference i.e., *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, while apprehending the pervasion, the objects are grasped with specific aspects. During inferential process they are taken with general aspects leaving the specialties. For e.g., on the basis of our observation of fruitfulness in agricultural activity of a farmer in terms of good production of grains, we infer the result of sacrificial activity in terms of experiencing the heaven. Here, while inferring only general aspects of properties such as 'being activity of an intelligent person' and 'fruitfulness' is considered.

Another classification

पुनर्द्विविधम् । साधनानुमानं, दूषणानुमानं चेति । तत्राद्यं यथा । धूमप्रमित्या अग्निप्रमितिसाधनम् । दूषणानुमानमपि द्वेधा । दुष्टिप्रमितिसाधनं, तर्कश्चेति । तत्र आद्यं यथा । नेदं स्वसाध्यसाधनसमर्थम् । प्रमाणबाधितत्वादित्यादि ।

punardvividham | sādhanānumānaṃ, dūṣaṇānumānaṃ ceti | tatrādyaṃ yathā | dhūmapramityā agnipramitisādhanam | dūṣaṇānumānamapi dvedhā | duṣṭipramitisādhanaṃ, tarkaśceti | tatra ādyaṃ yathā | nedaṃ svasādhyas-ādhanasamartham | pramāṇabādhitatvādityādi |

Yet again inference is classified as the inference that establishes the proponent's case and the inference that refutes the case of the opponent. The illustration for the first type is the inference of fire by smoke. Here, the existence of fire is established on the basis of the knowledge of smoke. The rebuttal inference is also of two kinds; showing the defects in opponents' case and counter-factual-reasoning or hypothetical logic. The former helps us to understand the inefficiency of arguments in opponents' case as they go against evidences.

Tarka - the counter-factual-reasoning

कस्यचिद्धर्मस्याङ्गीकारे अर्थान्तरस्यापादनं तर्कः । तस्य पञ्चाङ्गानि । आपादकस्यापाद्येन व्याप्तिः, प्रतितर्केणाप्रतिघातः, आपाद्यस्यानिष्टत्वम् । तत् द्विविधम् । प्रामाणिकहानम्, अप्रामाणिककल्पनं चेति । तत्राद्यं त्रेधा । दृष्ट–अनुमित–श्रुत–हानभेदात् । द्वितीयमपि अदृष्ट–अननुमित–अश्रुत–कल्पनाभेदात् त्रिविधम् । एतदेव कल्प्यानेकत्वे कल्पनागौरवम् इत्युच्यते । आपाद्यस्य विपर्यये पर्यवसानं, परस्याननुकूलत्वं चेति ।

kasyaciddharmasyāṅgīkāre arthāntarasyāpādanaṃ tarkaḥ | tasya pañcāṅgāni| āpādakasyāpādyena vyāptiḥ, pratitarkeṇāpratighātaḥ, āpādyasyāniṣṭatvam | tat dvividham | prāmāṇikahānam, aprāmāṇikakalpanaṃ ceti | tatrādyaṃ tredhā | dṛṣṭa-anumita-śruta-hānabhedāt | dvitīyamapi adṛṣṭa-ananumita-aśrutakalpanābhedāt trividham | etadeva kalpyānekatve kalpanāgauravam ityucyate | āp-ādyasya viparyaye paryavasānaṃ, parasyānanukūlatvaṃ ceti |

Tarka, the counter-factual-reasoning is nothing but inevitable deduction of an object (unwanted to the opponent) in case of admission of some other objects, which is yet to be proved. It has got five parts: a) Pervasion of deducer property by the deduced property b) Nonopposition by counterlogic c) Unwantedness or unacceptability of deduced property d) Reversibility of logical argument (conclusion in negation of a deduced property) and 5) Not being helpful to the opponent. Being unacceptable of deduced property to the proponent himself is of two fold, abandoning of real objects proved by evidences and assuming the unreal objects that are against proof. The former is of three kinds; abandoning of perceived, inferred and heard objects. The latter is also of three types; assuming of unperceived, not inferred and untold objects. Such an argument that assumes numerous unproven objects is called *Kalpanāgaurava*, the heavy assumption.

आपाद्यमनिष्टं पुनः पञ्चधा भिद्यते । आत्माश्रयत्वम्, अन्योन्याश्रयत्वं, चक्रकाश्र-यत्वम्, अनवस्था, केवलानिष्टं चेति । तद्भेदात् तदापादनरूपस्तर्कोऽपि पञ्चविधः । तत्र, तस्यैवोत्पत्तिज्ञप्त्यर्थं तदुत्पत्तिज्ञप्त्यपेक्षाङ्गीकारे, स्वापेक्षया पूर्वभावित्वरूपम्, आत्माश्रयत्वमापाद्यते । यदि घटोऽयमस्यैव घटस्योत्पादकः स्यात्, तर्हि स्वतोपि पूर्वभावी स्यात् । यत् यस्य कारणं, तत् ततोऽपि पूर्वभावि दृष्टम् । यथा पटकारणं तन्तवः, तदपेक्षया पूर्वभाविनः। न चात्र प्रतिकूलस्तर्कोऽस्ति । यदि घटस्य घट एव कारणं न स्यात्, तर्हीदमापद्यते इति । अनिष्टं चेदम् । स्वापेक्षया पूर्वभावित्वस्य अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । व्याहतत्वेन अङ्गीकर्तुमनुचितत्वाच्च । पूर्वभावित्वं हि तदभाववति काले भावः । न च स्वाभाववति काले स्वयं भवतीति न व्याहतम् । न चेत् पूर्वभावित्वमङ्गीक्रियते, तदा न स्वस्य स्वयं कारणम् । न चैवमेवापादकं प्रत्यापादयितुं शक्यत इति पञ्चाङ्गानि ।

āpādyamaniṣṭaṃ punaḥ pañcadhā bhidyate | ātmāśrayatvam, anyonyāśrayatvaṃ, cakrakāśrayatvam, anavasthā, kevalāniṣṭaṃ ceti | tadbhedāt tadāpādanarūpastarkospi pañcavidhaḥ | tatra, tasyaivotpattijñaptyartham tadutpattijñaptyapekṣāṅgīkāre, svāpekṣayā pūrvabhāvitvarūpam, ātmāśrayatvamāpādyate| yadi ghaṭosyamasyaiva ghaṭasyotpādakaḥ syāt, trhi svatopi pūrvabhāvī syāt | yat yasya kāraṇam, tat tatospi pūrvabhāvi dṛṣṭam | yathā paṭakāraṇaṃ tantavaḥ, tadapekṣayā pūrvabhāvinaḥ | na cātra pratikūlastarkos

sti | yadi ghaṭasya ghaṭa eva kāraṇaṃ na syāt, tarhīdamāpadyate iti | aniṣṭaṃ cedam | svāpekṣayā pūrvabhāvitvasya aprāmāṇikatvāt | vyāhata-tvena aṅgīkartumanucitatvācca | pūrvabhāvitvaṃ hi tadabhāvavati kāle bhāvaḥ | na ca svābhāvavati kāle svayaṃ bhavatīti na vyāhatam | na cet pūrvabhāvitvamaṅgīkriyāte, tadā na svasya svayaṃ kāraṇam | na caivamevāpādakaṃ pratyāpādayituṃ śakyata iti pañcāṅgāni |

The deduced property is classified into five; a) self-dependence b) mutual-dependence c) circular-dependence d) infinite regress and e) Complexity or heaviness. According to this classification, *Tarka* is also classified into five kinds.

Self-dependence logic is moved when A is said to be caused by A itself or A is admitted to be known by A itself. This logic shows self-dependency in the form of being of the object A preceded to the self. For e.g., if the pot X is admitted to be produced by pot X itself, then it must be assumed to be present before its existence, which is impossible. For anything that causes the other is found to exist a moment earlier. The threads that act as cause for cloth are found to be preceding its effect. Here, there is no counterlogic for this. Nobody can argue that in case, pot X is not produced by pot X, then there would be some problem. However, this kind of counterargument is not acceptable to anybody. For, pre-existence i.e., being present of an object before its own coming into being is not only unproved but highly illogical too. What is pre-existence of Y? It is nothing but Y being present when X was absent. To say that object X is present in the moment when X is absent, is a total paradox. Hence, in conclusion when the pre-existence of X is not acceptable, it would be established that X is not caused on its own. The proponent's case cannot be rebutted in similar way. This is how the five parts constitute the *Tarka*.

एवं ज्ञप्तावपि तज्ज्ञानस्य तज्ज्ञानं प्रति पूर्वभावित्वमापाद्यम् । द्वयोरितरेतरे कारणत्वाङ्गीकारे तु, अन्योन्यापेक्षया पूर्वभावित्वरूपमन्योन्याश्रयत्वमापाद्यम् । बहूनां चक्रवत्, कार्यकारणभावाभ्युपगमे पूर्वभावित्वलक्षणं चक्रकाश्रयत्वम् । अनवस्थितासिद्धकारणापेक्षायां मूलक्षयापरनामक–प्रतीतकार्यविलोपलक्षणा अनवस्था ।

evaṃ jñaptāvapi tajjñānasya tajjñānaṃ prati pūrvabhāvitvamāpādyam | dvayoritaretare kāraṇatvāṅgīkāre tu, anyonyāpekṣayā pūrvabhāvitvarūpamanyon yāśrayatvamāpādyam | bahūnāṃ cakravat, kāryakāraṇabhāvābhyupagame pūrvabhāvitvalakṣaṇaṃ cakrakāśrayatvam | anavasthitāsiddhakāraṇāpekṣāyāṃ mūlakṣayāparanāmaka-pratītakāryavilopalakṣaṇā anavasthā |

In the same manner, in case of cognitive state, pre-existence of the cognition of X is to be shown when it is admitted to cause for itself.

In case, two distinct objects are agreed to be caused by each other, mutual-dependency i.e., mutual pre-existence has to be posed by the logic. If the similar causal connection is admitted in case of many, then it leads to circular dependency. If the causal connection is an unproven chain and has no end, then infinite regress is to be posed that leads to the lapse of perceived effects by breaking its root.

केवलानिष्टापादनमपि त्रेधा । दृष्ट–अनुमित–श्रुत–हान–आपादनभेदात् । अदृष्ट–अननुमित–अश्रुतकल्पनाऽपादनभेदाच्च । एतदेव कल्प्यानेकत्वे कल्पनागौरवमित्युच्यते । दृष्टहानं यथा । यदि पर्वतो निरग्निकः, तर्हि निर्धूमः स्यादिति । एवम् अन्यस्यापि उदाहरणं शास्त्रे द्रष्टव्यम् ।

kevalāniṣṭāpādanamapi tredhā | dṛṣta-anumita-śruta-hāna-āpādanabhedāt | adṛṣta-ananumita-aśrutakalpanāऽpādanabhedācca | etadeva kalpyānekatve kalpanāgauravamityucyate | dṛṣṭahānaṃ yathā | yadi parvato niragnikaḥ, tarhi nirdhūmaḥ syāditi | evam anyasyāpi udāharaṇaṃ śāstre draṣṭavyam |

Posing the necessity of an unacceptable idea is also of three kinds; impositions of leaving out the perceived, inferred and heard objects. Similarly, deductions of assumption of unperceived, uninferred, and unheard objects are the other three kinds. This kind of assumption itself is termed as *Kalpanāgaurava*, when the number of assumed objects is multiplied.This will lead to contradiction with the proofs. Leaving out the perceived object may be illustrated with the example of smoke and fire, in the form of "if the hills were not fiery, then, they were not smoky". Here, smoke, which is perceived, has to be rejected. Other examples can be traced in different works of *Śāstra*.

अनुमानत्वेऽपि तर्कस्य आपादकासिद्धिः अदूषणम् । पराभ्युपगममात्रस्य तत्र सिद्धिपदार्थत्वात् । एवमापाद्यस्य प्रमाणविरोधः, अपसिद्धान्तश्च न दूषणम् । निर्धूमो भवतीति असाधनात् । यथा साधनानुमाने न व्याप्तिमात्रं, नापि पक्षधर्मतामात्रं साध्यप्रमितिसाधनं, किन्तु मिलितमेव ।

एवमनिष्टापादनं, विपर्यये पर्यवसानं चोभयं मिलितमेव, अनुमितिसाधनं भवतीति तर्कस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यते । सोऽयं क्वचिद्विपरीतशङ्कानिरसनद्वारेण प्रमाणानामनुग्राहकोऽपि भवतीति ।

anumānatveऽpi tarkasya āpādakāsiddhiḥ adūṣaṇam | parābhyupagamamātrasya tatra siddhipadārthatvāt | evamāpādyasya pramāṇavirodhaḥ, apasiddhāntaśca na dūṣaṇam | nirdhūmo bhavatīti asādhanāt | yathā sādhanānumāne na vyāptimātraṃ, nāpi pakṣadharmatāmātraṃ sādhyapramitisādhanaṃ, kintu militameva | evamaniṣṭāpādanaṃ, viparyaye paryavasānaṃ cobhayaṃ militameva,

anumitisādhanaṃ bhavatīti tarkasya prāmāṇyamupapadyate | sosyaṃ kvacidvip arītaśaṅkānirasanadvāreṇa pramāṇānāmanugrāhakospi bhavatīti |

Though *Tarka* is also a kind of inference, wherein *Hetu*, the sign must be agreeable to both the parties, the disagreement of *Āpādaka*, the deducer for proponent in *Tarka* is not a disqualification. Here, only "admission of deducer property by the opponent" serves the purpose of the agreement; one party agreement is sufficient. Along the same lines, contradiction of proof and disagreement with one's own position with respect to the deduced object are not defects either. For, the proponent is not trying to prove that hill is not smoky. Rather, it was just an assumption of existence of smoke in the absence of fire. Just as in case of proving inference, neither the universal relation nor the relation of sign with the inferential subject are enough to prove the probandum; but both of them work together, even in case of *Tarka*, both the deduction of inadmissible object and reverse conclusion lead to right resolution and hence *Tarka* could be a means of knowledge. This tool is sometimes used as a support to other proofs, such as perception and verbal testimony by resolving the wrong assumptions, which are hurdles for the right judgment.

The rejection of classification of inference of Naiyyāyikas

केवलान्वयि–केवलव्यतिरेकि–अन्वयव्यतिरेकि-भेदात् त्रिविधमनुमानमित्येके । साध्यधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी पक्षः । तत्र व्याप्त्या वर्तमानम् । निश्चितसाध्यसमानधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः । तत्र सर्वस्मिन् एकदेशे वर्तमानम् । साध्यतत्समानधर्मरहितो धर्मी विपक्षः । तद्रहितं केवलान्वयी ।

तत् द्विविधम् । सर्वसपक्ष–तदेकदेशवृत्तिभेदात् । शब्दोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वादिति सपक्षव्यापकम् । सर्वस्मिन् अभिधेयतया सम्प्रतिपन्ने, प्रमेयत्वस्य वृत्तेः । गुणत्वादिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्ति । रूपादौ वृत्तेर्घटादाववृत्तेः ।

kevalānvayi-kevalavyatireki-anvayavyatireki-bhedāt trividhamanumānamityeke | sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī pakṣaḥ | tatra vyāptyā vartamānam | niścita-sādhyasamānadharmā dharmī sapakṣaḥ | tatra sarvasmin ekadeśe vartamānam | sādhyatatsamānadharmarahito dharmī vipakṣaḥ | tadrahitaṃ kevalānvayī |

tat dvividham | sarvasapakṣa-tadekadeśavṛttibhedāt | śabdosbhidheyaḥ prameyatvāditi sapakṣavyāpakam | sarvasmin abhidheyatayā sampratipanne, prameyatvasya vṛtteḥ | guṇatvāditi sapakṣaikadeśavṛtti | rūpādau vṛtterghaṭādāvavṛtteḥ |

Naiyyāyikas admit three kinds of inferences: a) *Kevalānvayī,* only having positive pervasion b) *Kevalavyatirekī,* only having negative pervasion and c) *Anvayavyatirekī,* having both positive and negative pervasion. The property-

bearer, which is the locus for the probandum property is called subject. The locus where the probandum is accepted by both is called co-subject. The locus where probandum and its equivalent properties are absent is called countersubject. The *Kevalānvayī* sign is one, which is pervasive in *Pakṣa*, which is located somewhere in *Sapakṣa*, and which does not have a *Vipakṣa*. That is of two kinds. One is present in all instances of *Sapakṣa*, and the other is present only in some instances of *Sapakṣa*. The example for former is in the form, "the sound is expressed, for it is knowable". The sign knowablity is present in all *Sapakṣas* that are expressed by words. The example for latter is the property of 'being quality' for the same proposition. Here the property of "being quality" is present only in qualities like colour etc., not in substances like pot etc., which are expressed as well.

द्विविधा किल व्याप्तिः । अन्वयतो, व्यतिरेकतश्चेति । साधनस्य साध्येन व्याप्तिरन्वयः । साध्याभावस्य साधनाभावेन व्याप्तिः व्यतिरेकः । तत्र अस्य केवलमन्वयः एवास्ति । यत्प्रमेयं तदभिधेयं, यथा घट इति । न तत्र व्यतिरेकः । यदभिधेयं न भवति तत्प्रमेयं न भवति, इति निदर्शनाभावात् । सर्वस्याप्यभिधेयत्वेन अनभिधेयासम्भवात् । तेनैतत् केवलान्वयीत्युच्यते ।

dvividhā kila vyāptiḥ | anvayato, vyatirekataśceti | sādhanasya sādhyena vyāptiranvayaḥ | sādhyābhāvasya sādhanābhāvena vyāptiḥ vyatirekaḥ | tatra asya kevalamanvayaḥ evāsti | yatprameyaṃ tadabhidheyaṃ, yathā ghaṭa iti | na tatra vyatirekaḥ | yadabhidheyaṃ na bhavati tatprameyaṃ na bhavati, iti nidarśanābhāvāt | sarvasyāpyabhidheyatvena anabhidheyāsambhavāt | tenaitat kevalānvayītyucyate |

Universal relation is of two kinds; positive and negative. The pervasion between sign and probandum is a positive relation. The pervasion between the absence of probandum and absence of sign is the relation of negative nature. *Kevalānvayī* has only positive pervasion. Whatever is expressible is knowable e.g., the pot. There is no negative pervasion. For, there is no instance to show that it is not expressible and hence not knowable. Since everything is expressible, nothing is left inexpressible. Hence, this is called *Kevalānvayī*, the sign having only positive pervasion.

पक्षव्यापकम्, अविद्यमानसपक्षं, सर्वस्माद्विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तं, केवलव्यतिरेकि । यथा जीवच्छरीरजातं सात्मकं, प्राणादिमत्त्वादिति । अस्य हि यत्सात्मकं न भवति तत्प्राणादिमन्न भवति, यथा घट इति व्यतिरेक एवास्ति । न तु यत्प्राणादिमत् तत् सात्मकमित्यन्वयः । सर्वस्यापि जीवच्छरीरस्य पक्षत्वात् । अन्यस्य सर्वस्य निरात्मकत्वात् । तेनैतत् केवलव्यतिरेकी इत्युच्यते ।

pakṣavyāpakam, avidyamānasapakṣaṃ, sarvasmādvipakṣād vyāvṛttaṃ, kevalavyatireki | yathā jīvaccharīrajātaṃ sātmakaṃ, prāṇādimattvāditi | asya

hi yatsātmakaṃ na bhavati tatprāṇādimanna bhavati, yathā ghaṭa iti vyatireka evāsti | na tu yatprāṇādimat tat sātmakamityanvayaḥ | sarvasyāpi jīvac-charīrasya pakṣatvāt | anyasya sarvasya nirātmakatvāt | tenaitat kevalavyatirekī ityucyate |

The sign is called *Kevalavyatirekī* having only negative pervasion when it is present everywhere in *Pakṣa*, having no *Sapakṣa*, and having not been present in any of *Vipakṣa*. For instance, it is because of having life etc., that the living body has the self or soul inside. Here, the whole set of living bodies is *Pakṣa* and everything else is non-living. It is therefore called *Kevalavyatirekī.*

पक्षव्यापकं, सपक्षवृत्ति, सर्वविपक्षव्यावृत्तम्, अन्वयव्यतिरेकीति । तदपि द्विविधम् । सर्वसपक्ष-तदेकदेशवृत्तिभेदात् । शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वादिति सपक्षव्यापकम् । सर्वस्मिन्ननित्ये कृतकत्वस्य वृत्तेः । पर्वतोऽग्निमान् धूमवत्वादिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्ति । अग्निमत्यपि क्वचित् वृत्तेः, क्वचिच्च अवृत्तेः । इदं हि यद् धूमवत् तदग्निमत्, यथा महानसः । यदग्निमन्न भवति तद्धूमवन्न भवति, यथा ह्रदः, इति व्याप्तिद्वयसद्भावात् अन्वयव्यतिरेकीत्युच्यते ।

pakṣavyāpakaṃ, sapakṣavṛtti, sarvavipakṣavyāvṛttam, anvayavyatirekīti | tadapi dvividham | sarvasapakṣa-tadekadeśavṛttibhedāt | śabdo'nityaḥ kṛtakatvāditi sapakṣavyāpakam | sarvasminnanitye kṛtakatvasya vṛtteḥ | parvato'gnimān dhūmavatvāditi sapakṣaikadeśavṛtti | agnimatyapi kvacit vṛtteḥ, kvacicca avṛtteḥ | idaṃ hi yad dhūmavat tadagnimat, yathā mahān-asaḥ | yadagnimanna bhavati taddhūmavanna bhavati, yathā hradaḥ, iti vyāptidvayasadbhāvāt anvayavyatirekītyucyate |

The sign, which is pervasive in *Pakṣa*, being present in *Sapakṣa*, and not being present in *Vipakṣa*, is called *Anvayavyatirekī*, the sign having both positive and negative pervasion. This is also of two types; one being present everywhere in *Sapakṣa* and the other being present in some cases of the same. The inference of the form 'the sound is non-eternal, as it is a product' is of the first kind. For, the sign 'product-hood' is present in every non-eternal thing. The second type is 'the hill is fiery since it is smoky'. This sign is present in some cases that are smoky and is not present in some others. It also has two types of universal relations. 'That whatever is smoky is fiery' is positive pervasion and 'that whatever is not fiery is not smoky' is negative pervasion. Therefore, it is *Anvayavyatirekī*, the sign having both positive and negative pervasions.

तदिदमसत् । व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेः प्रकृतसाध्यसिद्धौ अनुपयोगात् । न हि भावेन भावसाधनेऽभावस्याभावेन व्याप्तिरुपयुज्यते । व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतयोः वैय्यधिकरण्यं चैवं सति स्यात् । कथं तर्हि केवलव्यतिरेकिणः शास्त्रे संव्यवहारः इत्थम् । तत्रापि यत् प्राणादिमत् तत्

सात्मकमित्येव व्याप्तिः । किन्तु व्याप्तिग्रहणस्थानस्यैव विप्रतिपत्तिविषयत्वप्राप्त्या, सा दर्शयितुम शक्याऽभूत् । ततोऽनुमानेन तां साधयितुं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरूपन्यस्यते । प्राणादिमत्त्वादिति प्रयुक्ते, कथमस्य व्याप्तिः इति आकाङ्क्षायां ? प्राणादिमत्त्वं सात्मकत्वेन व्याप्तम् । तदभावव्यापकाभावप्रतियोगित्वात् । यद्यदभावव्यापकाभावप्रतियोगि तत् तेन व्याप्तम् । यथा धूमवत्त्वमग्निमत्त्वेनेत्यस्यार्थस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरनुपयुक्तैव । विवक्षितव्याप्तेः प्रत्यक्षादिनैव सिद्धत्वात् । व्यभिचाराभावदर्शनमुखेन कथञ्चित् उपयुज्यते वेति ।

tadidamasat | vyatirekavyāpteḥ prakṛtasādhyasiddhau anupayogāt | na hi bhāvena bhāvasādhanesbhāvasyābhāvena vyāptirupayujyate | vyāptipakṣadharmatāyoḥ vaiyyadhikaraṇyaṃ caivaṃ sati syāt | kathaṃ tarhi kevalavyatirekiṇaḥ śāstre saṃvyavahāraḥ ittham | tatrāpi yat prāṇādimat tat sātmakamityeva vyāptiḥ | kintu vyāptigrahaṇasthānasyaiva vipratipattiviṣayatvaprāptyā, sā darśayitumaśakyāsbhūt | tatosnumānena tāṃ sādhayituṃ vyatirekavyāptirupanyasyate | prāṇādimattvāditi prayukte, kathamasya vyāptiḥ iti ākāṅkṣāyāṃ? prāṇādimattvaṃ sātmakatvena vyāptam | tad abhāvavyāpakābhāvapratiyogitvāt | yadyadabhāvavyāpakābhāvapratiyogi tat tena vyāptam | yathā dhūmavattvamagnimattvenetyasyārthasya vivakṣitatvāt | anvayavyatirekiṇi tu vyatirekavyāptiranupayuktaiva | vivakṣitavyāpteḥ pratyakṣādinaiva siddhatvāt | vyabhicārābhāvadarśanamukhena kathañcit upayujyate veti |

This theory is not correct. For, negative pervasion is of no use in proving the probandum in the *Pakṣa*. It is obvious that while proving a being object (positive) by another being one, the pervasion between the negatives will not be utilized. In that case, pervasion and position of sign in proper loci will not be present in one property-holder, which is not at all acceptable to Naiyyāyikas. If this type of inference is not admissible, then, how is it that *Kevalavyatirekī* inference is employed in many places in *Śāstra*? The answer is as follows. The form of pervasion is "that whatever has got life, breath etc., is resided by the soul". However, this positive pervasion could not be established, since all instances of getting pervasion became the spot of doubt. In that situation, in order to establish the positive pervasion, negative pervasion is employed. When the sign having life, breath etc. is put forward, a question will arise as to how has it got pervasion with the having soul? Then this inference having the form and the sign, which have life etc., is pervaded by the probandum having soul, for, the sign is counterpositive of the absence that is pervasive of absence of probandum. Whatever Y is counterpositive of absence of X, that Y is pervaded by X. For e.g., smoke is pervaded by fire. This kind of proof is intended.

In the case of *Anvayavyatireki*, the sign having both positive and negative pervasion, the negative pervasion is useless. For, positive pervasion required for inference is known through perception etc. Otherwise, we may assume that it is somehow utilized just to show *Vyabhicāra*, the absence of deviation in the sign; nothing else.

On the number of parts of syllogism or inferential argument

पुनरनुमानं द्विविधम् । स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति । तत्र परोपदेशमनपेक्ष्य, यत्स्वयमेव व्याप्तिज्ञानतत्स्मरणसहितं लिङ्गज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत् स्वार्थानुमानम् । यत्तु परोपदेशापेक्षमुत्पद्यते तत् परार्थानुमानम् । तज्जनकत्वात् परोपदेशोऽपि परार्थानुमानमिति क्वचित् उपचर्यते । परोपदेशस्तु पञ्चावयववाक्यानीति नैयायिकादयः । प्रतिज्ञा–हेतु–उदाहरण–उपनय–निगमनानि अवयवाः । एते एव वैशेषिकैः प्रतिज्ञा–उपदेश–निदर्शन–अनुसन्धान–प्रत्याम्नाया इत्युच्यन्ते ।

punaranumānaṃ dvividham | svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ceti | tatra paropadeśam anapekṣya, yatsvayameva vyāptijñānatatsmaraṇasahitaṃ liṅgajñānamutpadyate tat svārthānumānam | yattu paropadeśāpekṣamutpadyate tat parārthānumānam | tajjanakatvāt paropadeśo'pi parārthānumānamiti kvacit upacaryate | paropadeśastu pañcāvayavavākyānīti naiyāyikādayaḥ | pratijñā-hetu-udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigamanāni avayavāḥ | eta eva vaiśeṣikaiḥ pratijñā-upadeśa-nidarśana-anusandhāna-pratyāmnāyā ityucyante |

Again, inference is of two kinds; inference for self (internal infering process), inference for others (inferential argument in the form of syllogism). The inference, which is independent of others argument, the cognition of sign with the recollection of universal relation is internal self-inference. The inference that is based on the argument of others in the form of syllogism is called external inference. The syllogism which causes for formal inference is also termed as inference for others. Informing others is a five-part-argument – this is the view of Naiyyāyikas et al. The five essential parts of syllogism, according to Naiyyāyikas are; a) postulation or thesis proposition b) reason c) illustration d) application and e) conclusion are the five parts. These are differently named by Vaiśeṣikas.

तत्र पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति । तत्र धर्मिणमुद्दिश्य, पश्चात् धर्मो विधातव्यः । साधनत्वख्यापकविभक्त्यन्तं लिङ्गवचनं हेतुः । यथा धूमवत्वादिति । व्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं दृष्टान्तः। स द्विविधः । साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो, वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तश्चेति । तत्रान्वव्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यथा धूमानुमाने महानसः । व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यथा तत्रैव महाह्रद इति ।

सम्यग्व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं दृष्टान्ताभिधानम् उदाहरणम् । तद् द्विविधम् । साधर्म्योदाहरणं, वैधर्म्योदाहरणं चेति । अन्वयव्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभिधानं साधर्म्योदाहरणम् । यथा यो यो धूमवान्, स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस इति । व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभिधानं वैधर्म्योदाहरणम् । यथा योऽग्निमान्न भवति, स धूमवान्न भवति । यथा महाह्रद इति । दृष्टान्ते प्रसिद्धाविनाभावस्य लिङ्गस्य, पक्षे व्याप्तिख्यापकं वचनमुपनयः । सोऽपि दृष्टान्तानुसारेण द्विविधः। तत्र महानस इव पर्वतोऽपि धूमवानिति साधर्म्योपनयः । न च ह्रद इवायं निर्धूमः पर्वत इति वैधर्म्योपनयः । पुनः सहेतुकं पक्षवचनं निगमनम् । यथा तस्मात्पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति ।

tatra pakṣavacanaṃ pratijñā | yathā parvatoऽgnimāniti | tatra dharmiṇamuddiśya, paścāt dharmo vidhātavyaḥ | sādhanatvakhyāpakavibhaktyantaṃ liṅgavacanaṃ hetuḥ | yathā dhūmavatvāditi| vyāptigrahaṇasthalaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ | sa dvividhaḥ | sādharmyadṛṣṭānto, vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaśceti| tatrānvavyāptigrahaṇasthalaṃ sādharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ| yathā dhūmānumāne mahānasaḥ | vyatirekavyāptigrahaṇasthalaṃ vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ | yathā tatraiva mahāhrada iti | samyagvyāptipradarśanapūrvakaṃ dṛṣṭāntābhidhānam udāharaṇam | tad dvividham | sādharmyodāharaṇaṃ, vaidharmyodāharaṇaṃ ceti | anvayavyāptipradarśanapūrvakaṃ sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhidhānaṃ sādharmyodāharaṇam | yathā yo yo dhūmavān, sa soऽgnimān yathā mahānasa iti | vyatirekavyāptipradarśanapūrvakaṃ vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntābhidhānaṃ vaidharmyodāharaṇam | yathā yoऽgnimānna bhavati, sa dhūmavānna bhavati | yathā mahāhrada iti | dṛṣṭānte prasiddhāvinābhāvasya liṅgasya, pakṣe vyāptikhyāpakaṃ vacanamupanayaḥ | soऽpi dṛṣṭāntānusāreṇa dvividhaḥ | tatra mahānasa iva parvatoऽpi dhūmavāniti sādharmyopanayaḥ | na ca hrada ivāyaṃ nirdhūmaḥ parvata iti vaidharmyopanayaḥ| punaḥ sahetukaṃ pakṣavacanaṃ nigamanam | yathā tasmātparvatoऽgnimāniti |

Statement about the inference subject is postulation as in, the hill is fiery. In this statement, keeping the property-bearer as subject, it must be predicated by a property. The statement about sign with the case-ending that indicates instrumentality is called reason. The locus of getting the universal relation is illustration. This is of two kinds; the illustration that is having the same property and having opposite property. The place, where positive pervasion is cognized is the former one. An example would be a kitchen in the case of smoke-fire inference. The place where negative pervasion is cognized is the latter one. An example would be a pond in the same smoke-fire case. The stating of the example while showing the pervasion is illustration. This is of two types. While stating positive pervasion, one can illustrate with an example of shared properties "whatever is smoky, that is fiery" just as kitchen. While stating negative pervasion, one can illustrate with an example with opposite properties– "what is not fiery is not smoky just as a pond".

The statement of pervasion of sign located in the subject, having pervasion of probandum is a well known example is 'application'. This is also of two types according to examples. "The hill too is fiery just as kitchen" is an illustration with shared property, whereas, "the hill is not smokeless like pond" is the other kind. Again, the proposition stating the subject with probandum along with justification is conclusion. For e.g., "therefore, the hill is fiery".

प्रतिज्ञा–हेतु–उदाहरणानि, उदाहरण–उपनय–निगमनानि वा त्रय एवावयवा इति भाट्टा: । उदाहरण–उपनयौ द्वावेति बौद्धा: ।

pratijñā-hetu-udāharaṇāni, udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigamanāni vā traya evāvayavā iti bhāṭṭāḥ / udāharaṇa-upanayau dvāveti bauddhāḥ /

In this context, Bhāṭṭas say that there are only three parts that consist of proposition, reason and illustration, or illustration, application and conclusion. The Bauddhas admit only the two; illustration and application.

तदेतदसत् । व्याप्तिद्वैविध्यनिराकरणेन उदाहरणोपनयद्वैविध्यस्यापि निराकृतत्वात् । नियमानुपपत्तेश्च । न हीदं वाक्यम् आगमतया व्याप्त्यादिबोधकम् । येनाकाङ्क्षाद्यनुसारेण पञ्चावयवादिनियम: स्यात् । परस्य परस्मिन्नाप्त्यनिश्चयात् । निश्चये वा, प्रतिज्ञामात्रेण पूर्तेर्हेत्वाद्यभिधानवैय्यर्थ्यात् । किन्तु गृहीतव्याप्ते: पुरुषस्य, तत्स्मारकत्वादिनाऽगृहीतव्याप्त्यादेस्तु तज्जिज्ञासाजनकत्वेन, उपयुज्यते । व्याप्तिस्मरणादिकं चैतच्चतुर्भिरपि प्रकारैर्भवदनुभूयते । तत्किमनेन नियमेन ।

tadetadasat / vyāptidvaividhyanirākaraṇen udāharaṇopanayadvaividhyasyāpi nirākṛtatvāt / niyamānupapatteśca / na hīdaṃ vākyam āgamatayā vyāptyā-dibodhakam / yenākāṅkṣādyanusāreṇa pañcāvayavādiniyamaḥ syāt / parasya parasminnāptyaniścayāt / niścaye vā, pratijñāmātreṇa pūrterhetvādyabhidhānavaiy yarthyāt / kintu gṛhītavyāpteḥ puruṣasya, tatsmārakatvādināsgṛhītavyāptyādestu tajjijñāsājanakatvena, upayujyate / vyāptismaraṇādikaṃ caitaccaturbhirapi prakārairbhavadanubhūyate / tatkimanena niyamena /

All these theories do not hold good. For, the two kinds of illustration and application are rejected on the basis of the rejection of two types of pervasion. The rigid ruling of fixed number of parts is not right either. This syllogism is not capable of conveying pervasion etc., just in the form of language, for which there could be some rule to have five parts according to expectancy etc. This is not so because there is no faith (judgmental belief of truthfulness) in each other between the proponent and the opponent. Or, if it is there, the proposition itself is enough to establish; therefore, the other parts go futile. However, this will be useful to the person who does have an idea about pervasion by acting as a reminder, and it will

also be useful to the person who does not have an idea about that by acting as a triggering factor and to desire and to know the pervasion etc. It is found that the recollection of pervasion etc., is possible through all these four varieties. Hence, what is the use of this rule? Regulation is in several parts of syllogism.

सम्भवन्ति चान्येऽपि प्रकाराः । पर्वतोऽग्निमान्धूमवत्वात्, महानसवदिति वा । धूमवान्पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति हेतुगर्भं पक्षवचनं वा । विवादेनैन प्रतिज्ञासिद्धौ, कुतः पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति प्रश्ने धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुमात्रं वा । पर्वतस्याग्निमत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति पृष्टे, धूमवत्वमिति लिङ्गोक्तिमात्रं वा । धूमवन्महानसवत्पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति सप्रतिज्ञं हेतुगर्भं दृष्टान्तवचनं वा । अग्निव्याप्यो धूमोऽत्र पर्वतेऽस्तीत्युपनयो वा । व्याप्त्यादिमद्धूमवत्त्वात् पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति निगमनं वेति । सांव्यावहारिकाश्चैते प्रकाराः सर्वेषु शास्त्रेष्वित्येवंप्रकारमनुमानमिति ।

sambhavanti cānyeऽpi prakārāḥ | parvatoऽgnimāndhūmavatvāt, mahānasavaditi vā | dhūmavānparvatoऽgnimāniti hetugarbhaṃ pakṣavacanaṃ vā | vivādenaina pratijñāsiddhau, kutaḥ parvatoऽgnimāniti praśne dhūmavattvāditi hetumātram vā| parvatasyāgnimatve kiṃ pramāṇamiti pṛṣṭe, dhūmavatvamiti liṅgoktimātram vā | dhūmavanmahānasavatparvatoऽgnimāniti sapratijñaṃ hetugarbhaṃ dṛṣṭānta-vacanaṃ vā | agnivyāpyo dhūmoऽtra parvateऽstītyupanayo vā | vyāptyādimad-dhūmavattvāt parvatoऽgnimāniti nigamanaṃ veti | sāṃvyāvahārikāścaite prakā-rāḥ sarveṣu śāstreṣvityevaṃprakāramanumānamiti |

There are other possibilities too. One can simply state a subject having probandum along with the reason like "the hill is fiery because of smoke just like kitchen", or like "the smoky hill has fire". When on the ground of dispute itself, the proposition is known, and the question is raised as to "why is it so", only in that context the reason "because of smoke" is sufficient. If somebody asks "what is the proof to state that the hill has fire?" just a word "the smoke" is enough in reply. Or sometimes, a statement with illustration including reason and proposition as "just like kitchen has smoke, the hill has fire" could also serve the purpose. Or, the application in the form "smoke pervaded by fire exists in the hill" is also fine sometimes. Or, the conclusion having the form "because of having smoke pervaded by fire, the hill is fiery" is also right. Many such kinds of varieties of syllogism are in use in all *Śāstras*. Thus all kinds of inferences are described.

Hetvābhāsas - the fallacies

अथ निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमानमित्युक्तम् । के तत्रोपपत्तिदोषाः । यत्सद्भावे लिङ्गाभिमतं ज्ञानमेव न जनयति, संशयविपर्ययौ वा करोति ते दोषाः। ते द्विविधाः । अर्थवचनदोषभेदात् । तत्र साक्षादुपपत्तेरेव दोषौ, विरोधासङ्गती । तद्द्वारा वचनस्यापि । वचनदोषौ, न्यूनाधिक्ये । वचनद्वारेणार्थस्यापि । तत्र योग्यताभावो विरोधः । आकाङ्क्षाविरहोऽसङ्गतिः ।

अवश्यवक्तव्यस्यैकदेशमात्रवचनं न्यूनम् । सन्निध्यभावविशेषः । आकाङ्क्षितस्यैवान्येन कृतकार्यस्य वचनमाधिक्यम् ।

atha nirdoṣopapattiranumānamityuktam | ke tatropapattidoṣāḥ | yatsad-bhāve liṅgābhimataṃ jñānameva na janayati, saṃśayaviparyayau vā karoti te doṣāḥ | te dvividhāḥ | artha-vacanadoṣabhedāt | tatra sākṣādupa-pattereva doṣau, virodhāsaṅgatī | taddvārā vacanasyāpi| vacanadoṣau, nyū-nādhikye | vacanadvāreṇārthasyāpi | tatra yogyatābhāvo virodhaḥ | ākāṅkṣāvirahossaṅgatiḥ| avaśyavaktavyasyaikadeśamātravacanaṃ nyūnam | sannidhyabhāvaviśeṣaḥ | ākāṅkṣitasyaivānyena kṛtakāryasya vacanamādhikyam |

Objection: Now, inference is defined as the defectless reason. What are the defects of reason?

Response: Defects are those factors of reason due to which the apparent reason does not cause for any cognition at all; or it causes for doubt or error. They are of two types; defects of objects and defects of speech. The two defects that are directly attached to reason are of former category. They are – *Virodha,* the contradiction and *Asaṅgati,* the incongruity. They get related to speech as well through objects. *Nyūna,* the omission of essential and *Adhika,* the unnecessary addition are the two defects of speech. Through the speech they are defects of objects also.

Among them the contradiction is the absence of compatibility. The incongruity is absence of expectancy. The partial statement of necessary content is omission. It is a kind of absence of proximity of word or words. The statement of the content that is essential, but redundant is an addition of extra information.

एते च विरोधादयो द्विविधाः । समयबन्ध–प्रश्न–स्वपक्षसाधन–परपक्षनिराकरणात्म ककथारूपसाधारणाः, अनुमाननिष्ठाश्च । तत्रानुमाननिष्ठास्तावदुच्यन्ते । त्रिविधोऽनुमानविरोधः । प्रतिज्ञा–हेतु–दृष्टान्त–विरोधभेदेन । तत्र प्रमाणविरोधः, स्ववचनविरोध इति द्विविधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोध । प्रमाणविरोधोऽपि द्वेधा । प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधः, समबलप्रमाणविरोधश्चेति । हीनबलस्यानेनैव बाधितस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । प्राबल्यं च द्विविधम् । बहुत्वेन, स्वभावेन च । स्वभावश्चोपजीव्यत्वं, निरवकाशत्वमित्यादिरूपः । प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधभेदेन द्वावपि प्रत्येकं त्रिविधौ । समबलानुमानविरोधोऽपि द्वेधा । तेनैवानुमानेनाऽनुमानान्तरेण चेति । स्ववचनविरोधोऽपि द्विविधः । अपसिद्धान्तो, जातिरिति। तत्र पूर्वाचार्यैर्यत् प्रामाणिकतयाऽभ्युपगतं तद्विरुद्धाङ्गीकारोऽपसिद्धान्तः । पूर्वाचार्यवचनस्यापि स्वयमङ्गीकृतत्वेन स्ववचनत्वात् ।

ete ca virodhādayo dvividhāḥ | samayabandha-praśna-svapakṣasādhana-parapakṣanirākaraṇātmakakathārūpasādhāraṇāḥ, anumānaniṣṭhāśca | tatrānumānaniṣṭhāstāvaducyante | trividhosnumānavirodhaḥ | pratijñā-hetu-dṛṣṭānta-virodhabhedena | tatra pramāṇavirodhaḥ, svavacanavirodha iti dvividhaḥ pratijñāvirodhaḥ | pramāṇavirodhospi dvedhā | prabalapramāṇavirodhaḥ, samabalapramāṇavirodhaśceti | hīnabalasyānenaiva bādhitasyākiñcitkaratvāt | prābalyaṃ ca dvividham | bahutvena, svabhāvena ca | svabhāvaścopajīvyatvaṃ, niravakāśatvamityādirūpaḥ | pratyakṣādivirodhabhedena dvāvapi pratyekaṃ trividhau | samabalānumānavirodhospi dvedhā | tenaivānumānenāsnumānāntareṇa ceti | svavacanavirodhospi dvividhaḥ | apasiddhānto, jātiriti | tatra pūrvācāryairyat prāmāṇikatayāsbhyupagataṃ tadviruddhāṅgīkārospasiddhānta | pūrvācāryavacanasyāpi svayamaṅgīkṛtatvena svavacanatvāt |

These defects are of two types; those, that are common to debate or dialect that includes agreement, questioning, defending the own case and rejecting the others case, but those, that are attributed to inference. The defects related to inference will be put forth first.

Contradiction in inference is of three types; a) contradiction to proposition b) reason and c) illustration. The contradiction to proposition is of two types; a) contradiction by proof and b) contradiction by own statement. The first one is also of two types; a) contradiction by a stronger proof and b) contradiction by equally powerful proof. The contradiction of less powerful reason is not considered, as the same is sublated by the powerful one, though it has nothing to do.

Powerfulness is of two kinds; a) numerical one and b) natural one. Natural power is 'being shelter' and 'being unprivileged' etc. Both are of three types on the varieties of proofs like perception. The contradiction of equally powerful proof is of two kinds; a) contradiction by the same inference or b) by the other inference.

The self-speech-contradiction is also of two types; a) *Apasiddhānta*, the contradiction to own view or theory and b) *Jāti*, the self-contradiction.

The acceptance that contradicts the doctrines admitted by the prior teachers of his own school, whose words are as good as own words, is said to be *Apasiddhānta* i.e., inconsistency to one's own theory.

स्ववचन एव व्याहतिर्जातिः । सा त्रिविधा । एककर्तृके वाक्ये पदयोरवान्तरवाक्ययोर्वा मिथो व्याघातः, क्रियाविरोधः, स्वन्यायविरोधश्चेति । हेतुविरोधोऽपि द्विविधः ।

असिद्धिरव्याप्तिश्चेति । समुचितस्थले लिङ्गस्याप्रमितिरसिद्धिः । अव्याप्तिस्त्रिविधा । लिङ्गस्य साध्येन तदभावेन च संबन्धः, साध्यसंबन्धस्याभावे सति तदभावेनैव सम्बन्धः, उभयसम्बन्धाभावश्चेति । दृष्टान्तविरोधोऽपि द्विविधः । साध्यवैकल्यं साधनवैकल्यं चेति । हेत्वादौ स्ववचनविरोधोऽसिद्ध्यादिनैव सङ्गृहीतः इति नोक्तः । एवमसङ्गतिन्यूनाधिक्यान्यपि प्रतिज्ञा-हेतु-दृष्टान्तसम्बन्धभेदेन प्रत्येकं त्रिविधानि । एतेषां उदाहरणानि कथारूपसाधारणान्, विरोधादींश्च परोदीरितनिग्रहस्थानानामेतेष्वेवान्तर्भावं वदन्तो दर्शयिष्यामः ।

svavacana eva vyāhatirjātiḥ | sā trividhā | ekakartṛke vākye padayoravāntaravākyayorvā mitho vyāghātaḥ, kriyāvirodhaḥ, svanyāyavirodhaśceti | hetuvirodhospi dvividhaḥ | asiddhiravyāptiśceti | samucitasthale liṅgasyāpramitirasiddhiḥ | avyāptistrividhā | liṅgasya sādhyena tadabhāvena ca saṃbandhaḥ, sādhyasaṃbandhasyābhāve sati tadabhāvenaiva sambandhaḥ, ubhayasambandhābhāvaśceti | dṛṣṭāntavirodhospi dvividhaḥ | sādhyavaikalyaṃ, sādhanavaikalyaṃ ceti | hetvādau svavacanavirodhossiddhyādinaiva saṅgṛhītaḥ iti noktaḥ | evamasaṅgatinyūnādhikyānyapi pratijñā-hetu-dṛṣṭāntasambandhabhedena pratyekaṃ trividhāni | eteṣāṃ udāharaṇāni kathārūpasādhāraṇān, virodhādīṃśca parodīritanigrahasthānānāmeteṣvevāntarbhāvaṃ vadanto darśayiṣyāmaḥ |

The paradox in own words is *Jāti,* the self-contradictory. It is of three kinds; a) in case the contradiction is seen between two words or two parts of sentence used by a single person b) if it is between one's own speech and action, then it is contradiction by own action and c) if the contradiction is between one's own speech and accepted principles, then it is contradiction by own principles.

The contradiction to reason is of two kinds; *Asiddhi,* the non-establishment and *Avyāpti,* the non-pervasion. Non-apprehension of sign in an appropriate location is *Asiddhi.* Non-pervasion is of three kinds; the relation of sign with both probandum and its absence, relation of sign with the absence of probandum only, the non-relation of the both probandum and its absence.

The contradiction to illustration is also of two types; lacking probandum and lacking reason. In reason, *Asiddhi,* the non-establishment takes care of contradiction to one's own speech also. Hence it is not seperately narrated. Similarly, *Asaṅgati, Nyūna, Adhika* are of threefold on the basis of the verities of *Pratijñā, Hetu,* and *Dṛṣṭānta.* We will give the example for these types, while explaining the inclusion of 'points of holding' defined by other schools into defects that are characterized by us.

न केवलमुपपत्तिदोषाणां विरोधादिभिः सङ्ग्रहः । किं नाम ? नैय्यायिकनिरूपिताशेषनिग्रहस्थानां वक्तृदोषाभ्यां संवादानुक्तिभ्यां युतानाम् एतेष्वेवान्तर्भावः । ततश्च विरोधासङ्गती, न्यूनाधिके, संवादानुक्ती इति षडेव निग्रहस्थानानि । विप्रतिपन्नप्रमेयाङ्गीकारः संवादः । परबोधनार्थस्यावश्यं वक्तव्यस्यावचनमनुक्तिः ।

na kevalamupapattidoṣāṇāṃ virodhādibhiḥ saṅgrahaḥ | kiṃ nāma? naiyyāyika nirūpitāśeṣanigrahasthānānāṃ vaktṛdoṣābhyāṃ saṃvādānuktibhyāṃ yutānām eteṣvevāntarbhāvaḥ | tataśca virodhāsaṅgatī, nyūnādhike, saṃvādānuktī iti ṣaḍeva nigrahasthānāni | vipratipannaprameyāṅgīkāraḥ saṃvādaḥ | parabodhanārthasyāvaśyaṃ vaktavyasyāvacanamanuktiḥ |

Not only the defects of reason, but also all the twenty-four internal classification points of holding that are detailed by Naiyyāyikas will be included in our small group of defects like *Virodha* group of defects, that include two or more defects of a the speaker; *Saṃvāda,* the admission of desputed tenet and *Anukti,* being speechless. Thus, there are only six 'points of holding or seize' 1) *Virodha,* the contradiction, 2) *Asaṅgati,* the incongruity, 3) *Nyūna,* the deficit, 4) *Adhika,* the surplus, 4) *Saṃvāda*, the admission of desputed tenet and 5) *Anukti,* the speechlessness.

The *Saṃvāda* is defined as the admission of disputed tenet and *Anukti* is defined as during the debate holding the facts is necessary to explain to others for their understanding.

Detailed list of *Nigrahasthānas* and their inclusion

कथायामखण्डिताहङ्कारेण परेण परस्याहङ्कारखण्डनं पराजयो निग्रह इति चोच्यते । तन्निमित्तं निग्रहस्थानम् । अहङ्कारखण्डनं च स्वपक्षसाधनपरपक्षदूषणसङ्कल्पभ्रंशः । अत एव कथाबाह्यानि, कथायामप्यपस्मारोन्मादादिदशापन्नानि झटिति संवरणेन तिरोहितोद्भावनावसराणि पुरस्फूर्तिकानधिकृतोद्भावितानि च व्यवच्छिन्नानि । परोक्तस्ववक्तव्ययोरज्ञानं विपरीतज्ञानं वा निग्रहः । तल्लिङ्गं निग्रहस्थानमिति वा ।

kathāyāmakhaṇḍitāhaṅkāreṇa pareṇa parasyāhaṅkārakhaṇḍanaṃ parājayo nigraha iti cocyate | tannimittaṃ nigrahasthānam | ahaṅkārakhaṇḍanaṃ ca svapakṣasādhanaparapakṣadūṣaṇasaṅkalpabhraṃśaḥ | ata eva kathābāh-yāni, kathāyāmapyapasmāronmādādidaśāpannāni jhaṭiti saṃvaraṇena tirohitodbhāvanāvasarāṇi purasphūrtikānadhikṛtodbhāvitāni ca vyavacchinnāni | paroktasvavaktavyayorajñānaṃ viparītajñānaṃ vā nigrahaḥ | tallingaṃ nigrahasthānamiti vā |

In the debate, one is taking over the other by crushing his pride, while not being defeated by him. This is said to be defeat or hold or seize of the opponent. The

ground of defeat is called *Nigrahasthāna*, the point of hold or the point of seize. Here, crushing the self-pride of the opponent means making them unsuccessful in their pledge for establishing their stand and discarding that of others. Therefore, the grounds that are placed outside the debate and even in the debate, if they are pointed out during the period of mental or physical instability or any other such situation, those that lose their context by shifting of topic, and those that are raised by an unauthorized person, are avoided. The seize can be defined in another way i.e., the lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of what is presented by others and what is one's own response. The sign of that is point of seize.

तानि च, (१) प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, (२) प्रतिज्ञान्तरं, (३) प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, (४) प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः, (५) हेत्वन्तरं, (६) अर्थान्तरम्, (७) निरर्थकं, (८) अविज्ञातार्थम्, (९) अपार्थकम्, (१०) अप्राप्तकालं, (११) न्यूनम्, (१२) अधिकम्, (१३) पुनरुक्तं, (१४) अननुभाषणम्, (१५) अज्ञानम्, (१६) अप्रतिभा, (१७) विक्षेपः, (१८) मतानुज्ञा, (१९) पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम्, (२०) निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः, (२१) अपसिद्धान्तः, (२२) हेत्वाभासश्चेति द्वाविंशतिः ।

tāni ca, (1) pratijñāhāniḥ, (2) pratijñāntaraṃ, (3) pratijñāvirodhaḥ, (4) pratijñāsannyāsaḥ, (5) hetvantaraṃ, (6) arthāntaram, (7) nirarthakaṃ, (8) avijñātārtham, (9) apārthakam, (10) aprāptakālaṃ, (11) nyūnam, (12) adhikam, (13) punaruktaṃ, (14) ananubhāṣaṇam, (15) ajñānam, (16) apratibhā, (17) vikṣepaḥ, (18) matānujñā, (19) paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam, (20) niranuyojyānuyogaḥ, (21) apasiddhāntaḥ, (22) hetvābhāsaśceti dvāviṃśatiḥ |

There are twenty-two *Nigrahasthānas*; 1) Loss of proposition 2) Change of proposition 3) Contradiction to proposition 4) Renouncing proposition 5) Change of reason 6) Change of object 7) Uselessness 8) Unknown object 9) Absurdity 10) Untimeliness 11) Deficit 12) Excessiveness 13) Redundancy 14) Speechless state 15) Ignorance 16) Lack of instantaneous response 17) Discontinuation 18) Acceptance to opposition 19) Ignoring the seize-point 20) Pointing-unduly 21) Conflicting with one's own doctrine and 22) Defects of reason.

Note: This part of the book (page no. 58 - 86) is highly technical. Hence, no literal translation is given for this part. Instead, we have given an account of the whole part at the end of this portion, for the benefit of readers, which we hope serves the purpose to some extent. This explanation is partly derived from the book "Epistemology of Dvaita Vedanta" by Dr P Nagaraja Sharma

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः ।। तत्र येन यद्यथा साध्यत्वादिना निर्दिष्टं, तेन तस्य तथा परित्यागः प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात् इत्युक्ते अनैकान्तिकत्वेन च प्रयुक्ते, 'मा भूत्तर्हि पर्वतोऽग्निमान् इति । अयन्तु संवाद एव ।

pratijñāhāniḥ || tatra yena yadyathā sādhyatvādinā nirdiṣṭam, tena tasya tathā parityāgaḥ pratijñāhāniḥ | yathā parvatosgnimān prameyatvāt ityukte anaikāntikatvena ca prayukte, 'mā bhūttarhi parvatosgnimān' iti | ayantu saṃvāda eva |

Pratijñāhāni is the giving up of what has been stated as the proposition. Suppose, the proponent declares that the mountain has fire because it is an object of cognition, and the opponent points out that the reason is inconclusive. For this, if the former replies, 'let the mountain have no fire', this becomes a vulnerable point. This can be included in *Saṃvāda*, the admission.

प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ।। प्रथममविशिष्टतयोक्ते साध्यभागे पुनर्विशेषणप्रक्षेपः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् । प्रतिज्ञोदाहरणे प्रयोज्यभागो, निगमनं चेति साध्यभागः । यथा शब्दोऽनित्य इति प्रतिज्ञाते, ध्वनिभिः सिद्धसाधनत्वोद्भावने, वर्णात्मकः शब्दोऽनित्य इत्यादि । अत्र वक्तव्यम् । किं पूर्वैव कथाऽनुवर्ततेऽथ कथान्तरम् । नाद्यः, एकस्य साधनस्य दूषणस्य वा स्थितौ भङ्गे वा कथायाः परिसमाप्तत्वात् । साधनान्तरोपन्यासस्यावसाराभावात् व्यर्थत्वात् । नचेदं पूर्वोक्तमेव । तथात्वे पूर्वदूषणेनैव दुष्टत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः । तथासति प्रथममेव विशिष्टस्योपात्तत्वेन प्रतिज्ञान्तराभावात् । वादे तु कथैक्येऽपि न निग्रहस्थानम् । शङ्कानिवृत्तिपर्यन्तं प्रतिवक्तव्यत्वात् । सत्यम् । निवृत्तयोरपि जल्पवितण्डयोः पुनर्विशेषणं प्रक्षिपतः को दोष इति चेत्, असङ्गत्यादिकमिति ब्रूमः । तदपि कथाबाह्यत्वान्न निग्रहस्थानम् ।

pratijñāntaram || prathamamaviśiṣṭatayokte sādhyabhāge punarviśeṣaṇa-prakṣepaḥ pratijñāntaram | pratijñodāharaṇe prayojyabhāgo, nigamanaṃ ceti sādhyabhāgaḥ| yathā śabdosnitya iti pratijñāte, dhvanibhiḥ siddhasādhana-tvodbhāvae, varṇātmakaḥ śabdosnitya ityādi | atra vaktavyam | kiṃ pūrvaiva kathāsnuvartatestha kathāntaram | nādyaḥ, ekasya sādhanasya dūṣaṇasya vā sthitau bhaṅge vā kathāyāḥ parisamāptatvāt | sādhanāntaropanyāsasyāvasārāb hāvāt vyarthatvāt | nacedaṃ pūrvoktameva | tathātve pūrvadūṣaṇenaiva duṣṭatvaprasaṅgāt | na dvitīyaḥ| tathāsati prathamameva viśiṣṭasyopāttatvena pratijñāntarābhāvāt | vāde tu kathaikyespi na nigrahasthānam | śaṅkānivṛtti-paryantaṃ prativaktavyatvāt | satyam | nivṛttayorapi jalpavitaṇḍayoḥ punar-viśeṣaṇaṃ prakṣipataḥ ko doṣa iti cet, asaṅgatyādikamiti brūmaḥ | tadapi kathābāhyatvānna nigrahasthānam |

Pratijñāntara is the qualifying of the statement by adding adjectives to that, which is already stated. On hearing the statement of the proponent 'sound is non-eternal', the opponent may point out that inarticulate sound is accepted to be non-eternal and there is no necessity of proving it. In that case, if the proponent adds *Varṇātmaka,* the articulate to the subject and thereby effects a

change in his original thesis, it is called *Pratijñāntara*. Here the question arises, 'is the previous debate continuing, or is it a fresh debate?' It cannot be the continuation of the previous debate; once a point is proved or the defect in the opponent's argument is pointed out, as the debate comes to a close. It is useless to add any words after the end of the debate. If it is the beginning of a fresh debate, there is no addition to the previous statement. Thus *Pratijñāntara* proves not to be a vulnerable point at all.

प्रतिज्ञाविरोध: ।। एकवक्तृके वाक्ये पदानामवान्तरवाक्यानां वा मिथो व्याघात: प्रतिज्ञाविरोध: । यथा मे माता वन्ध्येति । द्रव्यं गुणव्यतिरिक्तमव्यतिरिक्तत्वादिति । अयं च प्रथमजातित्वात् स्ववचनविरोध एव ।

pratijñāvirodhaḥ || ekavaktṛke vākye padānāmavāntaravākyānāṃ vā mitho vyāghātaḥ pratijñāvirodhaḥ | yathā me mātā vandhyeti | dravyaṃ guṇavyatirikt amavyatiriktatvāditi | ayaṃ ca prathamajātitvāt svavacanavirodha eva |

Pratijñāvirodha is the self-contradication in the words or sentences of an individual. For e.g., 'My mother is childless'. This is included in *Svavacanavirodha.*

प्रतिज्ञासन्यास: ।। स्वोक्तापलाप: प्रतिज्ञा–संन्यास: । यथाऽग्निरनुष्ण इत्युक्ते प्रत्यक्षविरोधे चाभिहिते ब्रवीति, 'न मयाऽग्निरनुष्ण इत्यभिहित' इति सोऽपि प्रमाणविरोध: एव । उक्ते: प्रमितत्वात् ।

pratijñāsannyāsaḥ || svoktāpalāpaḥ pratijñā-saṃnyāsaḥ | yathāsgniranuṣṇa ityukte pratyakṣavirodhe cābhihite bravīti, 'na mayāsgniranuṣṇa ityabhihita' iti sospi pramāṇavirodhaḥ eva | ukteḥ pramitatvāt |

Pratijñāsannyāsa is a denial of one's own words. On hearing the statement 'fire is not hot', if the opponent points out that the statement is opposed to general perception, then the proponent changes his stand and says, 'I did not say that fire is not hot'. This is included in *Pramāṇavirodha.*

हेत्वन्तरम् ।। प्रथमविशिष्टतयोक्ते साधकांशे पुनरधिकप्रक्षेपो हेत्वन्तरम् । हेतु:, उदाहरणे प्रयोजकांश:, उपनयो, दूषणं चेति साधकांश: । यथा शब्दो नित्य ऐन्द्रियकत्वादित्युक्ते सामान्येनानैकान्त्येऽभिहिते सामान्यवत्वे सतीत्यादि । एतत्प्रतिज्ञान्तरनिरासेनैव निरस्तम् । प्रतिज्ञाग्रहणस्योक्तोपलक्षणत्वेन पृथङ् न वक्तव्यं च । अनुपलक्षणत्वे तूदाहरणान्तरादिकमपि पृथग्वाच्यं स्यात् । प्रतिज्ञापदेन साध्यांश: एवोपलक्ष्यत इति चेन्न वैय्यर्थ्यात् । अन्यथा प्रतिज्ञाहान्यादावपि किं विभागो न क्रियत इति ।

hetvantaram || prathamaviśiṣṭatayokte sādhakāṃśe punaradhikaprakṣepo hetvantaram | hetuḥ, udāharaṇe prayojakāṃśaḥ, upanayo, dūṣaṇaṃ ceti

sādhakāṃśaḥ | yathā śabdo nitya aindriyakatvādityukte sāmānyenānaikāntye 'bhihite sāmānyavatve satītyādi | etatpratijñāntaranirāsenaiva nirastam | pratijñāgrahaṇasyoktopalakṣaṇatvena pṛthaṅ na vaktavyaṃ ca | anupalakṣaṇatve tūdāharaṇāntarādikamapi pṛthagvācyaṃ syāt | pratijñāpadena sādhyāṃśaḥ evopalakṣyata iti cenna vaiyyarthyāt | anyathā pratijñāhānyādāvapi kiṃ vibhāgo na kriyāta iti |

Hetvantara is modifying the reason, which was first stated without any qualification. Sound is non-eternal because it is cognized by the senses. When such an inference is stated, the critic points out that the *Hetu* is deviated with regard to the universal which though cognized by the senses is accepted to be eternal and the proponent then qualifies his statement by adding the words, 'while possessing a universal'. This defect, like *Pratijñāntara*, is dismissed on the ground that it is not a vulnerable point at all.

अर्थान्तरम् ।। प्रकृतानुपयुक्तान्वितोक्तिरर्थान्तरम् । यथा शब्दो नित्यः, प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः। हेतुशब्दश्च हिनोतेर्धातोस्तुन्प्रत्यये कृते सति कृदन्तं पदमित्यादि । इदम नाकाङ्क्षितत्वादसङ्गति-रेवेति ।

arthāntaram || prakṛtānupayuktānvitoktirarthāntaram | yathā śabdo nityaḥ, prameyatvādityatra prameyatvaṃ hetuḥ | hetuśabdaśca hinoterdhātostunpratyaye kṛte sati kṛdantaṃ padamityādi | idamanākāṅkṣitatvādasaṅgatireveti |

Arthāntara is making an additional statement not useful in the context but having a syntactical relation, e.g., 'Sound is non-eternal, *Hetu,* the cause being an object of cognition. The term *Hetu* is derived from *hin,* the root that has *tun*, the suffix'. This is included in *Asaṅgati.*

निरर्थकम् ।। अवाचकपदप्रयोगो निरर्थकम् । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कचटतपानां जबगडदत्वादित्यादि । इदं त्वनुक्तिरेव ।

nirarthakam || avācakapadaprayogo nirarthakam | yathā śabdo nityaḥ kacaṭatapānāṃ jabagaḍadatvādityādi | idaṃ tvanuktireva |

Nirarthaka is the use of meaningless words, e.g., 'Sound is eternal because *ka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa* is *ja, ba, ga, ḍa, da'*. This is included in *Anukti* because a proper reason is not given.

अविज्ञातार्थम् ।। त्रिवारमुक्तेऽपि परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यामविज्ञातार्थवाचकपदमविज्ञातार्थम् । यथा कश्यपतनयाधृतिहेतुरयं त्रिनयन-तनयासनसमाननामधेययुक्त इत्यादि । तद्ध्वजवत्त्वादित्यादि । इदमप्यनुक्तिरेव ।

avijñātārtham || trivāramukteṣpi pariṣatprativādibhyāmavijñātārthavācakapada mavijñātārtham | yathā kaśyapatanayādhṛtiheturayaṃ trinayanatanayāsanasam-ānanāmadheyayukta ityādi | taddhvajavattvādityādi | idam apy-anuktireva |

Avijñātārtha is the use of obscure words, the meanings of which are not understood by the assembly and the opponents, even after the statement is repeated thrice. For e.g., 'This is the cause of supporting the daughter of Kaśyapa, which is conjoined with that which has the same name as the vehicle of the son of the three-eyed, because it possesses the latter's flag'. The above inference when stated in ordinary, intelligible terms is 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke'. This is included under *Anukti.*

अपार्थकम् ।। अनन्वितवाचकपदादिप्रयोगोऽपार्थकम् । यथा कुण्डमजाजिनं दशदाडिमानि षडपूपा इत्यादि । इदं च स्फुटमसङ्गतम् ।

apārthakam || ananvitavācakapadādiprayogoṣpārthakam | yathā kuṇḍamajā-jinaṃ daśadāḍimāni ṣaḍapūpā ityādi | idaṃ ca sphuṭamasaṅgatam |

Apārthaka is the use of words, which have individual meanings but are not syntactically related, for e.g., '*Kuṇḍa*, the sacrificial hearth, *Ajājina*, the skin of sheep, *Daśadāḍima*, the ten pomegranates, and *Ṣadapūpa*, the six cakes'. This comes under *Asaṅgati.*

अप्राप्तकालम् ।। क्रमविपर्यासोऽप्राप्तकालम् । यथा कृतकत्वादनित्य: शब्द इत्यादि । इदं किञ्चिन्न निग्रहस्थानम् । प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवत्प्रमाणमित्यादिसंव्यवहारात् । निग्रहस्थानं त्वसङ्गतिरेव ।

aprāptakālam || kramaviparyāsoṣprāptakālam | yathā kṛtakatvādanityaḥ śabda ityādi | idaṃ kiñcinna nigrahasthānam | pravṛttisāmarthyādarthavatpramāṇamit yādisaṃvyavahārāt | nigrahasthānaṃ tvasaṅgatireva |

Aprāptakāla is the reversal of the accepted order of the members of a syllogism, e.g., 'because it is made, sound is non-eternal'. This is not a vulnerable point; there are instances of such valid usages as in the case, 'because it generates fruitful activity, *Pramaṇa* serves a purpose' (*Nyāyabhāṣya*).

न्यूनम् ।। अवश्योपादेयानामन्यतमानुपदानं न्यूनम् । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमान्महानसवदित्यादि । एतन्न्यूनमेव ।

nyūnam || avaśyopādeyānāmanyatamānupadānaṃ nyūnam | yathā parvatoṣ gnimānmahānasavadityādi | etannyūnameva |

Nyūna is the omission of one of the essential factors in a statement, e.g., 'the mountain has fire, like the kitchen'. Here the statement of the reason is omitted. This is the omission.

अधिकम् ।। अन्वितोपयुक्तापुनरुक्तकृतकार्यप्रयोगोऽधिकम् । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमान् धूमवत्वात्प्रकाशविशेषवत्त्वाच्चेत्यादि । एतदधिकमेव । पुनरुक्तम् ।। प्रतीतार्थस्य पुनः स्ववचनेन प्रयोजनं विनाऽभिधानं पुनरुक्तम् । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमान् पर्वतोऽग्निमानित्यादि । एतदधिकमेव ।

adhikam || anvitopayuktāpunaruktakṛtakāryaprayogosdhikam | yathā parvatosgnimān dhūmavatvātprakāśaviśeṣavattvāccetyādi | etadadhikameva |

Adhika is the use of words, which have syntactical relation, and are not respective and are not entirely irrelevant, but serve a purpose already achieved by other words in the statement, e.g., 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke and also because it has luminosity'.

पुनरुक्तम् ।। प्रतीतार्थस्य पुनः स्ववचनेन प्रयोजनं विनाऽभिधानं पुनरुक्तम् । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमान् पर्वतोऽग्निमानित्यादि । एतदधिकमेव ।

punaruktam || pratītārthasya punaḥ svavacanena prayojanaṃ vināsbhidhānaṃ punaruktam | yathā parvatosgnimān parvatosgnimānityādi | etadadhikameva |

Punarukta is repeating one's own words without any purpose even after the meaning has been understood, e.g., 'the mountain has fire, and the mountain has fire'. This is included in *Adhika*.

अननुभाषणम् ।। वादिनोक्तस्य प्राश्निकैर्विज्ञातार्थस्य वादिना परिषदा वा पुनरनूद्य दत्तस्योच्चारणयोग्यस्य स्वाज्ञानमनाविष्कुर्वता कथामविच्छिन्दता यदप्रत्युच्चारणं तदननुभाषणम् । तत्पञ्चविधम् । यत्तदित्याद्यनुवादो, दूष्यैकदेशानुवादः, केवलं दूषणोक्तिः, अन्यथानुवादः, तूष्णीभावश्चेति । तत्राद्यत्रयं न्यूनम् । चतुर्थमसङ्गतम् । पञ्चमम् अनुक्तिः ।

ananubhāṣaṇam || vādinoktasya prāśnikairvijñātārthasya vādinā pariṣadā vā punaranūdya dattasyoccāraṇayogyasya svājñānamanāviṣkurvatā kathāmavicchindatā yadapratyuccāraṇaṃ tadananubhāṣaṇam | tatpañcavidham | yattadityādyanuvādo, dūṣyaikadeśānuvādaḥ, kevalaṃ dūṣaṇoktiḥ, anyathānuvādaḥ, tūṣṇībhāvaśceti | tatrādyatrayaṃ nyūnam | caturtham asaṅgatam | pañcamam anuktiḥ |

Ananubhāṣaṇa is the case where, though the proponent's statement is understood by the judges and is iterated by the proponent or the assembly, the opponent fails to reply to the statement, but hides his ignorance without breaking the debate. It is of five kinds; arguments like 'what the disputant said is this', restating the defective part in the statement, stating only the defects, misstating the case and silence. The first three are included under *Nyūna*, the fourth under *Asaṅgati* and the fifth under *Anukti*.

अज्ञानम् ।। वादिना त्रिवारमभिहितस्य परिषदा विज्ञातार्थस्य वाक्यस्यार्थाप्रतिपत्तिरज्ञानम् ।

ajñānam || vādinā trivāramabhihitasya pariṣadā vijñātārthasya vākyasyārthā-pratipattirajñānam |

Ajñāna is non-comprehension of the meaning of a statement, which has been repeated by the disputants, and the meaning of which is understood by the assembly. This is included in *Anukti*.

अप्रतिभा ।। वादिनोक्तस्य प्रत्युत्तराप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा ।

apratibhā || vādinoktasya pratyuttarāpratipattirapratibhā |

Apratibhā is when, the opponent does not know the answer to the question asked by the disputant. This is included in *Anukti.*

विक्षेपः ।। केनचिद् व्याजेन कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः । यथा, कथामारभ्याह– अद्य मे महत्प्रयोजनमस्ति तस्मिन्नवसिते वक्ष्यामीति । एतत्त्रयमनुक्तिरेव ।

vikṣepaḥ || kenacid vyājena kathāvicchedo vikṣepaḥ | yathā, kathām ārabhyāha adya me mahatprayojanamasti tasminnavasite vakṣyāmīti | etattrayamanuktireva |

Vikṣepa is stopping the debate by making some excuses. This is included in *Anukti.*

मतानुज्ञा ।। इष्टापादनं मतानुज्ञा । यथा केनचित् स्वस्य चोरत्वमभ्युपेत्य त्वं चोरः पुरुषत्वादित्युक्ते, तर्हि तवापि चोरत्वं प्रसज्येतेति । इयमसङ्गतिरेव । पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ।। अवश्योद्भाव्यतया प्राप्तनिग्रहस्थानानुद्भावनं पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् । इदमप्यनुक्तान्तर्गतम् ।

matānujñā || iṣṭāpādanaṃ matānujñā | yathā kenacit svasya coratvama-bhyupetya tvaṃ coraḥ puruṣatvādityukte, tarhi tavāpi coratvaṃ prasajyeteti | iyamasaṅgatireva|

Matānujñā is deducing what is acceptable to the opponent. For e.g., if the proponent, while admitting himself to be a thief accuses the opponent that 'you are a thief because you are a man' and the opponent replies 'then you too should be a thief'. This comes under *Asaṅgati.*

पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ।। अवश्योद्भाव्यतया प्राप्तनिग्रहस्थानानुद्भावनं पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् । इदमप्यनुक्तान्तर्गतम् ।

paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam || avaśyodbhāvyatayā prāptanigrahasthānānudbhāv-anaṃ paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam | idamapyanuktāntargatam |

Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa is a failure to point out the vulnerable point when it should be pointed out. This comes under *Anukti.*

निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ।। अतन्निग्रहप्राप्तौ तन्निग्रहोद्भावनं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः । स चतुर्विधः । (१) छलम् । (२) जातिः । (३) हान्याद्याभासः । (४) अप्राप्तकाले ग्रहणं चेति ।

niranuyojyānuyogaḥ || atannigrahaprāptau tannigrahodbhāvanaṃ niranuyo-jyānuyogaḥ | sa caturvidhaḥ | (1) chalam | (2) jātiḥ | (3) hānyādyābhāsaḥ | (4) aprāptakāle grahaṇaṃ ceti |

Niranuyojyānuyoga is asserting the presence of a particular vulnerable point, which actually has not arisen. It is of four kinds; a) *Chala* b) *Jāti* c) *Hānyādyābhyāsa* and d) *Aprāptakāle grahaṇa.*

छलम् ।। तत्र परोक्तस्य तदभिप्रेतार्थादर्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य तद्दूषणेन परोक्तभङ्गः छलम् । यथा गृष्टिविवक्षया गामानयेत्युक्ते पृथिवीविवक्षया गवानयनमशक्यमिति । एतदसङ्गतम् । विवक्षितदूषणस्यैवाकाङ्क्षितत्वात् । छलवाक्यस्यप्यर्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य गवनयनमित्यनन्वितमिति दूषणसम्भवेन स्वन्यायविरोधेऽप्यन्तर्भवति छलम् ।

chalam || tatra paroktasya tadabhipretārthādarthāntaraṃ parikalpya tadd-ūṣaṇena paroktabhaṅgaḥ chalam | yathā gṛṣṭivivakṣayā gāmānayetyukte pṛthivī-vivakṣayā gavānayanamaśakyamiti | etadasaṅgatam | vivakṣitadūṣaṇasyaivākāṅ kṣitatvāt | chalavākyasyapyarthāntaraṃ parikalpya gavanayanamityananvitamiti dūṣaṇasambhavena svanyāyavirodheṣpyantarbhavati chalam |

Defeating the opponent's point in a debate by interpreting the words used by him in a sense other than the one intended by him is called *Chala*, e.g., this is when one uses the word *Gau* to mean a cow and the other interprets it as 'earth'. This is a case of *Asaṅgati. Jāti* is quibbling.

The different types of *Jāti,* the enumerated by the *Nyāya* school are treated in detail by Jayatīrtha. *Hānyādyābhyāsa* seems *Pratijñāhāni,* etc. It is included in *Pramaṇavirodha. Aprāptakāle grahaṇa* is the raising of a vulnerable point at a wrong time. It is included in *Asaṅgati.*

Jāti - the futile objections

जातिः ।। सिद्धमपि दूषणासमर्थमुत्तरं जातिः । असामर्थ्यं च द्विविधम् । साधारणम्, असाधारणं च । तत्र साधारणं स्वव्याहतिः, असाधारणं तु युक्ताङ्गहीनत्वम्, अयुक्ताङ्गाधिकत्वम्, अविषयवृत्तित्वं चेति । सा च साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्य-उत्कर्ष-अपकर्ष-वर्ण्य-अवर्ण्य-विकल्प-साध्य-प्राप्ति-अप्राप्ति-प्रसङ्ग-प्रतिदृष्टान्त-अनुत्पत्ति-संशय-प्रकरण-अहेतु-अर्थापत्ति-अविशेष-

उपपत्ति–उपलब्धि–अनुपलब्धि–नित्य–अनित्य–कार्य–समभेदाच्चतुर्विंशतिधा । तत्र वादिना स्थापनाय हेतौ प्रयुक्तेऽनभ्युपेतयुक्ताङ्गेन प्रतिप्रमाणेन प्रतिपक्षोद्भावनं प्रतिधर्मसमाजातिः । सा च प्रत्यक्षाभासादिभेदेन बहुविधा ।

jātiḥ || siddhamapi dūṣaṇāsamarthamuttaraṃ jātiḥ | asāmarthyaṃ ca dvividham| sādhāraṇam, asādhāraṇaṃ ca | tatra sādhāraṇaṃ svavyāhatiḥ, asādhāraṇaṃ tu yuktāṅgahīnatvamayuktāṅgādhikatvamaviṣayavṛttitvaṃ ceti | sā ca sādharmya-vaidharmya-utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-prāpti-aprāpti-prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭānta-anutpatti-saṃśaya-prakaraṇa-ahetu-arthāpatti-aviśeṣa-upapatti-upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-nitya-anitya-kārya-sama bhedāccaturviṃśatidhā| tatra vādinā sthāpanāya hetau prayuktesnabhyupetayuktāṅgena pratipramāṇena pratipakṣodbhāvanaṃ pratidharmasamājātiḥ | sā ca pratyakṣābhāsādibhedena bahuvidhā |

Those objections of an opponent, which do not have the necessary efficacy to refute the proponent's arguments and are accepted as such by both the disputants are called *Jāti*, the futile objections. These are generally intended to score a victory over the proponent in case he is not alert enough to see through the futility and falsity of the objection. The Nyāya school enumerates twenty-four types of *Jāti*, which Jayatīrtha includes in the defects of inference accepted by him.

तत्र व्याप्तिहीनेनानुमानेन यत्प्रतिपक्षचोदनं तद् द्विविधम् । साधर्म्येण वैधर्म्येण च ।

साधर्म्यसमः ।। तत्र साधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानं साधर्म्यसमः प्रतिषेधः । यथा यदि महानससाधर्म्याद् धूमवत्त्वादग्निमान्पर्वत इष्यते, तर्हि ह्रदसाधर्म्याद् द्रव्यवादनग्निरपि किं नेष्यत इति ।

tatra vyāptihīnenānumānena yatpratipakṣacodanaṃ tad dvividham | sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca |

sādharmyasamaḥ || tatra sādharmyeṇa pratyavasthānaṃ sādharmyasamaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ | yathā yadi mahānasasādharmyād dhūmavattvādagnimānparvata iṣyate, tarhi hṛdasādharmyād dravyattvādanagnirapi kiṃ neṣyata iti |

Sādharmyasama is questioning the proponent's argument with an inference which has no pervasion but based on some similarity. For e.g., Proponent says 'this mountain has fire because it has smoke, like the kitchen', and the opponent replies 'let the mountain have no fire because of possessing *Dravyatva*, the substanceness, like the lake'.

वैधर्म्यसमः ।। वैधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानं वैधर्म्यसमः प्रतिषेधः । यथा यदि ह्रदवैधर्म्याद् धूमवत्वात्पर्वतोऽग्निमानिष्यते तर्हि महानसवैधर्म्यात्पर्वतत्वादनग्निः किं नेष्यत इति । अत्र

व्याप्तिलक्षणयुक्ताङ्गराहित्यमेव प्रथममुद्भाव्यम् । न तु जातित्वम् । परचित्तवर्तिनो व्याप्त्यनभ्युपगमस्याद्यापि ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् । यदा तु परो ब्रूयात्साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यमात्रं प्रयोजकं किं व्याप्त्येति । तदा वक्तव्यम् – एवं सति नेदं साधकं सत्प्रतिपक्षितत्वादिति । त्वदनुमानस्यापि व्याप्तिहीनेन साधर्म्येण वैधर्म्येण वा प्रतिपक्षसंभवाद्व्याघात इति । तथा च प्रतिषेधे स्वन्यायविरोधात्मकतृतीयजातवन्तर्भावः इति ।

vaidharmyasamaḥ || vaidharmyeṇa pratyavasthānaṃ vaidharmyasamaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ | yathā yadi hṛdavaidharmyād dhūmavatvātparvatoऽgnimāniṣyate tarhi mahānasavaidharmyātparvatatvādanagniḥ kiṃ neṣyata iti | atra vyāptilakṣaṇayuktāṅgarāhityameva prathamamudbhāvyam | na tu jātitvam | para-cittavartino vyāptyanabhyupagamasyādyāpi jñātumaśakyatvāt | yadā tu paro brūyātsādharmyavaidharmyamātraṃ prayojakaṃ kiṃ vyāptyeti | tadā vaktavyam - evaṃ sati nedaṃ sādhakaṃ satpratipakṣitatvāditi | tvadanumānasyāpi vyāptihīnena sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa vā pratipakṣa-saṃbhavādv vyāghāta iti | tathā ca pratiṣedhe svanyāyavirodhātmakatṛtīyajātav antarbhāvaḥ iti |

Vaidharmyasama is the same as the above except that the argument proceeds on the ground of some dissimilarity, e.g., 'if the mountain has fire because of being dissimilar to the lake in respect of possessing smoke, why cannot the mountain have no fire because of being dissimilar to the kitchen in respect of possessing the attribute 'mountainness'?

In these two cases, there is no pervasion in the opponent's argument. If the opponent declares that only some similarity or dissimilarity is needed for an inference and not pervasion, it has to be pointed out that his argument also can be refuted by a counterargument based on some similarity or dissimilarity without the need of any pervasion. The principle enunciated by the opponent refutes his own inference; hence Jayatīrtha classifies these two types of *Jāti* under *Svanyāyavirodha*.

उत्कर्षसमः ।। वादिसाधनसामर्थ्येन साध्यस्येव व्याप्तिं विना कस्यचिदनिष्टधर्मस्य दृष्टान्तात्पक्षे उत्कर्षः उत्कर्षसमः । यदि धूमवत्वान्महानसवदग्निमान्पर्वतस्तर्हि तत एव तद्वदेव स्थाल्यादिमानपि स्यादिति । अत्रापि व्याप्तिवैकल्यात् तर्काभासो अयमित्युत्तरं वक्तव्यम् । साहचर्यमात्रेण तर्कस्य प्रवृत्तेः किं व्याप्त्येति वदतः स्वन्यायविरोधेन व्याघात इति ।

utkarṣasamaḥ || vādisādhanasāmarthyena sādhyasyeva vyāptiṃ vinā kasyacid-aniṣṭadharmasya dṛṣṭāntātpakṣe utkarṣaḥ utkarṣasamaḥ | yadi dhūmavatvānm ahānasavadagnimānparvatastarhi tata eva tadvadeva sthālyādimānapi syāditi

| atrāpi vyāptivaikalyāt tarkābhāso ayamityuttaraṃ vaktavyam | sāhacarya-mātreṇa tarkasya pravṛtteḥ kiṃ vyāptyeti vadataḥ svanyāyavirodhena vyāghāta iti |

Utkarṣasama is deducing the existence of some irrelevant things in the subject on the strength of their presence in the example, using the same reason as used by the proponent, e.g., 'if the mountain has fire because it has smoke, like the kitchen, then why should it not have cooking vessels also like the kitchen? Here, it may be pointed out that the inference has no pervasion. If the opponent then declares that what is necessary for an inference is the fact of being together and not pervasion, then his argument can be refuted similarly by taking into account 'being together' and non-pervasion. This *Jāti* can also come under *Svanyāyavirodha.*

अपकर्षसमः ।। पक्षादिष्टधर्मापकर्षणम् अपकर्षसमः इत्येके । यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वादित्युक्ते, तर्हि तत एव तद्वदेव शब्दः श्रावणोऽपि मा भूदिति । अत्र वक्तव्यम्, किमिदं साधनमुतापादन-मिति । नाद्यः । अर्थान्तरत्वेन निरनुयोज्यानुयोगत्वाभावात् । द्वितीये तु उत्कर्षसम एवायम् । न हि भावोत्कर्षोऽभावोत्कर्ष इत्येतावता भेदः संभवति ।

apakarṣasamaḥ || pakṣādiṣṭadharmāpakarṣaṇam apakarṣasamaḥ ityeke | yathā śabdo'nityaḥ kṛtakatvādityukte, tarhi tata eva tadvadeva śabdaḥ śrāvaṇo'pi mā bhūditi | atra vaktavyam, kimidaṃ sādhanamutāpādanamiti | nādyaḥ | arthān-taratvena niranuyojyānuyogatvābhāvāt | dvitīye tu utkarṣasama evāyam | na hi bhāvotkarṣo'bhāvotkarṣa ityetāvatā bhedaḥ saṃbhavati |

Apakarṣasama is deducing the non-existence of some admitted attributes in the subject, e.g., 'If sound is non-eternal because it is produced, like the pot, then let sound not be an object of hearing because it is produced, like the pot'. Here the purpose of the opponent's argument is to be ascertained. If it is to establish the point that sound is not an object of hearing, then the argument suffers from the defect of *Arthāntara.* If it is an argument to refute the proponent, then it is not different from *Utkarṣasama.* The difference between *Utkarṣasama,* which deduces a positive attribute and *Apakarṣasama,* which deduces the non-existence of an admitted attribute, it does not count much.

उदयनस्तु दृष्टान्ते साध्येन साधनेन वा सहचरितस्य कस्यचिद्धर्मस्य निवृत्त्या, पक्षे तयोरन्यतराभावसाधनमपकर्षसम इत्याह । यथा महानसेऽग्निमत्त्वेन धूमवत्त्वेन वा सह दृष्टस्य स्थाल्यादिमत्त्वस्य पर्वतेऽभावात्तयोरप्यभावः । तत्र साध्याभावसाधने सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं बाधो वाऽऽरोप्यः । साधनाभावसाधने त्वसिद्धिरिति । इदमप्यसत् । साध्याभावसाधने साधर्म्यसम प्रकरणसमाभ्यां भेदाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद्व्याप्त्यनपेक्षया पक्षे साधनाभावसाधनमेवापकर्षसमः ।

तत्र व्याप्त्यभावः साधनग्राहकप्रमाणाविरोधश्चेत्युत्तरं वाच्यम् । साहचर्यमेव प्रयोजकं किं व्याप्त्यादिनेति ब्रुवाणं प्रति स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

udayanastu dṛṣṭānte sādhyena sādhanena vā sahacaritasya kasyaciddharmasya nivṛttyā, pakṣe tayoranyatarābhāvasādhanamapakarṣasama ityāha | yathā mahānaseऽgnimattvena dhūmavattvena vā saha dṛṣṭasya sthālyādimattvasya parvateऽbhāvāttayorapyabhāvaḥ | tatra sādhyābhāvasādhane satpratipakṣatvaṃ bādho vāऽऽropyaḥ | sādhanābhāvasādhane tvasiddhiriti | idamapyasat | sādhyābhāvasādhane sādharmyasamaprakaraṇasamābhyāṃ bhedābhāvaprasaṅgāt | tasmādvyāptyanapekṣayā pakṣe sādhanābhāvasādhanamevāpakarṣasamaḥ | tatra vyāptyabhāvaḥ sādhanagrāhakapramāṇāvirodhaścetyuttaraṃ vācyam | sāhacaryameva prayojakaṃ kiṃ vyāptyādineti vruvāṇaṃ prati svanyāyavirodha iti |

According to Udayana, *Apakarṣasama* consists of deducing the non-existence of either the reasons or the probandum in *Pakṣa*, the subject on the ground of the absence of certain things found together with either of them in the example, 'the mountain has no fire, or it has no smoke, because of the non-existence of the cooking vessels, which were found together with smoke and fire in the kitchen'. This is also not sound. If it is an argument to deduce the non-existence of the probandum, it is not different from *Sādharmyasama* or *Prakaraṇasama*. Therefore, it has to be accepted that *Apakarṣasama* is that argument, which seeks to establish the non-existence of reasons in the subject without accepting the principle of pervasion.

वर्ण्यसमः ।। पक्षवद् दृष्टान्तस्यापिसाध्यत्वचोदनं वर्ण्यसम इत्येके । तदसत् । दृष्टान्ते साध्यसाधनविप्रतिपत्त्या चोदने सदुत्तरत्वात् । एवमेव चोदनस्य निर्बीजतयाऽसम्भवदुक्तिकत्वात् । एवं तेनैव हेतुना साध्यत्वचोदनमपि निर्बीजम् । पक्षे हेतुः साध्येन सहचरित उपलब्धो, दृष्टान्तस्यापि तदापादयतीत्येवं चोदनायामुत्कर्षसम एव । पक्षे दृष्टान्ते चोत्कर्षणमित्येतावता भेदेऽतिप्रसङ्गः । साध्यसमाच्च भेदाभावः । तस्मात् पक्षमात्रविवक्षितासिद्धार्थत्वादिरूपवद्धेतुमत्त्वतदभावयोर्दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यत्वापादनं वर्ण्यसम इत्युदयनः । यथाऽसिद्धार्थं धूमवत्वं पर्वत इव महानसेऽस्ति चेत्, सोऽपि साध्यवत्तया साध्यः स्यात् । न चेत्साधनवत्त्या साध्यः स्यादिति । अत्रापि हेतुस्वरूपस्य सद्भावमात्रेण दृष्टान्तत्वोपपत्तौ रूपविशेषचिन्ता व्यर्थेति वाच्यम्। तदावश्यकत्वाभ्युपगमे तु स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

varṇyasamaḥ || pakṣavad dṛṣṭāntasyāpisādhyatvacodanaṃ varṇyasama ityeke | tadasat | dṛṣṭānte sādhyasādhanavipratipattyā codane saduttaratvāt | evameva codanasya nirbījatayāऽsambhavaduktikatvāt| evaṃ tenaiva hetunā sādhyatvacodanamapi nirbījam | pakṣe hetuḥ sādhyena sahacarita upalabdho, dṛṣṭāntasyāpi tadāpādayatītyevaṃ codanāyāmutkarṣasama eva | pakṣe dṛṣṭānte

cotkarṣaṇamityetāvatā bhedestiprasaṅgaḥ | sādhyasamācca bhedābhāvaḥ | tasmāt pakṣamātravivakṣitāsiddhārthatvādirūpavaddhetumattvatadabhāvayordṛṣṭāntasya sādhyatvāpādanaṃ varṇyasama ityudayanaḥ | yathāssiddhārthaṃ dhūmavatvaṃ parvata iva mahānasessti cet, sospi sādhyavattayā sādhyaḥ syāt | na cetsādhanavattyā sādhyaḥ syāditi | atrāpi hetusvarūpasya sadbhāvamātreṇa dṛṣṭāntatvopapattau rūpaviśeṣacintā vyartheti vācyam | tadāvaśyakatvābhyupagame tu svanyāyavirodha iti |

Varṇyasama is stating the objection that the example also has to be proved as having the probandum and the reasons just like the subject. If this objection is the result of genuine doubt regarding the proved existence of the probandum, and the reasons in the example, then it is not a futile objection. Otherwise, there is no reason why such an objection should be made. If the opponent further urges that the reasons in the example are to be proved on the ground that in the subject it has the attribute of 'having to be proved', then this is not different from *Utkarṣasama*.

Udayana defines *Varṇyasama* as deducing the reasons that have the same characteristics in the example as in the subject, including the attribute of 'having to be proved'. The case is argued as follows; if the reasons present in the example are the same as the one in the subject, then the probandum in the example also has to be proved as in the subject. If the reasons present in the example are other than the one in the subject, it has to be proved afresh.

Here, the opponent is to be answered that, the mere presence of the reasons in the example are enough to vouch for their validity. There is no necessity for reasons in the subject to be present in the same form as in the example. If the opponent insists on the presence of the identical form of reasons, then his arguments has to be included in *Svanyāyavirodha* as the inference advanced by him can also be refuted on the same ground.

अवर्ण्यसमः ।। दृष्टान्तवत्पक्षस्याप्यसाध्यत्वचोदनम् अवर्ण्यसम इत्येके । अत्रापि सिद्धत्वाभिमानेन चादेने सदुत्तरम् । अन्यथा निर्बीजत्वम् । साधनसाहचर्यबलेनाऽपादने तूत्कर्षसम एव । तस्माद् दृष्टान्तमात्रविवक्षित–सिद्धार्थत्वादिरूपवद्धेतुमत्त्वतदभावयोः पक्षस्यासाध्यत्वचोदनम वर्ण्यसम इत्युदयनः । यथा सिद्धार्थं धूमवत्वं महानस इव पर्वते वर्तते चेत्साध्यस्य सिद्धत्वादसाध्यत्वम् । न चेदुपायाभावादसाध्यत्वमिति । अस्यापि पूर्ववदन्तर्भावो वाच्य इति ।

avarṇyasamaḥ || dṛṣṭāntavatpakṣasyāpyasādhyatvacodanam avarṇyasama ityeke | atrāpi siddhatvābhimānena cādene saduttaram | anyathā nirbījat-vam | sādhanasāhacaryabalenāspādane tūtkarṣasama eva | tasmād dṛṣṭānta-

mātravivakṣita-siddhārthatvādirūpavaddhetumattvatadabhāvayoḥ pakṣasyāsād hyatvacodanamavarṇyasama ityudayanaḥ / yathā siddhārthaṃ dhūmavatvaṃ mahānasa iva parvate vartate cetsādhyasya siddhatvādasādhyatvam/ na cedupāyābhāvādasādhyatvamiti / asyāpi pūrvavadantarbhāvo vācya iti /

Avarṇyasama is deducing the probandum has been already established in the subject because of its being established in the example. If the deduction is made in the belief that the probandum has been established in respect of the subject, it is a valid reasoning and therefore ceases to be a futile objection. If it is otherwise, there is no reason why such a deduction should be attempted. If the deduction is based merely on the strength of the coexistence of the reasons and the probandum, it is an example of *Utkarṣasama.*

Udayana defines *Avarṇyasama* as deducing the established nature of the probandum in the subject on the strength of the reasons having the same characteristics in the example, such as 'being proved'. If the same reasons as related to an established predicate (smoke which is present in the kitchen) is present in the mountain, the probandum as in the example is established in the subject. If it is not so, the probandum ceases to be a probandum since there are no reasons to prove it. The proponent may point out that, in the opponent's inference, one can deduce the same defect, i.e., the probandum in respect of the subject is established in the example. Hence, this leads to inclusion of this *Jāti* into *Svanyāyavirodha.*

विकल्पसम: ।। धर्माणां धर्मान्तरव्यभिचारदर्शनेन साधनस्यापि साध्यव्यभिचारचोदनं विकल्पसम: । यथा कृतकत्व–अविशेषेऽपि किञ्चिन्मूर्तं दृष्टं घटादि, किञ्चिदमूर्तं रूपादि, तथा कृतकमपि किंचिन्नित्यं किंचिदनित्यं किं न स्यादिति । अत्र शङ्कामात्रं चेत्सदुत्तरमेव । उपाध्यभावादिना समाधेयं धर्मान्तरव्यभिचारेणास्यापि व्यभिचारसाधनं चेद्धर्मान्तरव्यभिचारो हेतुर्वा स्यात् दृष्टान्तो वा । आद्ये व्याप्त्यभावो वक्तव्य: । द्वितीये हेत्वभावान्न्यूनम् । हेतोरनङ्गत्वादिहेत्वङ्गीकारे प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमसाङ्कर्यम् । धर्मत्वादिहेत्वङ्गीकारे व्याप्त्यभाव एव । तदनङ्गीकारे तु स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

vikalpasamaḥ // dharmāṇāṃ dharmāntaravyabhicāradarśanena sādhanasyāpi sādhyavyabhicāracodanaṃ vikalpasamaḥ / yathā kṛtakatva-aviśeṣes pi kiñcinmūrtaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ ghaṭādi, kiñcidamūrtaṃ rūpādi, tathā kṛtakam-api kiṃcinnityaṃ kiṃcidanityaṃ kiṃ na syāditi / atra śaṅkāmātraṃ cet sad-uttarameva / upādhyabhāvādinā samādheyaṃ dharmāntara-vyabhicāreṇāsyāpi vyabhicārasādhanaṃ ceddharmāntaravyabhicāro heturvā syāt dṛṣṭānto vā / ādye vyāptyabhāvo vaktavyaḥ / dvitīye hetvabhāvānnyūnam / hetoranaṅgat-vādihetvaṅgīkāre pratidṛṣṭāntasamasāṅkaryam / dharmatvādihetvaṅgīkāre vyā-ptyabhāva eva / tadanaṅgīkāre tu svanyāyavirodha iti /

Vikalpasama is deducing the inconstancy of the reasons and the probandum on the strength of the inconstancy of certain attributes, e.g. 'the attribute "producibility" is found in the pot, which is *Mūrta*, the concrete as well as in the colour of the pot, which is *Amūrta*, the abstract. On the same ground, let certain things that are produced be eternal and the others non-eternal'. Here, if this is a mere doubt, it is answerable. In that case, the absence of any adjunct has to be indicated. Further, if the opponent holds that his arguments are means to refute the proponent, then it is to be ascertained if the inconstancy is shown here as the reason or as an example. If it is a reason, it has no pervasion. If it is the example, there is the nonstatement of the reason and so it is *Nyūna*. Further, it proves to be not any different from *Pratidṛṣṭāntasama*. If the opponent does not agree that pervasion is necessary for inference, then it proves to be a case of *Svanyāyavirodha*.

साध्यसमः ।। साध्यवद् दृष्टान्तस्यापि साध्यत्वचोदनं साध्यसम इत्येके । तदसत् । विप्रतिपत्त्या चोदने सदुत्तरत्वात् । एवमेव चोदनेऽसम्भवदुक्तिकत्वात् । तेनैष हेतुना साध्यत्वापादनेऽप्येवमेव । वर्ण्यसमवद्बीजोपपादने तु तदभेदः । तस्मात् क्रोडीकृतधर्म्यादिविषयस्य लिङ्गस्य धर्म्यादावप्रयोजकत्वे साध्येऽपि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात् तेनैव हेतुना धर्म्यादेरपि साध्यत्वापादनं साध्यसम इत्युदयनः । व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मवत्तयैव प्रयोजकत्वोपपत्तेस्तत्सिद्धतामात्रेण साधनाङ्गत्वसम्भवात् तेनैव हेतुना साधनमित्युत्तरं वाच्यम् । तदनङ्गीकारे तु स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

sādhyasamaḥ || sādhyavad dṛṣṭāntasyāpi sādhyatvacodanaṃ sādhyasama ityeke | tadasat | vipratipattyā codane saduttaratvāt | evameva codaneऽsambhavaduktikatvāt | tenaiṣa hetunā sādhyatvāpādaneऽpyevam eva | varṇyasamavadbījopapādane tu tadabhedaḥ | tasmāt kroḍīkṛtadharmyādiviṣayasya liṅgasya dharmyādāvaprayojakatve sādhyeऽpi tathātvaprasaṅgāt tenaiva hetunā dharmyāderapi sādhyatvāpādanaṃ sādhyasama ityudayanaḥ | vyāptipakṣadharmavattayaiva prayojakatvopapattestatsiddhatāmātreṇa sādhanāṅgatvasambhavāt tenaiva hetunā sādhanamityuttaraṃ vācyam | tadanaṅgīkāre tu svanyāyavirodha iti |

Sādhyasama is deducing the unestablished nature of the probandum in the example as in the proposition. This view is not correct. If the argument is stated in order to find out the disputed nature of the probandum, then it is valid. If it is a mere objection, it has no justification.

Udayana defines *Sādhyasama* as 'questioning why the reason cannot prove the existence of the subject, the reason itself, and their attributes as well as the probandum'. The answer is that the existence of the subject is already proved

as pervasion and *Pakṣadharmatā* (presence in the appropriate place, which is the sense of the term in Madhva's philosophy) are necessary conditions for an inference. If the opponent holds that they are not, it is to be pointed out that his argument can also be refuted by an inference, which has no pervasion and *Pakṣadharmatā*. Therefore, it is included in *Svanyāyavirodha*.

प्राप्तिसमः ।। अप्राप्तिसमः ।। साधनस्य साध्यप्राप्तिपक्षनिरासेन तस्य साधनत्वभङ्गः प्राप्तिसमः । प्राप्तिपक्षनिरासेन तद्भङ्गः अप्राप्तिसमः । कृतिज्ञप्तिसाधारणमिदं जातिद्वयम्। यथा धूमज्ञानमग्निज्ञानं प्राप्य जनयति चेत्, सतैव प्राप्तिरिति तस्य प्राक् सिद्धत्वान्नोत्पादकम्। तथा धूमज्ञानमग्निं प्राप्य ज्ञापयति चेत्तर्ह्यन्यस्याः प्राप्तेरसम्भवाद्विविषयविषयिभावे वक्तव्ये धूमज्ञान एवाग्नेः स्फुरणान्न तज्ज्ञापकत्वमिति प्राप्तिसमः । अप्राप्योत्पादकत्वं ज्ञापकत्वं चेत्तन्न । क्वाप्यदर्शनात् । न ह्यप्राप्याग्निः काष्ठं दहति । नापि प्रकाश्यमप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाशयति। अतिप्रसङ्गश्चान्यथेत्यप्राप्तिसमः। अत्र कृतौ सामर्थ्यलक्षणप्राप्तिसद्भावेनातिप्रसङ्गाभावात् । स्वरूपप्राप्तिरनपेक्षितैव । ज्ञाप्तावपि तद्व्याप्तिलिङ्गविषयत्वरूपप्राप्तिसद्भावेन अतिप्रसङ्गाभावाद्विषयविषयिभावः अनपेक्षित एवेत्युत्तरं वाच्यम् । एतदनङ्गीकृत्य स्वरूपप्राप्त्यादिकमपेक्षमाणस्य स्वन्यायेन व्याघात इति ।

prāptisamaḥ || aprāptisamaḥ || sādhanasya sādhyaprāptipakṣanirāsena tasya sādhanatvabhaṅgaḥ prāptisamaḥ | prāptipakṣanirāsena tadbhaṅgaḥ aprāptisamaḥ| kṛtijñaptisādhāraṇamidaṃ jātidvayam | yathā dhūmajñānamagnijñānaṃ prāpya janayati cet, sataiva prāptiriti tasya prāk siddhatvānnotpādakam | tathā dhūmajñānamagniṃ prāpya jñāpayati cet tarhyanyasyāḥ prāpterasambhavādviviṣayaviṣayibhāve vaktavye dhūmajñāna evāgneḥ sphuraṇānna tajjñāpakatvamiti prāptisamaḥ | aprāpyotpādakatvaṃ jñāpakatvaṃ cettanna | kvāpyadarśanāt | na hyaprāpyāgniḥ kāṣṭhaṃ dahati | nāpi prakāśyamaprāpya pradīpaḥ prakāśayati | atiprasaṅgaścānyathetyaprā ptisamaḥ | atra kṛtau sāmarthyalakṣaṇaprāptisadbhāvenātiprasaṅgābhāvāt | svarūpaprāptiranapekṣitaiva | jñāptāvapi tadvyāptiliṅgaviṣayatvarūpaprāptisad bhāvenātiprasaṅgābhāvādviṣayaviṣayibhāvoऽnapekṣita evetyuttaraṃ vācyam | etadanaṅgīkṛtya svarūpaprāptyādikamapekṣamāṇasya svanyāyena vyāghāta iti |

Prāptisama is the refutation of the reason as being a reason on the assumption that the cognition of the reason originates the cognition of the probandum after becoming related to it.

Aprāptisama is the refutation of the same on the assumption that the cognition of the reason causes that of the probandum without becoming related to it.

If the cognition of smoke gives rise to the cognition of fire after becoming related to it, it follows that the cognition of fire must have already existed. Hence, the

cognition of fire is not caused by the cognition of smoke because the cognition of fire is already there. Or, if the cognition of smoke becomes related with fire and then gives rise to the cognition of fire, no other type of relation exists between the cognition of smoke and the fire accepting that of cognition and the object of cognition. The cognition of smoke has fire also. Thus, there is cognition of fire already established. If it is contended that the cognition of the reason gives rise to the cognition of the probandum without becoming related to it, we should reply that there is no such instance. Fire does not burn a stick without becoming related to it, nor does a lamp illuminate an object without becoming related to it.

The proponent replies that the reason gives rise to the cognition of the probandum by its own potency to become related to the probandum. The object of the cognition of smoke is not mere smoke, but smoke as related to the pervasion. If the opponent does not agree to it, it proves to be a case of *Svanyāyavirodha* as in the inference used by him, there is the same doubt as to whether the reasons give rise to the cognition of the probandum after becoming related to it or before.

प्रसङ्गसमः ।। अनवस्थाभासप्रसञ्जनं प्रसङ्गसमः । यथा पर्वतस्योत्पादकं वाच्यम् । तस्यापीत्यनवस्था । एवं पर्वतस्य ज्ञापकं वाच्यम् । तस्यपीत्यनवस्थेति । अत्र सिद्धविषयत्वेनावस्थानसम्भवेन मूलक्षयभावाददोषत्वमिति वाच्यम् । तदनङ्गीकारे तु स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

prasaṅgasamaḥ || anavasthābhāsaprasañjanaṃ prasaṅgasamaḥ | yathā parvatasyotpādakaṃ vācyam | tasyāpītyanavasthā | evaṃ parvatasya jñāpakaṃ vācyam | tasyapītyanavastheti | atra siddhaviṣayatvenāvasthānasambhavena mūlakṣayabhāvādadoṣatvamiti vācyam | tadanaṅgīkāre tu svanyāyavirodha iti |

Prasaṅgasama is deducing apparent infinite regress, e.g., when the familiar inference of fire from smoke is stated, the opponent remarks; 'What is the origin of the mountain? What is the origin of the origin of mountain? Thus it leads to infinite regress.' Here, it is to be answered that since an established thing has a definite ground, it cannot be contested. If the opponent does not agree to this, it should be pointed out to him that his inference also can be refuted for the same reasons. Thus, it is a case of *Svanyāyavirodha*.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमः ॥ प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रत्यवस्थानं प्रतिदृष्टान्तसम इत्येके । तदसत् । साधर्म्यसमादावपि तद्भावात् । यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः, ऐन्द्रियकत्वादित्युक्ते वदति । यदि घटदृष्टान्तेन ऐन्द्रियकत्वादनित्यस्तर्हि सामान्यदृष्टान्तेन नित्यः किं न स्यादिति । व्यभिचारचोदनाभिप्रायेण

प्रवृत्तेन साधर्म्यादिसाङ्कर्यमिति चेन्न । अस्यासदुत्तरत्वात् । तस्माद्धेतुनिरपेक्षेण प्रतिदृष्टान्तमात्रेण बाधप्रतिरोधयोरन्यतरोद्भावनं प्रतिदृष्टान्त सम इत्युदयनः । यथा यदि महानसदृष्टान्तेनाग्निमानिष्यते तर्हि ह्रददृष्टानेनानाग्निकोऽस्त्वित्यादि । अत्र न्यूनत्वं वाच्यम् । हेतोरनङ्गत्वाभिमाने तु स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

pratidṛṣṭāntasamaḥ || pratidṛṣṭāntena pratyavasthānaṃ pratidṛṣṭāntasama ityeke | tadasat | sādharmyasamādāvapi tadbhāvāt | yathā śabdo'nityaḥ aindriyakatvādityukte vadati | yadi ghaṭadṛṣṭāntena aindriyakatvādanityastarhi sāmānyadṛṣṭāntena nityaḥ kiṃ na syāditi | vyabhicāracodanābhiprāyeṇa pravṛtterna sādharmyasamādisāṅkaryamiti cenna | asyasaduttaratvāt | tasmāddhetunirapekṣeṇa pratidṛṣṭāntamātreṇa bādhapratirodhayoranyatarodbhāvanaṃ pratidṛṣṭāntasama ityudayanaḥ | yathā yadi mahānasadṛṣṭāntenāgnimāniṣyate tarhi hṛdadṛṣṭāntenānagniko'stvityādi | atra nyūnatvaṃ vācyam | hetoranaṅgatvābhimāne tu svanyāyavirodha iti |

Pratidṛṣṭāntasama is refutation with a counterexample, e.g., if sound is non-eternal because it is an object of the senses like the pot, then let it be eternal like *Sāmānya,* the universal. This view is not correct as *Sādharmyasama* also has the same function. Udayana defines *Pratidṛṣṭāntasama* as deducing either *Satpratipakṣa,* the counterreason or *Bādha,* the sublation on the strength of a counterexample alone without reasons e.g., 'if the mountain has fire because of examples of the kitchen, let the mountain have no fire because of the example of the lake. This is a case of the omission of the necessary parts (*Nyūna*) as the reason is not stated. If it is contended that the reason is not necessary, it will come under *Svanyāyavirodha,* Since the opponent's inference can also be refuted by another inference which has no pervasion.

अनुत्पत्तिसमः ।। पक्षादीनां प्रागुत्पत्तेर्हेतुवृत्त्यभावेनासिद्ध्युद्भावनमनुत्पत्तिसमः । यथा पर्वतस्योत्पत्तेः प्राक् तत्र धूमवत्त्वं न वृत्तमिति भागासिद्धमित्यादि । अत्रानुत्पन्नस्य पर्वतत्वाभावेनपक्षत्वात् तत्र वृत्त्यभावो न दोपायेति वाच्यम् । न चेदेवं तदा स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

anutpattisamaḥ || pakṣādīnāṃ prāgutpatterhetuvṛttyabhāvenāsiddhyudbhāvanamanutpattisamaḥ | yathā parvatasyotpatteḥ prāk tatra dhūmavatvaṃ na vṛttamiti bhāgāsiddhamityādi | atrānutpannasya parvatatvābhāvenapakṣatvāt tatra vṛttyabhāvo na dopāyeti vācyam | na cedevaṃ tadā svanyāyavirodha iti |

Anutpattisama is deducing the unestablished nature of the reason by pointing out its absence in the subject prior to its origin, e.g., 'before the origin of the mountain, as there was no smoke on it, it proves to be a partially unestablished case'. Here it is to be pointed out that the absence of the reason from the

mountain prior to its origin is not defective at all because the mountain before its origin is not the subject. If the opponent does not agree to this, the same objection can be levelled against this inference; therefore, it proves to be a case of *Svanyāyavirodha*.

संशयसम: ।। सत्यपि निर्णयकारणे साधारणधर्मादिमात्रेण संशयापादनं संशयसम: । यथा यदि धूमवत्त्वादग्निमत्त्वनिश्चयस्तर्हि ह्रदमहानससाधारणेन द्रव्यत्वेन तत्संशय: किं न स्यादिति । तत्र निर्णायकाभावसहकृतस्यैव समानधर्मादे: संशयकारणत्वादत्र निर्णायकसद्भावादसंशय इति वाच्यम् । निर्णायकं न संशयप्रतिबन्धकमिति वदत: स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

saṃśayasamaḥ || satyapi nirṇayakāraṇe sādhāraṇadharmādimātreṇa saṃśayāpādanaṃ saṃśayasamaḥ | yathā yadi dhūmavattvādagnimatt vaniścayastarhi hṛdamahānasasādhāraṇena dravyatvena tatsaṃśayaḥ kiṃ na syāditi | tatra nirṇāyakābhāvasahakṛtasyaiva samānadharmādeḥ saṃśayakāraṇatvādatra nirṇāyakasadbhāvādasaṃśaya iti vācyam | nirṇāyakaṃ na saṃśayapratibandhakamiti vadataḥ svanyāyavirodha iti |

Saṃśayasama is deducing doubt merely on the ground of some common attribute despite the presence of the determining factor, e.g., if the mountain has fire like the kitchen, because the common attribute 'having smoke' is found in both, a doubt arises as to why the mountain should not be without fire, because the common attribute, substanceness is found in the kitchen and in the lake. Here, we must answer that a doubt arises only in the absence of determining factor aided by a common attribute. In the present case, there is the determining factor, therefore, there is no scope for doubt. If the opponent says that presence of the determining factor is not an obstruction to doubt, then we shall have to argue that doubt can be deduced in his arguments also on the same ground. Thus, this *Jāti* is included in *Svanyāyavirodha*.

प्रकरणसम: ।। प्रत्यनुमानेन प्रत्यवस्थानं प्रकरणसम इत्येके । यथा शब्दोऽनित्य: कृतकत्वादित्युक्ते, नित्य: शब्द: श्रावणत्वाच्छब्दत्ववदिति । अत्र प्रत्यनुमानस्याङ्गसाकल्याभिमाने सदुत्तरमेव । अन्यथा साधर्म्यसमाद्यन्तर्भाव: । तस्मादङ्गीकृतानधिकबलेन बाधचोदनं प्रकरणसम इत्युदयन: । एतदप्ययक्तम् । यथ प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमादावन्यतरचोदनेनैकजातित्वं तथा साधर्म्यसमादिनाऽप्येकजातित्वसम्भवेन पृथक्करणानुपपत्ति: । उद्दारस्तु तद्वदेव ।

prakaraṇasamaḥ || pratyanumānena pratyavasthānaṃ prakaraṇasama ityeke | yathā śabdosnityaḥ kṛtakatvādityukte, nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvācchabdatvavaditi | atra pratyanumānasyāṅgasākalyābh imāne saduttarameva | anyathā sādha-rmyasamādyantarbhāvaḥ |

tasmādaṅgīkṛtānadhikabalena bādhacodanaṃ prakaraṇasama ityudayanaḥ | etadapyayuktam | yatha pratidṛṣṭāntasamādāvanyataracodanenaikajātitvaṃ tathā sādharmyasamādināऽpyekajātitvasambhavena pṛthakkaraṇānupapattiḥ | uddārastu tadvadeva |

Prakaraṇasama is refuting with the counter inference, e.g., if sound is non-eternal because it is produced, then let sound be eternal because it is the object of the sense of hearing. If the counter inference is stated in the belief that it has all the necessary parts of an inference, it is not different from *Sādharmyasama*. Udayana defines *Prakaraṇasama* as follows: 'an attempt to refute the proposition with an argument, which is accepted to be not stronger than the proposition. This is not different from *Sādharmyasama*. If this is not accepted, it has to be treated as *Svanyāyavirodha*.

अहेतुसमः ।। हेतोः साध्यपेक्षया पूर्वापरसहभावनिरासेन अहेतुत्वचोदनमहेतुसमः । यथा न तावत् सर्वसाधनं साध्यपूर्वम् । साध्याभावे तन्निरूप्यसाधनत्वायोगात् । नापि साधनं पश्चाद्भावि । साधनाभावे साध्ययोगात् । नापि द्वयोर्यौगपद्यम् । अविशेषेण साध्यसाधनभावायोगादिति । अत्र कृतौ पूर्वभाविनः साधनत्वम् । साधनशक्तेः परानपेक्ष्यत्वात्, तद्व्यवहारस्य बुद्धिस्थेनैव साध्येनोपपत्तेः । ज्ञतौ तु यथायथं पक्षत्रयमपि । ज्ञातत्वाज्ञातत्वाभ्यां विशेष इत्युत्तरं वाच्यम् । तदनङ्गीकारे तु स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

ahetusamaḥ || hetoḥ sādhyapekṣayā pūrvāparasahabhāvanirāsena ahetutva-codanamahetusamaḥ | yathā na tāvat sarvasādhanaṃ sādhyapūrvam | sādhyābhāve tannirūpyasādhanatvāyogāt | nāpi sādhanaṃ paścādbhāvi | sādhanābhāve sādhyayogāt | nāpi dvayoryaugapadyam | aviśeṣeṇa sādhyasādhanabhāvāyogāditi | atra kṛtau pūrvabhāvinaḥ sādhanatvam | sādhanaśakteḥ parānapekṣyatvāt, tadvyavahārasya buddhisthenaiva sādhyenopapatteḥ | jñatau tu yathāyathaṃ pakṣatrayamapi | jñātatvājñātat-vābhyāṃ viśeṣa ityuttaraṃ vācyam | tadanaṅgīkāre tu svanyāyavirodha iti |

Ahetusama is deducing the ineffective nature of the reason by refuting the possibility of its origin before the probandum or after it, or simultaneously with it. The argument is as follows: 'The reason in its origin as well as in cognition is not prior to the probandum because there cannot be reason in the absence of a probandum. Nor can it be posterior to the probandum as there cannot be a probandum without a reason. The reason and the probandum could not have come into existence simultaneously or else we would be unable to distinguish which is probandum and which is reason. Here, the answer should be that the proban has its origin prior to the probandum and that of the reason, by its own potency, gives rise to the cognition of the probandum, which exists in concept. As for the reason in cognition, it gives rise to the cognition of the probandum

in all the three modes mentioned above. The difference of the three modes is mentioned above. The difference that marks off the reason from the probandum is that one is known and the other is unknown. If the opponent does not agree to this, we can deduce the same defects in his inference. Hence it is included in *Svanyāyavirodha*.

अर्थापत्तिसमः ।। अर्थापत्त्याभासेन प्रत्यवस्थानमर्थापत्तिसमः । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमानित्युक्तेऽर्थदापद्यतेऽन्यदनग्निमदित्यादि । तथा च साध्यविकलो दृष्टान्त इति । अत्रानुपपद्यमानदर्शनानुपपादके बुद्धिरर्थापत्तिः । न चात्रानुपपद्यमानं किञ्चिदस्ति । अतो नायं प्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम् । उक्तविपरीतापेक्षमात्रमर्थापत्तिरित्यङ्गीकारे तु स्वन्यायविरोध इति । उपपत्तिसमवद्बीजाभावान्नेदं जात्युत्तरम् ।

arthāpattisamaḥ || arthāpattyābhāsena pratyavasthānamarthāpattisamaḥ | yathā parvatosgnimānityuktesrthadāpadyatesnyadanagnimadityādi | tathā ca sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭānta iti | atrānupapadyamānadarśanānupapādake buddhir-arthāpattiḥ | na cātrānupapadyamānaṃ kiñcidasti | ato nāyaṃ prasaṅga iti vācyam | uktaviparītāpekṣamātramarthāpattirityaṅgīkāre tu svanyāyavirodha iti | upapattisamavadbījābhāvānnedaṃ jātyuttaram |

Arthāpattisama is deducing something through an apparent presumption, e.g., 'if it is said that the mountain has fire, it follows through *Arthāpatti*, the presumption that objects other than the mountain have no fire. Therefore, the example, namely, the kitchen, would have the defect of lack of probandum'. Here, it is to be pointed out that when something is unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is called presumption. There is nothing unintelligible in the above instance, therefore, there is no need for deduction through presumption. If the opponent holds that anything that is not stated is to be presumed, the same defect can be found in his argument. Hence it proves to be a case of *Svanyāyavirodha*.

अविशेषसमः ।। साधनप्रतिबन्ध्या तदितरधर्मेण तद्वतां सर्वपदार्थानामविशेषापादनमविशेषसमः । यथा यदि धूमवत्वात्पर्वतमहानसयोरग्निमत्वविशेषः, तदा सर्वभावानां सत्वादनित्यत्वविशेषप्रसङ्ग इति । अत्र व्याप्त्यादिसदसद्भावाभ्यां विशेषान्न प्रति बन्दीग्रहणमित्युत्तरं वाच्यम् । तदनङ्गीकारेण प्रवृत्तस्य स्वन्यायविरोध इति ।

aviśeṣasamaḥ || sādhanapratibandyā taditaradharmeṇa tadvatāṃ sarvapadārthānāmaviśeṣāpādanamaviśeṣasamaḥ | yathā yadi dhūmavatvātparvatamahānasayoragnimatvaviśeṣaḥ, tadā sarvabhāvānāṃ satvādanityatvaviśeṣaprasaṅga iti | atra vyāptyādisadasadbhāvābhyāṃ viśeṣānna prati bandīgrahaṇamityuttaraṃ vācyam | tadanaṅgīkāreṇa pravṛttasya svanyāyavirodha iti |

Aviśeṣasama is constructing an argument, which is an attribute other than that deduced by the proponent, and to deduce from non-distinctness of all things possessing that attribute. For e.g., 'If the mountain has fire on account of its similarity to the kitchen in respect to possessing smoke, then let all existent things be eternal because of their similarity in respect of existence'. Here it should be pointed out that in the former case, there is pervasion between the reason and the probandum. Whereas, in the latter case, there is not. If the opponent does not agree to this, the same defect can be deduced in his inference as well. Hence it is *Svanyāyavirodha*.

उपपत्तिसमः ।। उभयहेतूपपत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमुपपत्तिसम इत्येके । यथा यदि शब्दस्यानित्यत्वोपपादकं कृतकत्वमस्तीत्यनित्यत्वमिष्यते तर्हि नित्यत्वोपपादकमस्पर्शत्वमस्तीति नित्यत्वमपि किं नेष्यत इति । एतदसत् । साधर्म्यसमाद्यभेदात् । तस्मान्मत्पक्षेऽपि किमपि साधनं भविष्यतीति सामान्यतः प्रत्यवस्थानमुपपत्तिसम इत्युदयनः । इदमप्यसत् । केवलाया एव मुक्तेर्निर्बीजत्वात् । प्रमाणोपपादने तूपपादकस्य साधुत्वे सदुत्तरत्वात् । असाधुत्वे तस्यैवोद्भाव्यत्वेनाजातित्वात् ।

upapattisamaḥ || ubhayahetūpapattyā pratyavasthānamupapattisama ityeke | yathā yadi śabdasyānityatvopapādakaṃ kṛtakatvamastītyanityatvamiṣyate tarhi nityatvopapādakamasparśatvamastīti nityatvamapi kiṃ neṣyata iti | etadasat | sādharmyasamādyabhedāt | tasmānmatpakṣespi kimapi sādhanaṃ bhaviṣyatīti sāmānyataḥ pratyavasthānamupapattisama ityudayanaḥ | idamapyasat | kevalāyā eva mukternirbījatvāt | pramāṇopapādane tūpapādakasya sādhutve saduttaratvāt | asādhutve tasyaivodbhāvyatvenājātitvāt |

Upapattisama is confronting the proponent with reasonable reason, which proves just the contrary to what the proponent has stated constitutes this *Jāti*, e.g., 'If the non-eternality of sound is proved by the reason, producibility, then the eternality of sound too can be proved by the reason's, non-touchability'. This is not different from *Sādharmyasama.* Udayana gives another definition; confronting the proponent with a general statement to the effect that the opponent also has reason to prove his point. In this case, there is no *Jāti*. If the reason stated by the opponent is valid, then it is a valid answer, if not, the defect has to be pointed out.

उपलब्धिसमः ।। निर्दिष्टहेत्वभावेऽपि साध्योपलब्ध्या हेतोरप्रयोजकत्वाभिधानमुपलब्धिसम इत्येके । यथा क्वचिद् धूमवत्त्वाभावेऽप्यग्निमत्वोपलब्धेरप्रयोजकं धूमवत्त्वमिति । उत्थानबीजाभावान्नेदं जात्युत्तरम् । किन्तु हान्याद्याभास एव । एव तस्माद्वादिवाक्यस्यावधारणे तात्पर्यमारोप्यावधारणं विकल्प्य दूषणमुपलब्धिसम इत्युदयनः । यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमानित्युक्ते

किं पर्वत एवाग्निमानुत पर्वतोऽग्निमानेवेति । नाद्यः । महानसादेरप्यग्निमत्वात् । न द्वितीयः । कदाचिदनग्निमत्त्वादित्यादि । इदमप्यसत् । तात्पर्यान्तरारोपेण सामान्यचलत्वात् । विकल्पेनोत्थानान्नेति चेन्न । अवधारणस्यैव विकल्पेनावधारणतात्पर्यारोपापरिहारात् । व्यवच्छेदवाक्यार्थरुचीनमवधारणं स्थितमेवेति चेन्न । तेशामप्यतद्व्यावृत्त्यङ्गीकारेणैवंविधवधारण स्यानिष्टत्वात् ।

upalabdhisamaḥ || nirdiṣṭahetvabhāveṣpi sādhyopalabdhyā hetoraprayoja katvābhidhānamupalabdhisama ityeke | yathā kvacid dhūmavatvābhāveṣ pyagnimatvopalabdherаprayojakaṃ dhūmavatvamiti | utthānabījābhāvānnedaṃ jātyuttaram | kintu hānyādyābhāsa eva | eva tasmādvādivākyasyāvadhāraṇe tātparyamāropyāvadhāraṇaṃ vikalpya dūṣaṇamupalabdhisama ityudayanaḥ | yathā parvatoṣgnimānityukte kiṃ parvata evāgnimānuta parvatoṣ gnimāneveti | nādyaḥ | mahānasāderapyagnimatvāt | na dvitīyaḥ | kadācid-anagnimattvādityādi | idamapyasat | tātparyāntarāropeṇa sāmānyachalatvāt | vikalpenotthānānneti cenna | avadhāraṇasyaiva vikalpenāvadhāraṇatātparyārop āparihārāt | vyavacchedavākyārtharucīnamavadhāraṇaṃ sthitameveti cenna | te śāmapyatadvyāvṛttyaṅgīkāreṇaivaṃvidhavadhāraṇasyāniṣṭatvāt |

Upalabdhisama is deducing the ineffective nature of the reason on the ground of the perception of the probandum in places where the specified reason is not found, e.g., 'The reason "smoke" cannot prove the existence of fire, because fire is found in some places, such as the red hot iron ball, where there is no smoke'. As this can only prove the inability of fire to cause the inference of smoke and not the contrary, this is not *Jāti* at all. It can be a case of *Hānyādyābhyāsa*. Udayana defines *Upalabdhisama* as imposing an emphasis either on the subject or the predicate of the proposition and then showing that in either case it is invalid, e.g., when the proponent states that the mountain has fire, the opponent suggests alternatives regarding what is meant by the statement and asks does the statement mean that the mountain alone has fire or does it mean that the mountain invariably has fire? It cannot be the first because there is fire in the kitchen as well. It cannot be the second because the mountain is found even without fire. This imposition of a restrictive sense not intended by the proponent is a case of *Chala* and not of *Jāti*.

अनुपलब्धिसमः ।। उपलब्ध्यादिविषयिधर्माणां स्वात्मनि वृत्यवृत्त्या तत्त्वव्याघातापादनमनुपलब्धिसमः । यथोपलब्धि स्वात्मनि वर्तते चेदुपलब्धत्वाद् घटादिवदनुपलब्धिः । न वर्तते चेत्तथापि तद्वदेवेत्यादि । अत्र विषयपेक्षयोपलब्धित्वस्य स्वात्मनि वृत्यवृत्तिभ्यां न निवृत्तिरिति वक्तव्यम् । तदनङ्गीकारे स्वन्यायविरोधः, स्वक्रियाविरोधो वेति ।

anupalabdhisamaḥ || upalabdhyādiviṣayidharmāṇāṃ svātmani vṛtyavṛttyā tattvavyāghātāpādanamanupalabdhisamaḥ | yathopalabdhi svātmani vartate cedupalabdhatvād ghaṭādivadanupalabdhiḥ | na vartate cettathāpi tadvadevetyādi | atra viṣayapekṣayopalabdhitvasya svātmani vṛttyavṛttibhyāṃ na nivṛttiriti vaktavyam | tadanaṅgīkāre svanyāyavirodhaḥ, svakriyāvirodho veti |

Anupalabdhisama is deducing contradiction in such attributes of the subject as cognition by supposing their existence or non-existence in themselves as loci, e.g., 'if it is accepted that cognition is found in itself because of the fact that cognition also is cognized, like the pot, cognition becomes non-cognition. If, on the other hand, cognition is not found in cognition, even then it becomes non-cognition. Here, the reply is that the cognitive nature of cognition, which is dependent on the object does not lose its cognitive nature whether it exists in itself or not. If the opponent does not agree to this, the same defect can be shown in his argument. Therefore, this is case of *Svanyāyavirodha*.

नित्यसमः ।। विशेषणधर्मस्य तदतद्रूपताविकल्पेन धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वभङ्गो नित्यसमः । यथा शब्दोऽनित्य इत्युक्तेऽनित्यत्वं नित्यमनित्यं वा । आद्ये धर्मिणो नित्यत्वापातः । द्वितीये तन्नाशे पुनः शब्दस्य नित्यत्वापत्तिरित्यादि । अत्र स्वपक्षे निर्वाहान्तरविवक्षया परपक्षे दौर्घट्यापादने तात्पर्यं चेत्सदुत्तरमेव । विशिष्टस्वरूपनिराकरणं चेत्तदादौ निर्वाहो वाच्यः । तदनभ्युपगमेन प्रवृत्तस्य स्वन्यायस्वक्रियाविरोधाविति ।

nityasamaḥ || viśeṣaṇadharmasya tadatadrūpatāvikalpena dharmiṇastadviśiṣṭatvabhaṅgo nityasamaḥ | yathā śabdo'nitya ityukte'nityatvaṃ nityamanityaṃ vā | ādye dharmiṇo nityatvāpātaḥ | dvitīye tannāśe punaḥ śabdasya nityatvāpattirityādi | atra svapakṣe nirvāhāntaravivakṣayā parapakṣe daurghaṭyāpādane tātparyaṃ cetsaduttarameva | viśiṣṭasvarūpanirākaraṇaṃ cettadādau nirvāho vācyaḥ | tadanabhyupagamena pravṛttasya svanyāyasvakriyāvirodhāviti |

Nityasama is analyzing the attribute into two forms; namely 'that' and the 'not that' and disproving the impossibility of its qualifying the subject. For e.g., when the proponent says that sound is non-eternal, the opponent asks him whether non-eternality itself is eternal or non-eternal. If it is eternal, the subject too becomes eternal and if it is non-eternal, by the very destruction of the non-eternality, the sound which is qualified by it becomes eternal. Here, if the purpose of such an argument is to deduce the unintelligibility of the proponent's argument, it is valid. If the intention is to refute the existence of the subject as qualified, the opponent must state his own proof at the beginning. If he does not agree to this, it is to be

pointed out that the same defect can be found in his argument. Therefore, so it is included in *Svanyāyavirodha* or *Svakriyāvirodha*.

अनित्यसमः ।। वादिसाधनप्रतिबन्ध्या धर्मान्तरेण तद्वदतां साध्यधर्मक्त्वापादनमनित्यसमः । यथा यदि कृतकत्वाच्छब्दोऽनित्यः स्यात्तर्हि सत्त्वात्सर्वमनित्यं स्यादिति । इयमप्यविशेषसमलक्षणेनैव सङ्गृहीतत्वान्न पृथग्वाच्यैव ।

anityasamaḥ || vādisādhanapratibandyā dharmāntareṇa tadvadatāṃ sādh yadharmakttvāpādanamanityasamaḥ | yathā yadi kṛtakatvācchabdosnityaḥ syāt tarhi sattvātsarvamanityaṃ syāditi | iyamapyaviśeṣasamalakṣaṇenaiva saṅgṛhītatvānna pṛthagvācyaiva |

Anityasama is deducing the attributes of the probandum in all other objects possessing an attribute other than that of the proponent's probandum, e.g., "If sound is non-eternal because it is produced, then let every object be non-eternal because it is existent'. This *Jāti* is not different from *Aviśeṣasama*.

कार्यसमः ।। हेतोः सन्दिग्धासिद्ध्या प्रत्यवस्थानं कार्यसम इति केचित् । यथा शब्दो नित्यः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादित्युक्ते प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वमुत्पाद्यत्वेन व्यङ्ग्यत्वेन वेति सन्दिह्यत इति । इदमप्यन्यथासिध्युद्भावनत्वात् सदुत्तरमेव । तस्मात्पक्षादीनामन्यतमस्यासिद्धिमुद्भाव्य तत्साधकत्वेन स्वयमुत्प्रेक्षितस्य दूषणेन वादिसाधनभङ्गः कार्यसम इत्युदयनः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कार्यत्वादित्युक्ते कार्यत्वमसिद्धम् । तत्साधकं च प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वं वाच्यम् । तच्चान्यथासिद्धमिति । इदमप्यनभिप्रेततात्पर्यारोपाच्छलमेवेति ।

kāryasamaḥ || hetoḥ sandigdhāsiddhyā pratyavasthānaṃ kāryasama iti kecit | yathā śavdo nityaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvādityukte prayatnānantarīyakatva mutpādyatvena vyaṅgyatvena veti sandihyata iti | idamapyanyathāsidhyud bhāvanatvāt saduttarameva | tasmātpakṣādīnāmanyatamasyāsiddhimudbh āvya tatsādhakatvena svayamutprekṣitasya dūṣaṇena vādisādhanabhaṅgaḥ kāryasama ityudayanaḥ | yathā śabdo nityaḥ kāryatvādityukte kāryatvam asiddham | tatsādhakaṃ ca prayatnānantarīyakatvaṃ vācyam | taccānyathāsiddhamiti | idamapyanabhipretatātparyāropācchalameveti |

Karyasama is deducing the doubtful nature of the reason, e.g., 'sound is non-eternal because it emanates after some effort'. Here the opponent asks; "is emanation of sound a case of manifestation or origination, if observed after some effort? This is a valid objection if it is deduced with a view to prove that the reason is otherwise accounted for.

Udayana defines *Karyasama* as 'refuting the opponent's argument by pointing out the unestablished nature of either the subject, the probandum, or what is imagined by oneself to be the reason'. For e.g., when the proponent says that sound is non-eternal because it is produced, the opponent replies that the producedness of the reason is not established. The opponent then suggests a reason, namely, 'emanation with some effort', and he subsequently refutes it by pointing out that it is otherwise accounted for. This is a case of *Chala*.

हान्याद्याभासः ।। प्रतिज्ञाहान्याद्यप्राप्तावपि भ्रान्त्यादिना तदुद्भावनं हान्याद्याभासः । स प्रमाणविरोध एव । हान्याद्याभासस्य प्राश्निकादिभिः प्रमितत्वात् ।

hānyādyābhāsaḥ || pratijñāhānyādyaprāptāvapi bhrāntyādinā tadudbhāvanaṃ hānyādyābhāsaḥ | sa pramāṇavirodha eva | hānyādyābhāsasya prāśnikādibhiḥ pramitatvāt |

Hānyādyābhāsa is raising the above-narrated objections due to some mistake, when they are not fit to be raised. That is contradiction by proof. For, the objection was understood by the mediators. If these objections are raised when the time is over, then that is called 'check-mate in undue-time'. This is nothing but incongruity. The *Apasiddhānta* is nothing but self-contradiction only, e.g., admission of God's existence by Prābhākaras, who do not hold this view.

अप्राप्तकाले ग्रहणम् ।। उद्भावनकालमप्राप्यातिक्रम्य वा निग्रहस्थानोद्भावनमप्राप्तकाले ग्रहणम् । तदसङ्गतमेवेति ।

aprāptakāle grahaṇam || udbhāvanakālamaprāpyātikramya vā nigrahasthānodbhāvanamaprāptakāle grahaṇam | tadasaṅgatameveti |

Trapping in inappropriate time is *Aprāptakālagrahaṇa*. Showing the fallacy in an inappropriate time when the moment has not yet arrived or the time is over is also a fallacy called *Aprāptakālagrahaṇa*. This could be included in *Asaṅgata*.

अपसिद्धान्तः ।। अपसिद्धान्तस्तु स्ववचनविरोध एव । यथा प्राभाकरस्येश्वराभ्युपगमः ।

apasiddhāntaḥ || apasiddhāntastu svavacanavirodha eva | yathā prābhākarasyeśvarābhyupagamaḥ|

Apasiddhānta could be self-contradicting statement itself. For e.g., in case a follower of Prabhākara (who is an atheist) accepts the existence of God, then it becomes *Apasiddhānta*.

Inclusion of *Hetvābhāsas* - the five pseudo-reasons

हेत्वाभासः ।। पक्षधर्मत्वं, सपक्षे सत्वं, विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः, अबाधितविषयत्वम्, असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति हेतोः पञ्चरूपाणि । तत्र अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणः पञ्चापि विवक्षितानि । इतरयोस्तु चत्वारि । केवलान्वयिनो विपक्षाभावेन ततो व्यावृत्त्यभावात् । केवलव्यतिरेकिणः सपक्षाभावेन तत्र सत्वानुपपत्तेः । तत्र विवक्षितरूपेषु कतिपयसहिताः कतिपयरहिता हेत्वाभासाः । ते च असिद्ध–विरुद्ध–अनैकान्तिक–अनध्यवसित–कालात्ययापदिष्ट–सत्प्रतिपक्ष–प्रकरणसमाः ।

hetvābhāsaḥ || pakṣadharmatvaṃ, sapakṣe satvaṃ, vipakṣādvyāvṛttiḥ, abādhitaviṣayatvam, asatpratipakṣatvaṃ ceti hetoḥ pañcarūpāṇi | tatra anvayavyatirekiṇaḥ pañcāpi vivakṣitāni | itarayostu catvāri | kevalānvayino vipakṣābhāvena tato vyāvṛttyabhāvāt | kevalavyatirekiṇaḥ sapakṣābhāvena tatra satvānupapatteḥ |tatra vivakṣitarūpeṣu katipayasahitāḥ katipayarahitā hetvābhāsāḥ | te ca asiddha-viruddha-anaikāntika-anadhyavasita-kālātyayāpadiṣṭa-satpratipakṣa-prakaraṇasamāḥ |

Inclusion of fallacies of Naiyyāyika in the list of fallacies accepted by the Dvaita philosophy:

Note: The twenty-two vulnerable point in the Nyāya list is *Hetvābhāsas* or fallacies of the reason. There is no unanimity of opinion about their number. Kaṇāda accepts only three, while Gautama and other Naiyyāyikas accept five. The names of the *Hetvābhāsas* are not the same in all Nyāya works. *Savyabhicāra* (or *Anaikāntika*), *Viruddha, Prakaraṇasama, Sādhyasama,* and *Atītakāla* are the names accepted by Gautama. Coming to such a late work as the Tarkasaṅgraha, we find that the first two have the same names but the latter three have different ones. *Prakaraṇasama* is that, which leaves the conclusion doubtful and the reason proves the probandum of both the proponent and the opponent. This is the same as *Satpratipakṣa,* the counterreason of Annambhaṭṭa. The *Sādhyasama Hetu* of Gautama is the one reason which is as doubtful as the probandum and is the same as the *Asiddhi* of Annambhaṭṭa. The *Kālātīta* of the former is named *Bādhita*, the sublated by the latter. Some of the ancient Nyāya writers have added *Anadhyavasita* to the other fallacies. Saṅkaramiṣra has identified it with *Anupasamhārī*. Therefore it comes under *Savyabhicāra*.

Śrī Jayatīrtha gives a seven fold classification of the fallacies of the reasons and then points out their subsumption, under the six defects of inference already noted; a) *Asiddha,* the unestablished b) *Viruddha,* the contrary c) *Anaikāntika,* the nonconclusive d) *Anadhyavasita,* the nondeterminate e) *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa,* the 'adduced out of time' or 'sublated' f) *Satpratipakṣa,* the counterreason; g) *Prakaraṇasama,* the 'similar to the context'.

Of these seven, we have already pointed out that *Anadhyavasita* is the same as *Anupasamhārī. Prakaraṇasama* is not different from *Satpratipakṣa* and *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa,* which is another name of *Bādhita.* Thus Jayatīrtha's enumeration is not essentially different from the five fallacies as generally found in Nyāya works.

A valid reason has five characteristics; it is present in the subject, and in the example, it is non-existent in the counterexample, it has a non-sublated probandum and it has no counterreason refuting it. In the positively and the negatively concomitant reason, all the five characteristics are necessary to ensure validity. In the reason whose concomitance is only positive or only negative, four of the above-mentioned characteristics are enough to ensure validity, since the merely positive reason has no counterexample and the merely negative reason has no positive instance. The absence of a few of the above-mentioned characteristics turns them into bad reason, which are known as follows *Asiddha, Viruddha* etc.

तत्र व्याप्तस्य पक्षधर्मत्वप्रमितिः सिद्धिः । तदभावोऽसिद्धिः । तद्वानसिद्धः । स चतुर्विधः । व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः, आश्रयासिद्धः, पक्षधर्मत्वासिद्धः, एतत् प्रमित्यसिद्धश्चेति ।

tatra vyāptasya pakṣadharmatvapramitiḥ siddhiḥ | tadabhāvoऽsiddhiḥ | tadvānasiddhaḥ | sa caturvidhaḥ | vyāpyatvāsiddhaḥ, āśrayāsiddhaḥ, pakṣa-dharmatvāsiddhaḥ, etat pramityasiddhaśceti |

The knowledge of establishment of concomitant sign is *Siddhi.* The non-cognition of the reason as having pervasion and as existing in the subject constitutes *Asiddhi.* It is of four kinds: *Vyāpyatvāsiddhi,* the nonestablishment of being pervaded; *Āśrayāsiddhi,* the nonetsablishment of the locus; *Pakṣadharmatvāsiddhi,* the nonestablishment of being in the subject; and *Etatpramityasiddhi,* the nonestablishment of the valid cognition of the reason concerned in a particular inference.

तत्र व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो द्विविधः । साध्यसम्बन्धरहितः, सोपाधिकसम्बन्धश्चेति । आद्यो यथा । सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्वादिति । अयमुभयसम्बन्धाभावादव्याप्तावन्तर्भूतः । द्वितीयो यथा । वैधीहिंसाऽधर्मसाधनम्, हिंसात्वात्, ब्रह्महिंसावदिति । हिंसात्वपापसाधनयोः सम्बन्धे निषिद्धत्वस्योपाधेः सत्त्वात् ।

tatra vyāpyatvāsiddho dvividhaḥ | sādhyasambandharahitaḥ, sopādhika-sambandha-śceti | ādyo yathā | sarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ satvāditi | ayamubhay asambandhābhāvādavyāptāvantarbhūtaḥ | dvitīyo yathā | vaidhīhiṃsāऽs

dharmasādhanam, hiṃsātvāt, brahmahiṃsāvaditi | hiṃsātvapāpasādhanayoḥ sambandhe niṣiddhatvasyopādheḥ sattvāt |

Vyāpyatvāsiddhi is of two kinds. The first has no relation to the probandum, e.g., 'everything is momentary because of being existent'. In this inference, the reason has no positive or negative pervasion. It comes therefore, under the defect *Avyāpti,* the non-pervasive. The second has a relation conditioned by an *Upādhi, the* adjunct.

साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः । निषिद्धत्वं च साध्यमधर्मसाधनत्वं व्याप्नोति । यत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति नियमात् । न व्याप्नोति च साधनत्वाभिप्रेतं हिंसात्वम्। पक्षे हिंसात्वसद्भावेऽपि निषिद्धत्वस्याभावात् । अयं तु विप्रतिपत्तेः प्रागव्यप्त्युन्नायकः। वैधीहिंसायाः साधनाव्यापकत्वान्निवर्तमानं निषिद्धत्वं, साध्यव्यापकत्वान्निवर्तयद् हिंसात्वस्य साध्याभावसंबन्धमापादयतीति । विप्रतिपत्त्युत्तरकालस्तु प्रतिपक्षोन्नायको भवति । साधनाव्यापकत्वात्। पक्षाद् व्यावर्तमानः उपाधिः साध्यव्यापकत्वात्तद् व्यावर्तयति । ततश्चोपाध्यभावः साध्याभावसाधने हेतुर्भवति । वैधीहिंसाऽधर्मसाधनं न भवति, अनिषिद्धत्वात्, भोजनवदिति । तथा च सोपाधिकस्याव्याप्तौ प्रतिज्ञायाः समबलविरोधे चान्तर्भावः ।

sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ | niṣiddhatvaṃ ca sādhyamadharmasādhanatvaṃ vyāpnoti | yatrādharmasādhanatvaṃ tatra niṣiddhatvamiti niyamāt | na vyāpnoti ca sādhanatvābhipretaṃ hiṃsātvam| pakṣe hiṃsātvasadbhāveऽpi niṣiddhatvasyābhāvāt | ayaṃ tu vipratipatteḥ prāgavyaptyunnāyakaḥ | vaidhīhiṃsāyāḥ sādhanāvyāpakatvānnivartamānaṃ niṣiddhatvaṃ, sādhyavyāpakatvānnivartayad hiṃsātvasya sādhyābhāvasaṃ bandhamāpādayatīti | vipratipattyuttarakālastu pratipakṣonnāyako bhavati | sādhanāvyāpakatvāt | pakṣād vyāvartamānaḥ upādhiḥ sādhyavyāpakatvāttad vyāvartayati | tataścopādhyabhāvaḥ sādhyābhāvasādhane heturbhavati | vaidhīhiṃsāऽdharmasādhanaṃ na bhavati, aniṣiddhatvāt, bhojanavaditi | tathā ca sopādhikasyāvyāptau pratijñāyāḥ samabalavirodhe cāntarbhāvaḥ |

The adjunct pervades the probandum and does not pervade the reasons. In the inference, 'the slaying of animals in Vedic sacrifices is sinful because it is slaying, like that of a *Brāhmaṇa* '. The adjunct, which is scriptural condemnation, pervades the probandum, i.e., sinfulness; wherever there is sinfulness, there is scriptural condemnation. It does not pervade the reason i.e., slaughter in Vedic sacrifices. The adjunct does not exist in the subject 'Vedic sacrifices'. The adjunct is the pervader and the probandum is the pervaded. From the non-existence of the adjunct in the subject, we can deduce the non-existence of the probandum

there, as the absence of the pervader leads to the absence of the pervaded. Thus we can show the invalidity of the above by an inference, which takes the following form; sacrificial slaughter is not sinful because, like eating, for it is not condemned by scripture. Those cases in which we cognize the adjunct before the use of inference have the defect of *Avyāpti,* the non-pervasion and those inferences in which we cognize the adjunct after the use of inference have the defect *Samabalapramāṇavirodha* because the counterinference is as valid as the proponent's inference.

आश्रयासिद्धोपि द्विविधः । असदाश्रयः, सिद्धसाधनश्चेति । आद्यो यथा । शशविषाणं तीक्ष्णम्, विषाणत्वादिति । प्रमाणविरोधाद्यसङ्कीर्णोदाहरणाभावादयं हेत्वाभास एव न भवति । द्वितीयो यथा । ईश्वरवादिनं प्रति क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तुकं कार्यत्वादिति । अयमसङ्गतावन्तर्भवति । अनाकाङ्क्षितसाधनाय प्रवृत्तत्वात् ।

āśrayāsiddhopi dvividhaḥ | asadāśrayaḥ, siddhasādhanaśceti | ādyo yathā | śaśaviṣāṇaṃ tīkṣṇam, viṣāṇatvāditi | pramāṇavirodhādyasaṅkīrṇodāhara ṇābhāvādayaṃ hetvābhāsa eva na bhavati | dvitīyo yathā | īśvaravādinaṃ prati kṣityādikaṃ sakartṛkaṃ kāryatvāditi | ayamasaṅgatāvantarbhavati | anākāṅkṣitasādhanāya pravṛttatvāt |

Āśrayasiddhi, the non-establishment of the locus is of two kinds. The first is that in which the locus is non-existent e.g., 'The horns of a hare are sharp, because they are horns, like the horns of a cow'. As it is not possible to find an example for *Āśrayasiddhi* not intermixed with defects like 'contradiction by valid knowledge', it is not defect of the reason at all. In the present example, as soon as we state the proposition 'the horns of a hare are sharp', we know that it is opposed to the *Pramāṇas.* From this defect, namely, contradiction to *Pramāṇas* the defect of the reason is derived. Hence it is not a defect of the reason. The contradiction to the *Pramāṇas* is the only defect here. The second kind of *Aśrayasiddhi* is proving the established, e.g., stating before the theist the following inference, which proves the existence of God according to the Nyāya school; the earth, etc., have an agent because they are effects (created)" this comes under *Asaṅgati* because it sets out to prove something for which there is no expectancy need.

पक्षधर्मत्वासिद्धोऽनेकविधः । यथा शब्दो नित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वादित्यादि । तत्र व्यधिकरणासिद्धो न दूषणमित्युक्तमेव । व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्धो व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्धश्च आधिक्येऽन्तर्भवतः । भूरियं शशविषाणोल्लिखिता भूत्वादिति । अप्रसिद्धविशेषणासिद्धिस्तु दोषान्तरासङ्कीर्णोदाहरणाभावान्न हेत्वाभासः । इतरः पक्षधर्मत्वासिद्धः असिद्धावन्तर्भवति । एतत्प्रमित्यसिद्धो यथा । धूमवाष्पाविवेके धूमवत्त्वादिति । अस्याप्यसिद्धिरेव । पक्षविपक्षयोरेव

वर्तमानो हेतुर्विरोधः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वादिति । अयमपि साध्यसम्बन्धाभावे सति तदभावसम्बन्धित्वादव्याप्तः ।

pakṣadharmatvāsiddhoऽnekavidhaḥ | yathā śabdo nityaścākṣuṣatvādityādi | tatra vyadhikaraṇāsiddho na dūṣaṇamityuktameva | vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddho vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddhaśca ādhikyeऽntarbhavataḥ | bhūriyaṃ śaśaviṣāṇollikhitā bhūtvāditi | aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇāsiddhistu doṣāntarāsaṅkīrṇodāharaṇābhāvā nna hetvābhāsaḥ | itaraḥ pakṣadharmatvāsiddhaḥ asiddhāvantarbhavati | etatpramityasiddho yathā | dhūmavāṣpāviveke dhūmavattvāditi | asyāpyasiddhireva | pakṣavipakṣayoreva vartamāno heturvirodhaḥ | yathā śabdo nityaḥ kṛtakatvāditi | ayamapi sādhyasambandhābhāve sati tadabhāvasambandhitvādavyāptaḥ |

Pakṣadharmatvāsiddhi, the nonestablishment of being in the subject is of several kinds. An example of *Svarūpāsiddha* would be 'sound is eternal because it is an object of the sense of sight' which is included in *Asiddhi.* An example of *Vyadhikaraṇasiddha* would be 'there is rain in the uphills because there is a flood in the river of the lowlands', which is not at all a defect. *Vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha* and *Vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha* are, which can be classified under the defect of *Adhika. Viśeṣaṇāsiddha, Viśeṣyāsiddha,* etc., are also included in the defect *Asiddhi.*

Etatpramityasiddhi, the nonestablishment of the valid cognition of the reason in a particular inference[1] is found in the example of the existence of fire inferred from smoke when it is not certain whether it is smoke or vapour. This is included in *Avyāpti.*

The existence of the reason only in the subject and in the negative instance constitutes the defect *Viruddha* e.g., 'sound is eternal because it is produced'. This comes under the defect *Avyāpti,* the non-pervasion because here, the reason is related only to the non-existence of the probandum.

पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः प्रमेयत्वादिति । अयमपि साध्यसम्बन्धित्वादव्याप्त एव । साध्यसाधकः पक्षे एव वर्तमनो हेतुरनध्यवसितः । स त्रिविधः । तत्र सपक्षविपक्षरहितो यथा । सर्वमनित्यं सत्वादिति । उभयवान् यथा, भूर्नित्या गन्धवत्वादिति । सपक्षवान् विपक्षरहितो यथा । शब्दोऽभिधेयः शब्दत्वादिति । अयं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धत्वान्न पृथग् हेत्वाभास इत्येके । अन्ये तु सपक्षविपक्षरहितो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । सति सपक्षे पक्षमात्रवृत्तिः । सपक्षवान्विपक्षरहितश्च द्वावनैकान्तिकेऽन्तर्भवत इत्याहुः । तथाहि । सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । व्यभिचारोऽन्वयतो व्यतिरेकतश्च । तत्रान्वयस्य भूमिः पक्षः सपक्षश्च । तददतिरेकेण विपक्षेपि

1 This type of *asiddhi* is not found in the Nyāya classification.

वर्तमानः साधारणानैकान्तिकः । व्यतिरेकस्य भूमिर्विपक्षः सपक्षैकदेशोऽपि । तत्र सर्वस्मिन्नपि सपक्षेऽवर्तमानः असाधारणानैकान्तिक इति । सर्वथाऽव्याप्तावन्तर्भवति । उभयसम्बन्धाभावात् । व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिसम्भवादयं न हेत्वाभास इत्येके । अपरे तु सत्यपि सपक्षे तत्रावर्तमानस्य किं व्याप्तिरेव नास्त्युत केवलव्यतिरेकिवदस्तीति सन्देहावस्कन्दनाद्धेत्वाभासत्वमित्याहुः ।

pakṣasapakṣavipakṣavṛttiranaikāntikaḥ | yathā śabdo nityaḥ prameyatvāditi | ayamapi sādhyasambandhitvādavyāpta eva | sādhyasādhakaḥ pakṣe eva vartamano heturanadhyavasitaḥ | sa trividhaḥ | tatra sapakṣavipakṣarahito yathā | sarvamanityaṃ satvāditi | ubhayavān yathā, bhūrnityā gandhavatvāditi | sapakṣavān vipakṣarahito yathā | śabdo'bhidheyaḥ śabdatvāditi | ayaṃ vyāpyatvāsiddhatvānna pṛthag hetvābhāsa ityeke | anye tu sapakṣavipakṣarahito vyāpyatvāsiddhaḥ | sati sapakṣe pakṣamātravṛttiḥ | sapakṣavānvipakṣarahitaśca dvāvanaikāntike'ntarbhavata ityāhuḥ | tathā hi | savyabhicāro'naikāntikaḥ | vyabhicāro'nvayato vyatirekataśca | tatrānvayasya bhūmiḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣaśca | tadatirekeṇa vipakṣepi vartamānaḥ sādhāraṇānaikāntikaḥ | vyatirekasya bhūmirvipakṣaḥ sapakṣaikadeśo'pi | tatra sarvasminnapi sapakṣe'vartamānaḥ asādhāraṇānaikāntika iti | sarvathā'vyāptāvantarbhavati | ubhayasambandhābhāvāt | vyatirekavyāptisambhavādayaṃ na hetvābhāsa ityeke | apare tu satyapi sapakṣe tatrāvartamānasya kiṃ vyāptireva nāstyuta kevalavyatirekivadastīti san dehāvaskandanāddhetvābhāsatvamityāhuḥ |

The existence of the reason in the subject in the positive instance and in the negative instance is called *Anaikāntika,* the nonconclusive, e.g. 'sound is eternal because it is an object of knowledge'. This also is included in *Avyāpti* because the reason is related to the probandum as well as to its non-existence.

The reason that is found in the subject alone and is not efficacious in proving the probandum constitutes the defect *Anadhyavasita,* the nondeterminate. It is of three kinds; that which has neither a negative nor a positive instance, e.g., 'all things are non-eternal because they are existent; that which has both the instances, e.g., 'the earth is eternal because it has smell'; and that which is present only in the subject, e.g., 'sound is namable because it has *Śabdatva,* the soundness. This defect is subsumed under *Avyāpti.*

The presence of the reason in the subject along with the probandum, which is sublated by another *Pramāṇa* is called *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa,* e.g., 'fire is not hot because it is a substance'. The probandum here is sublated by our perception of heat in fire. This is included in *Prabalapramaṇavirodha.*

Satpratipakṣa is that reason, which is contradicted by another equally strong one, e.g., 'air is visible because it is known through touch'. This can be contradicted by the counter interference; 'air is not visible because it is a substance devoid of colour'. This is included in *Pratijñavirodha.*

स्वपरपक्षसिद्धावपि त्रिरूपो हेतुः प्रकरणसमः यथा विमतं मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वादिति । सत्यत्वेऽप्यस्य वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् । अयं त्वसम्भवीति केचिदाहुः । तदसत् सत्प्रतिपक्षवदभिमानतः संभवात् । अयमपि प्रतिज्ञायाः समबलविरोध एवेति । पक्षाभासहेत्वाभासान्तर्भूतत्वान्न पृथक् वाच्या इत्याहुः । तदसत् । प्रतिज्ञामात्रेणैव स्फुरणात् । साधने स्वक्रियाविरोधस्वन्यायविरोधयोर्हेत्वाभासानन्तर्भावाच्च । स्वक्रियाविरोधो यथा । अहं मूक इति । स्वन्यायविरोधो यथा । प्रमेयं प्रमाणानपेक्षमिति ।

svaparapakṣasiddhāvapi trirūpo hetuḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ | yathā vimataṃ mithyā, dṛśyatvāditi | satyatvesṣpyasya vaktuṃ śakyatvāt | ayaṃ tvasambhavīti kecidāhuḥ | tadasat | satpratipakṣavadabhimānataḥ saṃbhavāt | ayamapi pratijñāyāḥ samabalavirodha eveti | pakṣābhāsahetvābhāsāntarbhūtatvān na pṛthak vācyā ityāhuḥ | tadasat | pratijñāmātreṇaiva sphuraṇāt | sādhane svakriyāvirodhasvanyāyavirodhayorhetvābhāsānantarbhāvācca | sva-kriyāvirodho yathā | ahaṃ mūka iti | svanyāyavirodho yathā | prameyaṃ pramāṇānapekṣamiti |

The reason, which proves the probandum of both the opponent and the proponent is called *Prakaraṇasama*, e.g., 'that which is under dispute is *Mithyā*, the unreal because it is seen. This reason can prove the reality as well. This is also subsumed under the defect *Pratijñāvirodha.*

The early Nyāya works include the fallacies of the subject and the example in the fallacies of the reason. But the Mādhva logicians treat them separately.

एवमुदाहरणाभासानपि हेत्वाभासेऽन्तर्भावयन्तः तेषां न पृथग्वाच्यतामाहुः । तथाहि । उदाहरणलक्षणरहिता उदाहरणवदवभासमाना उदाहरणाभासाः । तत्र साधर्म्योदाहरणे साध्यविकलो यथा । मनोऽनित्यं मूर्तत्वात् । यन्मूर्तं तत् अनित्यम् । यथा परमाणुरिति । साधनविकलो यथा कर्मेति । उभयविकलो यथा आकाश इति । आश्रयहीनो यथा शशविषाणमिति । अव्याप्त्यभिधानं यथा घटवदिति । विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानं यथा यदनित्यं तन्मूर्तम्, यथा घट इति । वैधर्म्योदाहरणे साध्याव्यावृत्तो यथा यदनित्यं न भवति तन्मूर्तं न भवति, यथा कर्मेति । साधनाव्यावृत्तो यथा परमाणुरिति । उभयाव्यावृत्तो यथा घट इति । आश्रयहीनः पूर्ववत् । अव्याप्त्यभिधानं यथा आकाश इति । विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानं यथा यन्मूर्तं न भवति तदनित्यं न भवति, यथाऽऽकाश इति । अत्र वैधर्म्योदाहरणस्यानुपयुक्तत्वात्तदाभासकथनमनुपयुक्तम् । अव्याप्त्यभिधानं तु न

दोषो न्यूनं वा । विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानमप्यसङ्गतम् । आश्रयहीनत्वं चाश्रयासिद्धवददूषणम् । अन्यतरवैकल्येनैव दृष्टान्तस्य दुष्टत्वादुभयवैकल्यं न पृथग्गणणीयम् । तस्मात् साध्यवैकल्यं साधनवैकल्यं च द्वयमेव दृष्टान्तदूषणम् । तत्र साध्यवैकल्ये दृष्टान्तो विपक्षो भवति । तत्र वर्तमानं साधनमनैकान्तिकं विरुद्धं वा भवति । साधनवैकल्ये व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरिति । दृष्टान्तदोषो हेत्वाभासेऽन्तर्भवतीति चेन्न । दृष्टान्तोक्त्यनन्तरं प्रतिभासात् । सपक्षान्तरे वर्तमानस्य साधनस्य दृष्टान्तीकृते सपक्षेऽवृत्तौ हेत्वाभासत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । तत्राप्यनुपदर्शितव्याप्तिकत्वेन व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध इति चेन्न । तथाऽप्यर्थदोषाभावादिति ।

evamudāharaṇābhāsānapi hetvābhāseऽntarbhāvayantaḥteṣāṃna pṛthag vācyatāmāhuḥ | tathāhi | udāharaṇalakṣaṇarahitā udāharaṇavadavabhāsamānā udāharaṇābhāsāḥ | tatra sādharmyodāharaṇe sādhyavikalo yathā manoऽnityam mūrtatvāt yanmūrtaṃ tat anityam, yathā paramāṇuriti | sādhanavikalo yathā karmeti | ubhayavikalo yathā ākāśa iti | āśrayahīno yathā śaśaviṣāṇamiti | avyāptyabhidhānaṃ yathā ghaṭavaditi | viparītavyāptyabhidhānaṃ yathā yadanityaṃ tanmūrtam, yathā ghaṭa iti | vaidharmyodāharaṇe sādhyāvyāvṛtto yathā | yadanityaṃ na bhavati tanmūrtaṃ na bhavati | yathā karmeti | sādhanāvyāvṛtto yathā paramāṇuriti | ubhayāvyāvṛtto yathā ghaṭa iti | āśrayahīnaḥ pūrvavat | avyāptyabhidhānaṃ yathā ākāśa iti | viparītavyāptyabhidhānaṃ yathā | yanmūrtaṃ na bhavati tadanityaṃ na bhavati | yathāऽऽkāśa iti | atra vaidharmyodāharaṇasyānupayuktatvāt tadābhāsakathanam anupayuktam | avyāptyabhidhānaṃ tu na doṣo nyūnaṃ vā | viparītavyāptyabhidhānamapyasaṅgatam | āśrayahīnatvaṃ cāśrayāsiddhavadadūṣaṇam | anyataravaikalyenaiva dṛṣṭāntasya duṣṭatvādubhayavaikalyaṃ na pṛthaggaṇaṇīyam | tasmāt sādhyavaikalyaṃ sādhanavaikalyaṃ ca dvayameva dṛṣṭāntadūṣaṇam | tatra sādhyavaikalye dṛṣṭānto vipakṣo bhavati | tatra vartamānaṃ sādhanamanaikāntikaṃ viruddhaṃ vā bhavati | sādhanavaikalye vyāpyatvāsiddhiriti | dṛṣṭāntadoṣo hetvābhāseऽntarbhavatīti cenna | dṛṣṭāntoktyanantaraṃ pratibhāsāt | sapakṣāntare vartamānasya sādhanasya dṛṣṭāntīkṛte sapakṣeऽvṛtttau hetvābhāsatvānupapatteśca | tatrāpyanupadarśitavyāptikatvena vyāpyatvāsiddha iti cenna | tathāऽpyarthadoṣābhāvāditi |

The fallacies of the subject are cognized by the mere statement of the proposition. They are included under *Svakriyāvirodha* and *Svanyāyavirodha*, e.g. "I am dumb"; "the knowledge of an object does not require the means of knowledge". Mādhva logicians recognized two fallacies in the above example; a) the lack of probandum because it is concrete like the prime atom. The atom, i.e., the example, is not non-eternal b) *Sādhanavaikalya,* the lack of reason, e.g., *Manas* is non-eternal because it is concrete like action. The reason, i.e. concreteness, is not existent in action.

The contention that the defect 'lack of probandum' in an example makes the example a negative instance where the probandum should not exist, which would be a case of *Anaikānta,* the nonconclusive or the *Viruddha,* the contradictory and the contention that the defect 'lack of reason is included in *Vyāpyatvāsiddhi,* is not correct. These defects are cognized after the example is stated and not before that.

End of Chapter II Inference

।। इति श्रीमज्जयतीर्थपूज्यचरणविरचितप्रमाणपद्धतावनुमानपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ।।

iti śrīmajjayatīrthapūjyacaraṇaviracitapramāṇapaddhatāvanumānaparicchedaḥ samāptaḥ |

Thus, ends Chapter II Inference in *Pramāṇapaddhatiḥ* authored by his holy-feet Śrī Jayatīrtha.

। अथ आगमपरिच्छेदः ।

Atha Āgama-Paricchedaḥ

Chapter III Verbal Testimony

The definition of the verbal testimony

निर्दोषः शब्दः आगमः । निरभिधेयत्वेन अन्वयाभावेन वाऽबोधकत्वं, विपरीतबोधकत्वं, ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वंम्, अप्रयोजनत्वंम्, अनभिमतप्रयोजनत्वंम्, अशक्यसाधनप्रतिपादनं, लघूपाये सति गुरूपायोपदेशनमित्यादिदोषरहितः शब्द आगमः । निर्दोषं वाक्यमिति वा ।

nirdoṣaḥ śabdaḥ āgamaḥ | nirabhidheyatvena anvayābhāvena vā abodha-katvaṃ, viparītabodhakatvaṃ, jñātajñāpakatvaṃ, aprayojanatvaṃ, anabhimata-prayojanatvaṃ, aśakyasādhanapratipādanaṃ, laghūpāye sati gurūpāyopadeśana mityādidoṣarahitaḥ śabda āgamaḥ|

Defect-free words constitute language. The defects of language are; a) being non-intelligible due to words lacking a referent or syntax lacking proper connection between senses b) giving rise to erroneous cognition c) conveying an object already known d) conveying useless or unintended use e) informing about a method that is not viable to accomplish f) preaching a complicated method though despite having an easy alternative. Language that is free from all such defects constitutes verbal testimony.

Explanation with another definition

विभक्त्यन्ता वर्णाः पदम् । आकाङ्क्षा–सन्निधि–योग्यतावतां पदानां समूहो वाक्यम् । आकाङ्क्षा जिज्ञासा । सा चेतनधर्मः । तद्विषयत्वादर्थाः साकाङ्क्षाः । तत्प्रतिपादकत्वात् पदान्यपि । सन्निधिः अविलम्बेनोच्चरितत्वं, पदधर्म एव । प्रतीतान्वयस्य प्रमाणविरोधाभावो योग्यता, पदार्थधर्मः । तद्वाचकत्वात् पदान्यपि योग्यतावन्ति इत्युच्यन्ते । तत्र पदत्वेन निरभिधेयत्वस्य, आकांक्षा-सन्निधिभ्याम् अन्वयाभावस्य, योग्यतया विपरीतबोधकत्वस्य च निरासे सति, अशेषदोषनिरासार्थं निर्दोषग्रहणम् ।

nirdoṣaṃ vākyamiti vā | vibhakyantā varṇāḥ padam | ākāṅkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā-vatāṃ padānāṃ samūho vākyam | ākāṅkṣā jijñāsā | sā cetanadharmaḥ | tadviṣayatvādarthāḥ sākāṅkṣāḥ | tatpratipādakatvāt padānyapi | sannidhiḥ avilambenoccaritatvaṃ, padadharma eva | pratītānvayasya pramāṇavirodhābhāvo yogyatā, padārthadharmaḥ | tadvācakatvāt padānyapi yogyatāvanti ityucyante | tatra padatvena nirabhidheyatvasya, ākāṃkṣā-sannidhibhyām anvayābhāvasya, yogyatayā viparītabodhakatvasya ca nirāse sati, aśeṣadoṣanirāsārthaṃ nirdoṣagrahaṇam |

Defect-free sentences also constitute a language. The series of letters ending with inflectional suffix constitute a morpheme. A group of morphemes having a) *Ākāṅkṣā,* the expectancy b) *Sannidhi,* the proximity and c) *Yogyatā,* the compatibility constitute a sentence. *Ākāṅkṣā,* the expectancy is nothing but an inquiry or the desire to know. That is a property of *Ātmā* or self. The objects are said to have expectancy as they are grasped as the content of the desire to know. The words that are referring to those objects are also called as having expectancy in the secondary sense. *Sannidhi,* the proximity is continuous utterance without any break of words, which is an attribute of words only. *Yogyatā,* the absence of inconsistency of proof to the syntactical meaning that is conveyed by syntax is compatibility among senses. This is an attribute of senses. Since words refer to the senses, words are said to be having compatibility. In the above stated definition of sentence, the term 'word' rejects the intangibility. The terms expectancy and proximity discard the lacking of proper relations. The compatibility gives no room for causing any error. Then, in order to eliminate all other possible defects, the term defect-free is added in the definition.

Sequence in letters and words

पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभव–जनितसंस्कारसहितं, वाच्यवाचकभाव–सम्बन्धग्रहणसंस्कारानुगृहीतम् अन्त्यवर्णसन्निकृष्टं श्रोत्रमनेकेष्वपि वर्णेषु एकां पदबुद्धिं जनयति । तथा पूर्वपूर्वपदानुभव–जनितसंसारसहकृतम् अन्त्यपदविषयं श्रोत्रमनेकेषु पदेषु एकां वाक्यबुद्धिम् आकाङ्क्षाद्यनुसारेण जनयति । तेन वर्णानां पदानां च सहानवस्थितप्रतीतानामपि समुदायो युज्यते ।

pūrvapūrvavarṇānubhava-janitasaṃskārasahitaṃ, vācyavācakabhāva-sambandhagrahaṇasaṃskārānugṛhītam antyavarṇasannikṛṣṭaṃ śrotramanekeṣvapi varṇeṣu ekāṃ padabuddhiṃ janayati | tathā pūrvapūrvapadānubhava-janitasaṃsārasahakṛtam antyapadaviṣayaṃ śrotramanekeṣu padeṣu ekāṃ vākyabuddhim ākāṅkṣādyanusāreṇa janayati | tena varṇānāṃ padānāṃ ca sahā-navasthitapratītānāmapi samudāyo yujyate |

The auditory sense in contact with the last letter uttered, assisted with the impressions of the relation of denotation among words, and with the impressions that are accumulated through experiences of previous letters articulated, would cause for the cognition of one word with respect to many letters. Similarly, the same sense organ on hearing many words, while being in contact with the last word, aided by the impressions that are accumulated through the experiences of previous words, cognizes the sentence as a whole, following the syntactical rules. With this notion, the theoretical grouping of letters and words becomes possible even though they are not congregated by auditory cognition.

Functions of language

आगमोऽपि सम्यक् श्रुतः, समयस्मरणानुगृहीतः, शाब्दन्यायानुसन्धानसहितः एव, स्वार्थस्य बोधको न तु सत्तामात्रेण ।

*āgamo*ऽ*pi samyak śrutaḥ, samayasmaraṇānugṛhītaḥ, śābdanyāyānus-andhānasahitaḥ eva, svārthasya bodhako na tu sattāmātreṇa |*

The sentence conveys its meaning only when it is completely heard, accompanied by recollection of word-denotation and awareness of syntactical regulations; not merely by its existence.

The meaning of word

जातिरेव वाच्या, पदानां व्यक्तयस्तु लक्ष्या इति भाट्टाः । जातिविशिष्टा व्यक्तयो वाच्या इति वैशेषिकाः। क्वचिज्जातिः, क्वचिद्व्यक्तिरिति वैयाकरणाः । क्वचिज्जातिः, क्वचिद्व्यक्तिः, क्वचिदाकृतिः, इति नैयायिकाः । अन्यापोह इति बौद्धाः । व्यक्तय एव वाच्याः, समयप्रतिपत्तौ तु सादृश्यमुपधानम् इत्याचार्याः ।

jātireva vācyā, padānāṃ vyaktayastu lakṣyā iti bhāṭṭāḥ | jātiviśiṣṭā vyaktayo vācyā iti vaiśeṣikāḥ | kvacijjātiḥ, kvacidvaktiriti vaiyākaraṇāḥ | kvacijjātiḥ, kvacidvyaktiḥ, kvacidākṛtiḥ, iti naiyāyikāḥ | anyāpoha iti bauddhāḥ | vyaktaya eva vācyāḥ, samayapratipattau tu sādṛśyamupadhānam ityācāryāḥ |

Only *Jāti*, the universal properties are denoted by words; *Vyakti*, the particulars are indirectly implied. This is the stand of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. Opinion of Vaiśeṣikas is that the particular is attributed by universal is denoted by word. Vaiyyākaraṇas say that, the universal is denoted at times and particular is denoted sometimes. Somewhere universal is denoted; somewhere particular is denoted; and *Ākṛti*, form is denoted somewhere is the view held by Naiyyāyikas. Bauddhas hold that double negation of referent is the sense of word. However, Ācārya Madhva admits that the only particulars are denoted by words and to know the denotation

function of words, *Sādṛśya*, the similarity of things to be denoted plays a major role as a factor.

Denotation function of the word

ननु समयो नाम पदानां पदार्थानां च वाच्यवाचकभावसम्बन्धः । स च सम्बन्धिष्वज्ञातेषु ज्ञातुमशक्य इति, पदार्थज्ञानस्य प्रागेव सिद्धत्वात्, किमागमस्य प्रयोजनम् । उच्यते । यथा ज्ञातयोरपि धर्मधर्मिणोः संसर्गोऽनुमानेन बोध्यते, तथा ज्ञातानामेव पदार्थानाम् अन्वयविशेषस्य आगमो बोधकः । पदानां पदार्थमात्रविषयत्वेन अन्वयबोधकं न किञ्चिदस्तीति चेत् । अत्र वर्णपदाभिव्यक्तोऽखण्डः स्फोटाख्यः शब्दोऽन्वयबोधक इति वैयाकरणा ब्रुवते । वर्णमाला इत्यपरे । वाक्यान्त्यो वर्ण इत्यन्ये । पदानां सान्निध्यमिति केचित् । पदैरभिहिताः पदार्था एवाऽकाङ्क्षादिशालिन इति भाट्टाः ।

nanu samayo nāma padānāṃ padārthānāṃ ca vācyavācakabhāvasambandhaḥ | sa ca sambandhiṣvajñāteṣu jñātumaśakya iti, padārthajñānasya prāgeva siddhatvāt, kimāgamasya prayojanam | ucyate | yathā jñātayorapi dharmadharmiṇoḥ saṃsargo'numānena bodhyate, tathā jñātānāmeva padārthānām anvayaviśeṣasya āgamo bodhakaḥ | padānāṃ padārthamātraviṣayatvena anvayabodhakaṃ na kiñcidastīti cet | atra varṇapadābhivyakto'khaṇḍaḥ sphoṭākhyaḥ śabdo'nvayabodhaka iti vaiyākaraṇā bruvate | varṇamālā ityapare | vākyāntyo varṇa ityanye | padānāṃ sānnidhyamiti kecit | padairabhihitāḥ padārthā evā'kāṅkṣādiśālina iti bhāṭṭāḥ |

Objection: The relation of 'denoted-denotative' between words and their meanings itself is connotation. It cannot be known when the relatives i.e., word and referent are unknown. Thus, if the referents are known well before hearing a sentence, what is the use of verbal testimony?

Response: As in the case of inference, the relation between the two known things i.e., subject and probandum is established by inference, the syntactical association of the senses that are already known is communicated by the sentence.

Objection: The words can refer to only their senses; there is nothing left to designate the syntactical association of senses. How to get it? As an answer to this question, Vaiyyākaraṇas say that a unique indivisible concept by name *Sphoṭa*, the explosion that manifests from letters and words, transmits the syntactical association of the word-senses. Some philosophers admit the sequence of letters could convey the same, whereas, others hold that the last letter of sentence is the conveyer of the meaning. According to others, the proximity of the words in a sentence conveys the meaning. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that senses of words themselves having expectancy etc., would convey the meaning of the sentence.

सर्वेषां पक्षाणामप्रामाणिकत्वात्, प्रमाणविरुद्धत्वाच्च, पदान्येव अन्वितस्वार्थाभिधायीनि इति प्रेक्षा-वन्तः । तत्र प्रत्येकमपि पदानि अन्वयविशेषाभिधानसमर्थानीति प्राभाकराः । प्रत्येकं सामान्यतो योग्येतरान्वितस्वार्थाभिधानशक्तीनि पदानि पदान्तरसन्निधानाहितशक्त्यन्तराणि विशेषतोऽप्यन्वितान् स्वार्थानभिदधति तथाऽनुभवादित्याचार्याः ।

sarveṣāṃ pakṣāṇāmaprāmāṇikatvāt, pramāṇaviruddhatvācca, padānyeva anvitasvārthābhidhāyīni iti prekṣāvantaḥ | tatra pratyekamapi padāni anvayaviśeṣābhidhānasamarthānīti prābhākarāḥ | pratyekaṃ sāmānyato yogyetarānvita-svārthābhidhānaśaktīni padāni padāntarasannidhānāhitaśaktyantarāṇi viśeṣatoऽpyanvitān svārthānabhidadhati tathāऽnubhavādityācāryāḥ |

Response: Since all these opinions are not supported by proof and are contradictory to proof, it is good to hold that the words themselves denote their senses in association with other senses. This is the way of right thinkers. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka considers that each word denotes a particular association with the other particular meaning. However, Ācārya Madhva holds that each word, though has got the power to express a meaning related with other competent meaning in general, it gets extra-power with the proximity of other words, to express its own particular meaning in association with a particularly syntactically related meaning. This is what everyone experiences.

Classification of verbal testimony

आगमो द्विविधः । अपौरुषेयः, पौरुषेयश्चेति । तत्र अपौरुषेयो वेदः, पौरुषेयोऽन्यः । वर्णाः सर्वत्र कूटस्थनित्याः । सर्वगताश्च । पदान्यपि नियतान्येव । तेषां पदार्थसम्बन्धोऽपि स्वाभाविक एव । तथाऽपि वाक्ये पदानामानुपूर्वीविशेषस्य स्वतन्त्रपुरुषपूर्वकत्व-भावाभावाभ्यामयं भेदः ।

āgamo dvividhaḥ | apauruṣeyaḥ, pauruṣeyaśceti | tatra apauruṣeyo vedaḥ, pauruṣeyoऽnyaḥ | varṇāḥ sarvatra kūṭasthanityāḥ | sarvagatāśca | padānyapi niyatānyeva | teṣāṃ padārthasambandhoऽpi svābhāvika eva | tathāऽpi vākye padānāmānupūrvīviśeṣasya svatantrapuruṣapūrvakatva-bhāvābhāvābhyāmayaṃ bhedaḥ |

Verbal testimony is divided into two kinds, viz. 1) *Apauruṣeya,* the compositions that do not have authorship and 2)*Pauruṣeya,* the human compositions. In those, Vedas are of the first kind and the rest belong to the second kind.

The articulations or letters are absolutely eternal and omnipresent. The words do not change either. The relation of words with their meanings is also a natural one. However, the difference between the authorless and authored is that in authorless Vedas, the particular sequence of words in a sentence is not produced

by an Independent person but in the case of authored texts the sequence is produced by an independent person.

Verbal testimony - an independent means of the knowledge

आगमोऽनुमाने एवान्तर्भवतीति वैशेषिकादयः । तदसत् । व्याप्त्याद्यननुसंधाने एव वाक्यार्थप्रतीतेरनुभवात् । अपौरुषेयः पृथक् प्रमाणम् । पौरुषेयस्त्वनुमानमिति प्राभाकराः । तदप्यसत् । उभयत्र सामग्रीसाम्येऽपि विशेषकल्पकाभावात् । तदेतानि त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानि ।

āgamo'numāne evāntarbhavatīti vaiśeṣikādayaḥ | tadasat | vyāptyādy-ananusaṃdhāne eva vākyārthapratīteranubhavāt | apauruṣeyaḥ pṛthak pramā-ṇam | pauruṣeyastvanumānamiti prābhākarāḥ | tadapyasat | ubhayatra sāmagrī-sāmye'pi viśeṣakalpakābhāvāt | tadetāni trīṇyeva pramāṇāni |

Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the verbal testimony can be included in the inference itself. However, it is not true, for, the cognition of syntactical meaning is experienced without any reflection about the universal relation. According to Prābhākaras, the authorless Vedic texts are a separate testimony; but, the other than Vedic texts are inference. This view does not hold good either. When both are same in all aspects, there would be nothing left to differentiate.

Thus, these three; *Pratyakṣa,* the perception, *Anumāna,* the inference and *Āgama,* the verbal testimony are the only proofs or means of knowledge. Thus, the section on verbal testimony ends.

Section on other sources of knowledge

Arthāpatti - the postulation

एतेषु अर्थापत्त्यादीनामन्तर्भावः । तथाहि, अनुपपद्यमानार्थदर्शनात् तदुपपादके बुद्धिरर्थापत्तिः । यथा जीवन् चैत्रो गृहे नास्तीति ज्ञाने सति, बहिर्भावज्ञानम् । अत्र यद्यपि, एकैकस्य बहिर्भावलिङ्गत्वं नोपपद्यते व्यभिचारात् । तथापि, चैत्रो बहिरस्ति जीवनवत्वे सति गृहेऽसत्वात् । यो जीवन् यत्र नास्ति स ततोऽन्यत्रास्ति । यथाऽहमिति, मिलितयोर्जीवनगृहाभावयोः लिङ्गत्वमुपपद्यत एव । विरुद्धयोः विशेषणविशेष्यभावानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न । सामान्यविशेषयोः अविरोधस्य स्वस्मिन्नेव दृष्टत्वात् । आत्यन्तिकविरोधे त्वर्थापत्तिरपि न प्रवर्तते । किन्तु विप्रतिपत्त्या सन्देह एव भवतीति ।

eteṣu arthāpattyādīnāmantarbhāvaḥ | tathāhi, anupapadyamānārthadarśanāt tadupapādake buddhirarthāpattiḥ | yathā jīvan caitro gṛhe nāstīti jñāne sati, bahirbhāvajñānam | atra yadyapi ekaikasya bahirbhāvaliṅgatvaṃ nopapadyate vyabhicārāt | tathāpi, caitro bahirasti jīvanavatve sati gṛhe'satvāt | yo jīvan yatra nāsti sa tato'nyatrāsti | yathā'hamiti, militayorjīvanagṛhābhāvayoḥ

liṅgatvamupapadyata eva | viruddhayoḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvānupapa ttiriti cenna | sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ avirodhasya svasminneva dṛṣṭatvāt | ātyantikavirodhe tvarthāpattirapi na pravartate | kintu vipratipattyā sandeha eva bhavatīti |

In these means of knowledge, the other proofs like *Arthāpatti* etc., are also subsumed. Thus, *Arthāpatti* has been defined as the cognition of reason, which would make something intelligible by justifying it that is generated by the experience of the apparently, otherwise unjustifiable thing. For e.g., when it is known that Caitra, who is alive is not present at home, he would be known to be outside. Here, *de facto* the reasons either just being alive or absence at home cannot justify being outside, for, they both deviate from the probandum. Nevertheless, Caitra has gone outside because he is not present at home but is alive. The person who,while being alive is not present in a place, must be present in some other place, as in my case it is proved. In this case, both the being alive and absent at home serve the purpose of sign together. So what is the problem in considering this as an inference?

Objection: How can there be a modifier-modified relation between contradictory properties?

Response: The non-contradiction of the modifier-modified is seen in the knower-self only. If it is absolute contradiction, then it would not be possible to postulate *Arthāpatti* either. Instead of opposite views, there is a possibility of doubt etc. Hence, *Arthāpatti* is nothing but a kind of inference.

Upamāna - the comparison

सादृश्यज्ञानसाधनम् उपमानम् । तत्र तेनायं सदृशः, सदृशाविमौ, इत्यादि वा ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षजम् । गोगवयौ सदृशाविति वाक्यजं त्वागम एव । गृह्यमाणे स्मर्यमाणसादृश्यं दृष्ट्वा, स्मर्यमाणे यद् गृह्यमाणसादृश्यं प्रत्येति तदनुमानमेव । ननु अनुभूयमानगतत्वेन प्रतीयमानं सादृश्यं करणम् । स्मर्यमाणगतं प्रमेयम् । तत्कथमनयोः व्यधिकरणयोः लिंङ्गलिङ्गिभाव इति चेन्न । स गौरेतद्गवयसदृशः ।
अस्य गवयस्य तद्गोसदृशत्वात् । यो यत्सदृशः, स तत्सदृशः । यथा यमो यमान्तरेणेति व्याप्तिसम्भवेन, व्यधिकरणस्यादोषत्वात् । एतद्गवयगतसादृश्यप्रतियोगित्वस्य वा लिङ्गत्वेन सामानाधिकरण्याच्चेति ।

sādṛśyajñānasādhanam upamānam | tatra tenāyaṃ sadṛśaḥ, sadṛśāvimau, ityādi vā jñānaṃ pratyakṣajam | gogavayau sadṛśāviti vākyajaṃ tvāgama eva | gṛhyamāṇe smaryamāṇasādṛśyaṃ dṛṣṭvā, smaryamāṇe yad gṛhyamāṇasādṛśyaṃ

pratyeti tadanumānameva | nanu anubhūyamānagatatvena pratīyamānaṃ sādṛśyaṃ karaṇam | smaryamāṇagataṃ prameyam | tatkathamanayoḥ vyadhikaraṇayoḥ liṃṅgaliṅgabhāva iti cenna | sa gauretadgavayasadṛśaḥ | asya gavayasya tadgosadṛśatvāt | yo yatsadṛśaḥ, sa tatsadṛśaḥ | yathā yamo yamāntareṇeti vyāptisambhavena, vyadhikaraṇasyādoṣatvāt | etadgavayagatasādṛśyapratiyogitvasya vā liṅgatvena sāmānādhikaraṇyācceti |

The distinctive causal condition of the similarity-cognition is *Upamāna,* the comparison. Of that, the cognition of the form "this is similar to that", "both these are similar" etc., is perceptual cognition. "The cow and cow-clone are similar" is a cognition generated by a sentence. If it is cognition of similarity in an object that is recalled, after getting the similarity of the object recalled in the object presently being cognized, then, it is none other than inference.

Objection: Now, the similarity that appears as present in an object being experienced is a distinctive cause. The similarity of the recalled object is to be known. Then, how do these two properties present in different locus, get the role of sign and probandum?

Response: Inference of the form that cow is similar to this cow-clone because, cow-clone is similar to that cow is possible. The objet X is similar to Y, when Y is similar to X, e.g., siblings. When this kind of universal relation is possible, then the absence of co-existence of sign and probandum is not at all a defect. Even if it is required, the sign can be put forward in different form as having been counter-positive of the similarity present in this cow-clone.

Abhāvapramāṇa - the proof of negation

अभावज्ञानकरणम् अभावप्रमाणम् । तत्र इदानीं कौरवाद्यभावो, भारताद्यागमात् अवगम्यते । देवदत्तस्य चक्षुराद्यभावो, रूपाद्यदर्शनलिङ्गगम्यः । सुखाद्यभावप्रमितिस्तु साक्षिप्रत्यक्षेणैव । पुरोवृत्तिघटाद्यभावप्रमितिस्तु झटिति जायमाना प्रत्यक्षफलमेव । न त्वनुपलब्धिमात्रजन्या अपरोक्षज्ञानत्वात् । अनुपलब्धिस्त्ववर्जनीयसन्निधिरेव । यत्र त्वन्धकारे हस्तप्रसारणादिरूपपरामर्शे न घटाभावं प्रत्येति न तदाऽनुपलब्धिः करणम् । किन्तु लिङ्गत्वेनैव । अत्र घटो नास्ति । योग्यत्वे सति, अनुपलभ्यमानत्वादिति । एवं प्रातर्गजाद्यभाव–ज्ञानम् अनुपलब्धिलिङ्गजन्यम् । अभावस्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न । भाववदभावस्यापीन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे बाधकाभावात् ।

abhāvajñānakaraṇam abhāvapramāṇam | tatra idānīṃ kauravādyabhāvo, bhāratādyāgamāt avagamyate | devadattasya cakṣurādyabhāvo, rūpādyadarśanaliṅgagamyaḥ | sukhādyabhāvapramitistu sākṣipratyakṣeṇaiva | purovṛttighaṭādyabhāvapramitistu jhaṭiti jāyamānā pratyakṣaphalameva | na tvanu-

palabdhimātrajanyā aparokṣajñānatvāt | anupalabdhistvavarjanīyasannidhi reva | yatra tvandhakāre hastaprasāraṇādirūpaparāmarśena ghaṭābhāvaṃ pratyeti na tadāsnupalabdhiḥ karaṇam | kintu liṅgatvenaiva | atra ghaṭo nasti | yogyatve sati, anupalabhyamānatvāditi | evaṃ prātargajādyabhāva-jñānam anupalabdhiliṅgajanyam | abhāvasyendriyasannikarṣānupapattiriti cenna | bhāv avadabhāvasyāpīndriyasannikarṣe bādhakābhāvāt |

The distinctive cause of cognition of absence is called *Abhāvapramāṇa,* the proof of negation. Of them, the absence of Kauravas in our times is known through the Mahābhārata text itself. The lacking of vision to Devadatta is known through the inference on the ground of non-perception of colour etc., The absence of happiness etc., is cognized by self-introspection only. When the cognition of absence of some object like pot etc., arises without any interruption, it is the result of perception only. It is not the result of non-availability of the object as this is a direct perception. Though there exists 'non-availability', it has nothing to do with the context, as it has got unavoidable futile presence. In such places, where absence of things like pot etc., is known in a dark area through hand-movement etc., then, non-availability is not an independent cause; but it is a cause in the form of reasoning. In that context, everyone concludes that, as the pot that is perceivable is not available, the pot is absent. This indicates that non-availability is a kind of inference. Similarly, a person sitting at home in the evening, and perceiving the absence of an elephant in the courtyard in the morning is also a result of non-availability reasoning.

Objection: How does the contact between absence and sense organ hold good?

Response: As in the case of presence, getting in contact with sense organ s does not find any problem in the case of absence either.

On the sources of other knowledge

बहुलज्ञानेऽल्पज्ञानं सम्भवः । यथा शतमस्तीति जाने पञ्चाशत् ज्ञानम् । तदप्यनुमानमेव । देवदत्तः पञ्चाशद्वान्, शतवत्वात् । यथाऽहमिति प्रयोगसंभवात् । प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधे परिशिष्यमाणे बुद्धिः परिशेषः । यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ एताविति ज्ञाने सति, एकस्मिन्नायं यज्ञदत्त इति प्रतिषेधे देवदत्तबुद्धिः । इयमनुमानजन्या । अयं देवदत्तः, देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोः अन्यतरत्वे सति, अयज्ञदत्तत्वात् । व्यतिरेकेण यज्ञदत्तवदिति प्रयोगोपपत्तेः । उपक्रमादीन्यप्यनुमानान्येव । अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं, प्रवादपारम्पर्यम्, ऐतिह्यम् । यथाऽत्र वटे वैश्रवणोऽस्तीति वाक्यम् । तदागम एव । एवमन्यान्यपि प्रमाणान्युक्तेष्वेव अन्तर्भाव्यानि ।

bahulajñāneslpajñānaṃ sambhavaḥ | yathā śatamastīti jāne pañcāśat jñānam | tadapyanumānameva | devadattaḥ pañcāśadvān, śatavatvāt |

yathāshamiti prayogasaṃbhavāt | prasaktapratiṣedhe pariśiṣyamāṇe buddhiḥ pariśeṣaḥ | yathā devadattayajñadattau etāviti jñāne sati, ekasminnāyaṃ yajñadatta iti pratiṣedhe devadattabuddhiḥ | iyamanumānajanyā | ayaṃ devadattaḥ, devadattayajñadattayoḥ anyataratve sati, ayajñadattatvāt | vyatirekeṇa yajñadattavaditi prayogopapatteḥ | upakramādīnyapyanumānānyeva | anirdiṣṭapravaktṛkaṃ, pravādapāramparyam, aitihyam | yathāstra vaṭe vaiśravaṇosstīti vākyam | tadāgama eva | evamanyānyapi pramāṇānyukteṣveva antarbhāvyāni |

Saṃbhava, the probability is a cognition of parts, while having the cognition of the whole. For e.g., having cognized that there exists hundred, having knowledge of fifty is the probability. It is also a kind of inference. Devadatta who has got hundred, has definitely got fifty as I have. This is the form of inference.

After the rejection of all possibilities, the resolution about remaining thing is called *Pariśeṣa.* While knowing, these two are Yajñadatta and Devadatta, if one person is known not to be Yajñadatta, then he would be declared to be Devadatta. This is also an inferential judgment. The form of inference is as follows: This person is Devadatta, because being either of the two and being other than Yajñadatta, in contrast with Yajñadatta.

The reasoning factors like *Upakrama* etc., that are utilized in deciding the purport of the text are also a kind of inference. *Aitihyam,* the ethnic tale, whose authorship is undetermined, is another kind of knowledge source. For illustration, the statement like there is Vaiśravaṇa - Kubera in this tree is included in verbal testimony itself.

Thus, all other sources of knowledge are to be amalgamated into the proofs described here.

Prāmāṇyasvatastva **- the intrinsic veridicality**

ननु एतेषां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यम्, अप्रमाणानामप्रामाण्यं, च केनोत्पद्यते केन वा ज्ञायत इति चेत्, उच्यते । तत्र ज्ञानानामुभयं स्वत एवेति साङ्ख्या मन्यन्ते ।
ज्ञानजनकातिरिक्तजनकानपेक्षत्वम् उत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वम् । ज्ञानज्ञापकातिरिक्तज्ञापकानपेक्षत्वं ज्ञप्तौ स्वतस्त्वम् ।

nanu eteṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam, apramāṇānāmaprāmāṇyaṃ, ca kenotpadyate kena vā jñāyata iti cet ucyate | tatra jñānānāmubhayaṃ svata eveti sāṅkhyā manyante | jñānajanakātiriktajanakānapekṣatvam utpattau svatastvam | jñānajñāpakātiriktajñāpakānapekṣatvaṃ jñaptau svatastvam |

Now, let us discus about the veridicality or truthfulness of knowledge , and their means and the non-veridicality or untruthfulness of erroneous cognition or illusion and their means as to how it comes into being. How is it known?

In reply to this question, Sāṃṅkhya philosophers maintain that both the veridicality and non-veridicality of cognitions are intrinsic. In respect of origin, veridicality being intrinsic in nature is not being reliant on any other factor than the causal condition of cognition. In respect of awareness of veridicality, 'being intrinsic' is 'not being reliant on any other apprehender than the apprehender of the cognition'.

उभयं परत एवेति नैयायिकादयः । ज्ञानजनकातिरिक्तकारणजन्यत्वम् उत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् । ज्ञानज्ञापकातिरिक्तप्रमाणापेक्षत्वं ज्ञप्तौ परतस्त्वम् । तत्र ज्ञानमिन्द्रियादिजन्यम् । प्रामाण्यं पुनरिन्द्रियादिगुणजन्यम् । तथाऽप्रामाण्यं तद्दोषजन्यम् । एवं ज्ञानं मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यम् । तत्र प्रामाण्यम्, अप्रामाण्यं च संवाद-विसंवादलिङ्गयमिति । प्रामाण्यं परतोऽप्रामाण्यं स्वत इति बौद्धाः । प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, अप्रामाण्यं परत इति पक्षमङ्गीकुर्वाणा अपि भाट्टाः, प्रामाण्यविशिष्टं ज्ञानं ज्ञातताविशेषेणानुमीयत इति ज्ञप्तौ स्वतस्त्वम् । अप्रामाण्यं तु, विसंवादाद्यनुमानान्तरवेद्यमिति परतस्त्वं मन्यन्ते । स्वप्रकाशज्ञानेनैव प्रामाण्यविशिष्टज्ञानं सिद्ध्यति ।
अप्रामाण्यं तु नास्त्येवेति प्राभाकराः ।

ubhayaṃ parata eveti naiyāyikādayaḥ | jñānajanakātiriktakāraṇajan yatvam utpattau paratastvam | jñānajñāpakātiriktapramāṇāpekṣatv aṃ jñaptau paratastvam | tatra jñānamindriyādijanyam | prāmāṇyaṃ punarindriyādiguṇajanyam | tathāsprāmāṇyaṃ taddoṣajanyam | evaṃ jñānaṃ mānasapratyakṣavedyam | tatra prāmāṇyam, aprāmāṇyaṃ ca saṃvāda-visaṃvādaliṅgamyamiti | prāmāṇyaṃ paratosprāmāṇyaṃ svata iti bauddhāḥ | prāmāṇyaṃ svataḥ, aprāmāṇyaṃ parata iti pakṣamaṅgīkurvāṇā api bhāṭṭāḥ, prāmāṇyaviśiṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ jñātatāviśeṣeṇānumīyata iti, jñaptau svatastvam | aprāmāṇyaṃ tu, visaṃvādādyanumānāntaravedyamiti paratastvaṃ manyante| svaprakāśajñānenaiva prāmāṇyaviśiṣṭajñānaṃ siddhyati | aprāmāṇyaṃ tu nāstyeveti prābhākarāḥ |

Naiyyāyikas maintain that both *Prāmāṇya* and *Aprāmāṇya* are only extrinsic. In respect of origin, veridicality being extrinsic in nature is being produced by the cause other than the cause of cognition. With respect to the awareness, the extrinsic nature of veridicality is being known by the apprehender other than the apprehender of the cognition. The cognition is produced by sense organs and other means. But, the veridicality is produced by the qualities of senses etc. Similarly, non-veridicality is produced by the defects of senses etc. Cognition is known by mental introspection. The veridicality of the cognition is known by the

aid of corresponding or equivalent proof and non-veridicality is inferred on the basis of disagreement of proof.

Bauddhas admit that the veridicality is extrinsic, whereas non-veridicality is intrinsic. Bhāṭṭas, even though hold that veridicality is intrinsic and non-veridicality is extrinsic, they propose a new theory by saying that the cognition attributed by veridicality is inferred by the property called *Jñātatā* or being known. This is the intrinsic nature of veridicality. However, non-veridicality is inferred by disagreement of proof. This is the extrinsic nature of non-veridicality. Prābhākaras hold that the self-luminous cognition is always known along with its veridicality. According to them, there is no non-veridical cognition at all.

इन्द्रियादिमात्रेणैव प्राण्यविशिष्टं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । गुणास्त्वकिञ्चित्कराः । अप्रामाण्यं दोषसहकृतेन्द्रियादिभिरुत्पद्यते । तथा ज्ञानं, तत्प्रामाण्यं च, साक्षिणैव ज्ञायते । अप्रमाणज्ञानस्वरूपमात्रं साक्षिवेद्यम् । तदप्रामाण्यं त्वनुमेयमित्याचार्याः ।

indriyādimātreṇaiva prāmāṇyaviśiṣṭaṃ jñānamutpadyate | guṇāstvakiñcitkarāḥ | aprāmāṇyaṃ doṣasahakṛtendriyādibhirutpadyate | tathā jñānaṃ, tatprāmāṇyaṃ ca, sākṣiṇaiva jñāyate | apramāṇajñānasvarūpamātraṃ sākṣivedyam | tadaprāmāṇyaṃ tvanumeyamityācāryāḥ |

Senses produce cognitions along with their veridicality. Qualities of the senses are of no use. They do not add anything, but, non-veridicality is generated by the defects of the senses etc. Similarly, cognition and the veridicality are both known by *Sākṣī*. However, only the erroneous cognition is grasped by *Sākṣī*, not its non-veridicality. Non-veridicality is inferred by external conditions. This is the stance of Ācārya Madhva.

करणानां तु ज्ञानजनकत्वशक्तिरेव, स्वकारणासादिता प्रामाण्यजनकत्वशक्तिः । अप्रामाण्यजनने त्वन्या शक्तिर्दोषवशदाविर्भवति । ज्ञप्तिस्तु परत एव । इन्द्रियादिस्वरूपस्य यथायथं स्वप्रम णवेद्यत्वात् । यथार्थज्ञानसाधनत्वस्यानुमानवेद्यत्वादिति ।

karaṇānāṃ tu jñānajanakatvaśaktireva, svakāraṇāsāditā prāmāṇyajanakatva-śaktiḥ | aprāmāṇyajanane tvanyā śaktirdoṣavaśadāvirbhava | jñaptistu parata eva | indriyādisvarūpasya yathāyathaṃ svapramāṇavedyatvāt | yathārthajñānasādhanatvasyānumānavedyatvāditi |

The 'causal power of an instrument for cognition' is nothing but the 'causal power to knowledge gained by their own causes. For generation of non-veridicality in senses, a different power is originated by the defects of their own causes. In the case of awareness, non-veridicality is extrinsic in nature. For, the senses are

known by their respective proofs, whereas, the causality to the veridicality is known by inference.

The ultimate use of knowledge and its sources or proofs

तदेवंभूतैः प्रमाणैः पदार्थानां नित्यानित्यत्वादिकं निश्चित्य, विषयेषु विरक्तस्य, शमदमादिसम्पत्तिमतो, वासुदेवैकशरणस्य, तद्विषयाणि श्रवण-मनन-निदिध्यासनानि, आदर-नैरन्तर्याभ्यां बहुकालमनुष्ठितवतो, भगवत्साक्षात्कारे सति, अत्युद्रिक्तया भक्त्या भगवत्प्रसादात्, अशेषानिष्टनिवृत्तिविशिष्टानन्दादिस्वरूपाविर्भावलक्षणा मुक्तिर्भवतीति ।

tadevaṃbhūtaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ padārthānāṃ nityānityatvādikaṃ niścitya, viṣayeṣu viraktasya, śamadamādisampattimato, vāsudevaikaśaraṇasya, tadviṣayāṇi śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsanāni, ādara-nairantaryābhyāṃ bahukālamanuṣṭhitavato, bha-gavatsākṣātkāre sati, atyudriktayā bhaktyā bhagavatprasādāt, aśeṣāniṣṭanivṛtti-viśiṣṭānandādisvarūpāvirbhāvalakṣaṇā muktirbhavatīti |

Thus, a true devotee by these kinds of proofs recognizes the mortality and immortality of the universal categories. The true devotee renounces this material world, with the qualities like devotion and sense-control etc., and surrenders to Lord Vāsudeva, while performing all kinds of activities like Śravaṇa the listening, Manana the meditation, and Nidhiddhyāsana the contemplation with continuity and commitment for long, and acquires the realization of God. Then, extremely powerful devotion leads to liberation, which reveals the blissful and blemish-free nature of the soul by the grace of the God.

End note – submission of the work

जयतीर्थमुनीन्द्रेण बालबोधाय निर्मिता ।
प्रमाणपद्धतिर्भूयात् प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः ।।

jayatīrthamunīndreṇa bālabodhāya nirmitā |
pramāṇapaddhatirbhūyāt prītyai mādhavamadhvayoḥ ||

Pramāṇapaddhati compiled by the saint Śrī Jayatīrtha, for the understanding of the novice, is for the pleasure of Lord Mādhava and Guru Madhva.

End of Chapter III Verbal testimony

।। इति श्रीमज्जयतीर्थपूज्यचरणविरचितप्रमाणपद्धतावागमपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ।।

|| iti śrīmajjayatīrthapūjyacaraṇaviracitapramāṇapaddhatāvāgamaparicchedaḥ samāptaḥ ||

Thus, ends Chapter III Verbal testimony in *Pramāṇapaddhatiḥ* authored by his holy-feet Śrī Jayatīrtha.

APPENDIX

Key to transliteration and pronunciation

Glossary

The works of Śrī Jayatīrtha

Key to *Devanāgarī* pronunciation and diacritical transliteration

Svarāḥ Vowels

Devanāgarī	Diacritics (Transliteration)	Pronunciation	उच्चारणा-स्थानम्	Vocal Tract
अ (अजः) क् [ॖ] क	a (ajaḥ) k	Come	Kanṭaḥ	Gutturalis brevis
आ (आनन्दः) का [ा]	ā (ānandaḥ) kā	Call	Kanṭaḥ	Gutturalis longa
इ (इन्द्रः) कि [ि]	i (indraḥ) ki	Kill	Tāluḥ	Palatalis brevis
ई (ईशः) की [ी]	ī (īśaḥ) kī	Keep	Tāluḥ	Palatalis longa
उ (उग्रः) कु [ु]	u (ugraḥ) ku	Could	Oṣṭhau	Labialis brevis
ऊ (ऊर्ज्जः) कू [ू]	ū (ūrjjaḥ) kū	Cool	Oṣṭhau	Labialis Longa
ऋ (ऋतम्भरः) कृ [ृ]	ṛ (ṛtambharaḥ) kṛ		Mūrdhā	Cerebralis brevis
ॠ (ॠघः) कॄ [ॄ]	ṝ (ṝghaḥ) kṝ		Mūrdhā	Cerebralis longa
ऌ (ऌशः) कॢ [ॢ]	ḷ (ḷśaḥ) kḷ	Cling	Dantāḥ	Dentalis brevis
ॡ (ॡजिः) कॣ [ॣ]	ḹ (ḹjiḥ) kḹ		Dantāḥ	Dentalis longa
ए (एकात्मा) के [े]	e (ekātmā) ke	Cake	Kanṭha-tālū	Gutturo-palatalis longa
ऐ (ऐरः) कै [ै]	ai (airaḥ) kai	Kite	Kanṭha-tālū	Diphthongus gutturo-palatale
ओ (ओजभृत्) को [ो]	o (ojabhṛt) ko	Cold	Kanṭha-oṣṭham	Gutturo-labialis longa
औ (औरसः) कौ [ौ]	au (aurasaḥ) kau	Cow	Kanṭha-oṣṭham	Diphthongus gutturo-labiale
अं (अन्तः) कं [ं]	aṃ (antaḥ) kaṃ	Come	Nāsikā (Anusvāraḥ)	Nasalis labiale
अः (अर्द्धगर्भः) कः [ाः]	aḥ (arddhagarbhaḥ) kaḥ	Kaha	Kanṭhaḥ (Visargaḥ)	Aspirata gutturale

Vyañjanāni - Consonants

Kaṇṭhaḥ Guttural - pronounced from the throat (back of mouth and throat)

Devanāgarī	Diacritics (Transliteration)	Pronunciation	Vocal Tract
क (कपिलः)	ka (kapilaḥ)	Come	Tenuis gutturale
ख (खपतिः)	kha (khapatiḥ)	Blockhead	Tenuis aspirata gutturale
ग (गरुडासनः)	ga (garuḍāsanaḥ)	Give	Media gutturale
घ (घर्मः)	gha (gharmaḥ)	Ghee	Media aspirate gutturale
ङ (ङसारः)	ṅa (ṅasāraḥ)	Sing	Nasalis gutturale

Tāluḥ Palatal - pronounced with middle of tongue against palate (near palate)

च (चार्वङ्गः)	ca (cārvaṅgaḥ)	Check	Tenuis palatale
छ (छन्दोगम्यः)	cha (chandogamyaḥ)	Catch Him	Tenuis aspirata palatale
ज (जनार्दनः)	ja (janārdanaḥ)	Judge	Media palatale
झ (झाटितारिः)	jha (jhāṭitāriḥ)	Hedgehog	Media aspirata palatale
ञ (ञमः)	ña (ñamaḥ)	Canyon	Nasalis palatale

Mūrdhā Cerebral - pronounced with tip of tongue against roof of mouth

ट (टङ्की)	ṭa (ṭaṅkī)	Tear	Tenuis cerebrale
ठ (ठकलः)	ṭha (ṭhakalaḥ)	Anthill	Tenuis aspirata cerebrale
ड (डरकः)	ḍa (ḍarakaḥ)	Dwell	Media cerebrale
ढ (ढरी)	ḍha (ḍharī)	Godhood	Media aspirata cerebrale
ण (णात्मा)	ṇa (ṇātmā)	Under	Nasalis cerebrale

Dantāḥ Dental - pronounced as cerebral but with tongue against teeth (with tip of tongue near gum ridge)

त (तारः)	ta (tāraḥ)	Think	Tenuis dentale
थ (थभः)	tha (thabhaḥ)	Theft	Tenuis aspirate dentale
द (दण्डी)	da (daṇḍī)	The	Media dentale
ध (धन्वी)	dha (dhanvī)	Breathe	Media aspirata dentale
न (नम्यः)	na (namyaḥ)	Not	Nasalis dentale

Oṣṭhau Labial - pronounced with lips (movement of lips)

प (परः)	pa (paraḥ)	Pen	Tenuis labiale
फ (फली)	pha (phalī)	Loophole	Tenuis aspirata labiale
ब (बली)	ba (balī)	Bag	Media labiale
भ (भगः)	bha (bhagaḥ)	Abhor	Media aspirata labiale
म (मनुः)	ma (manuḥ)	Mother	Semivocalis labiale

Antasthāḥ Semivowel – a vowel like sound that serves as a consonant

य (यज्ञः)	ya (yajñaḥ)	Yes	Semivocalis palatale
र (रामः)	ra (rāmaḥ)	Run	Semivocalis cerebrale
ल (लक्ष्मीपतिः)	la (lakṣmīpatiḥ)	Luck	Semivocalis nasalis dentale
व (वरः)	va (varaḥ)	Victory	Semivocalis dento labiale

Ūṣmāṇaḥ Sibilant – pronounced by a hissing sound (like s or sh)

श (शान्तसंवित्)	śa (śāntasaṃvit)	Show	Spiritus asper assibilatus
ष (षड्गुणः)	ṣa (ṣaḍguṇaḥ)	Information	Spiritus asper cerebrale
स (सारात्मा)	sa (sārātmā)	Sun	Spiritus asper dentale
ह (हंसः)	ha (haṃsaḥ)	Home	Spiritus asper gutturale
ळ (ळाळुकः)	ḷa (ḷāḷukaḥ)		Semivocalis mollis dentale
क्ष (क्षत्रियः)	kṣa (kṣatriyaḥ)	Rickshaw	Gutturo dentale

Saṅkhyā - Numerals

०	१	२	३	४	५	६	७	८	९	१०
शून्यम्	एकम्	द्वे	त्रीणि	चत्वारि	पञ्च	षट्	सप्त	अष्ट	नव	दश
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Śūnyam	Ekam	Dve	Trīṇi	Catvāri	Pañca	Ṣaṭ	Sapta	Aṣṭa	Nava	Daśa

अवग्रहः	(अ)	ऽ
Avagrahaḥ	(a)	:'

Glossary of Technical Terms

A

Abhāva	Absence – it is an entity that has independent existence like any other entity
Abhidhā	Primary expressive power of word to convey meaning
Adhikaraṇa	Locus, substratum
Adhikārī	The befitting person who possesses all eligibility criteria that has been prescribed for any specified activity
Adhyavasāya	Determinative knowledge
Advaita	Monism
Āgama	Verbal testimony
Aitihya	Tradition
Alaulika Pratyakṣa	Super-normal perception
Anadhyavasāya	Non-determination
Anaikāntika	Non-conclusive (concomitance)
Anavasthā	Endless Regression
Antaḥkaraṇa	Internal instrument or sense
Anubhava	Experience
Anumāna	Inference
Anumiti	Inferential knowledge, conclusion or judgment
Anupalabdhi	Non-cognition
Anupasaṃhārī	Non-exclusive
Anusandhāna	Subsumtive correlation
Anuvyavasāya	Subsequent consciousness, cognition of cognition
Anvaya Sahacāra	Coexistence of positive being
Anvaya Vyāpti	Concomitance of positive pervasion
Anvaya	Positive
Anvaya Vyatireki	the reason concomitant in affirmation and negation
Anyathāsiddha	Pseudo-cause, dispensable antecedents, accidental circumstance, superfluous
Anyonyābhāva	Mutual negation, difference
Anyonyāśraya	Mutual dependence
Aparokṣa	Immediate perception
Aparvarga	Emancipation
Apoha	Negating

Apramā	False apprehension
Aprāmaṇya	Falsity
Apūrva	Unseen potency
Artha	Object or purpose
Arthāpatti	Presumption
Asādhāraṇa Kāraṇa	Special or unique cause
Asamavāyi Kāraṇa	Non-inherent cause, non-intimate cause
Asambhava	Impossibility
Asiddha	Unknown reason
Atideśavākya	The assimilative proposition, statement of comparison
Atīndriya	Supersensible
Ativyāpti	Over-pervasion
Atyantābhāva	Absolute negation, absence
Avayava	Constituent of a syllogism
Avinābhāva	Invariable relation, inseparability
Avyabhicāri	Invariable
Avyapadeśa	Non-verbal, unverbalizable
Avyāpti	Non-pervasion
Ayathārtha	Erroneous
Ayathārthānubhava	Erroneous experience
Ayāthārthya	Not being correspondent to the fact
Āpta	Trustworthy person
Ātman	Self or soul

B

Bādha	Sublation, negation, rejection, nullifying, stultification
Bādhita	The stultified reason, belated reason, contradicted reason
Bauddha	Buddhists
Bhāṭṭa	Scholastic successors of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
Bhāva	Existence, positive entity, being
Bheda	Difference
Bhrānti	Illusion, error
Buddhi	Intellect

C

Chala	Dialectic quibbling
Cit	Spirit, consciousness

D

Dalakṛtya	Objective of the part of the definition
Darśana	Philosophy, vision, thought
Dhārāvāhikajñāna	Chain cognition
Doṣa	Fault, defect
Dṛṣṭānta	Example
Dṛṣṭārthāpatti	A type of postulation
Duḥkha	Pain, sorrow
Dvaita	Dualism, which is different from western dualism
Dveṣa	Aversion

G

Grāhaka	Revealer of cognition, cognisor
Grāhya	Object of cognition
Guṇa	Quality

H

Hāna	Detachment
Hetu	Middle term, reason
Hetvābhāsa	Fallacies in reasoning, pseudo-reason

I

Icchā	Desire
Indriya	Sense organ
Indriyārtha	The object of the sense
Indriyārthasannikarṣa	Relation between sense organ and the object

J

Jalpa	Argument 'both constructive and destructive character'
Jāti	Unavailing or futile objection, futility, genus, genetic character
Jñāna	Cognition, awareness
Jñātatā	Known-ness, being cognized

K

Kālātīta	Mistimed reason
Kalpanā	Presumptive imagination, factitious fabrication
Kāraka	factor
Kāraṇa	Cause, mean
Karaṇa	Efficient, instrumental cause
Karma	Action, motion, object
Kartā	Agent, doer, subject
Kārya	Result, effect
Kārya Kāraṇa Bhava	Relation between cause and effect
Kathā	Dialect
Kevalānvayī	Concomitant in affirmation alone
Kevala Vyatirekī	Concomitant in negation alone
Kriyā	Movement, action

L

Lakṣaṇa	Definition
Lakṣaṇā	Implied meaning
Lakṣaṇa-Lakṣaṇa	Definition of definition
Laukika	Worldly
Liṇga	Sign, probans, mark, reason
Liṇga-Parāmarśa	Consideration of sign

M

Manaḥ	Mind, manas
Mānasapratyakṣa	Mental perception
Maṅgala	Invocation
Māyāvāda	Illusionism
Mithyājñāna	false cognition
Mukti	Liberation, salvation, emancipation

N

Naiyyāyika	Scholastic successors of Gautama
Nidarśana	Illustration
Nigamana	Conclusion

Nigrahasthāna	Point of holding, fault in a syllogism or vulnerable point in debate
Nimittakāraṇa	Occasional cause, instrumental cause, cause in general
Nirākāra	Formless
Nirṇaya	Conclusion
Nirvikalpaka	Indeterminate, non-qualificative cognition
Nityatva	Eternality
Nivṛtti	Cessation
Nyāya	Logic, syllogism

P

Paddhati	Path, way
Padārtha	Category
Pakṣa	Minor term, subject
Pakṣatā	Being subject
Pakṣadharmatā,	Being present in attribute of subject
Pañcāvayavā	The five premises in a syllogism
Parāmarśa	Subsumptive reflection, consideration, logical antecedent
Paraprakāśā	Illuminate by others
Parataḥ Prāmāṇya	Theory of extrinsic validity
Parārthānumāna	Inference for others
Parīkṣā	Test, analysis, examination
Pariṇāma	Change, modification
Parokṣa	Indirect cognition
Phala	Consequences, result
Prābhākara	Scholastic successors of Prabhākara, who is a disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
Pradhvaṃsābhāva	Destruction negation, subsequent or annihilative non-existence
Prāgabhāvaḥ	Antecedent negation, absence
Prakaraṇasama	Balancing the controversy
Prakāśa	Luminosity
Prakṛti	Primordial matter
Pramā	Knowledge, true cognition
Pramāṇa	Means of true cognition

Prāmāṇya	Veridicality, truth
Prāmāṇyavāda	Theory of truth
Pramātā	Knower
Prameya	Object of true cognition, knowable
Pramiti	True cognition, knowledge
Prātibhajñāna	Intuitive cognition
Pratibhāsa	Apparent
Pratijñā	The thesis set down, proposition, a proposition to be proved in logic, promise
Pratyabhijñā	Recognition
Pratyakṣa Jñāna	Sensory knowledge
Pratyakṣam	Perception
Pratyāsatti	contact between sense and object
Pravṛtti	Activity
Pravṛttinimitta	Connotation, cause of application of a word, the ground or property of application of a word
Prayatna	Effort, volition
Prayojanam	Purpose, utility
Pretyabhāva	Transmigration
Punarukti	Repetition, redundancy
Purāṇa	Indian epics and narratives
Pūrvapakṣa	The prima-facie position, opponent's position
Pūrvavat	The inference of the effect from the cause, reasoning from cause to effect

S

Śabda	Sound, verbal testimony, word
Saddhetu	Good reason - a proban becomes positive, while it is not failing in any five conditions
Sādhana	Middle term, proban, instrument
Sādhya	Probandum, property to be established, major term, inferable property
Sādhyasama	Balancing the reciprocity
Sādṛśya	Similarity
Sādṛśyajñāna	Knowledge of similarity is the efficient instrument of assimilative cognition

Sajātīya	Homogeneous
Śakti	Significative potency, expressive power of words, potentiality
Sāmagrī	The whole cause apparatus, casual complex, collection of causes
Sāmānya	Generality, universal, generic property, class character
Sāmānyalakṣaṇā	Relation by generality or class nature
Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa	Induction, a form of inference
Sāmarthyābhāva	The negation of capacity
Samavāya	Co-inherence, inherence
Samaveta Samavāya	Inherence with the inherent, intimate union with intimately united
Saṃbandha	Relation, connection
Sambhava	Probability, inclusion
Saṃsargābhāva	Relational negation, relational absence
Saṃśaya	Doubt, dubiety
Saṃskāra	Impression
Saṃvit	Knowledge
Saṃyoga	Contact
Saṃyukta Samavāya	Inherence with the contacted object, intimate union with conjunction
Saṃyukta Samaveta Samavāya	Intimate union with intimately united with the conjunction, inherence with the inherent in the contacted object
Sāṅkhya	Scholastic successors of sage Kapila
Sannikarṣa	Relation, contact
Sapakṣa	Similar instance, positive instance
Sattā	Existence, being-ness
Savikalpaka	Determinate knowledge
Savyabhicāra	The reason that strays away, discrepancy of reason, straying reason
Śeṣavat	reasoning from effect to cause
Siddhānta	Conclusion, stand, position
Siṣādhayiṣā	The desire to prove the existence of the probandum
Smṛti	Recollection, remembrance, memory
Śrutārthapatti	A type of postulation

Śūnya	Void
Sūtra	Aphorism, maxim, formula
Svaprakāśa	Self-illuminate
Svārthānumāna	Inference for one self, inferring for oneself
Svataḥ Prāmāṇya	Theory of a self-verified knowledge

T

Tarka	Counter-factual-reason, argument, conflation
Tātparya	Intention of speaker
Tattva	Truth, reality, fact
Tattva Jñāna	Knowledge
Tatva Vāda	Realism

U

Udāharaṇa	Exemplification
Uddeśa	Meaning, labelling, enumeration, naming, subject
Upādānakāraṇa	Material cause
Upadeśa	Enumeration
Upādhi	Limitation condition, adventitious condition
Upalabdhi	Cognition, getting
Upamāna	Comparison
Upameya	Object of comparison
Upamiti	The knowledge due to similarity
Upanaya	Application, the subsumptive correlation
Upekṣā	Indifference
Utpatti	Production

V

Vāda	Debate, discussion to arrive at the truth, argument for truth
Vaidharmya Hetu	Heterogeneous, negative reason
Vaiśeṣika	Scholastic successors of Kaṇāda
Veda	Vedic texts
Vidyā	Knowledge
Vijātiya	Heterogeneous
Vijñāna	Consciousness

Vipakṣa	Negative instance, counter example
Viparyaya	Misapprehension, erroneous cognition
Viruddha	The adverse reason, contradictory reason
Viśeṣaṇa	Determinant, differentiator, adjunct, qualifier
Viśeṣya	Substantive, qualificand
Vṛtti	Transformation of mind
Vyaṅgya	Suggested meaning
Vyāpaka	Pervasive of greater extent, widely extending, pervade
Vyāpāra	Mediate activity, intermediate cause, operation with reference to a cause
Vyāpta	Pervaded
Vyāpti	Invariable concomitance, co-extension, pervasion, concomitance
Vyāpya	Pervaded, of less extent, the Middle term of a syllogism
Vyabhicāra	Straying reason, discrepancy of reason
Vyatireka Sahacāra	Coexistence of negation
Vyatireka Vyāpti	Concomitance of negation
Vyavaccheda	Differentiation, distinguishing
Vyavacchina	Differentiated, distinguished
Vyavasāya	Decisive cognition
Vyutpatti	Etymology

Y

Yathārthajñāna	Knowledge, true cognition
Yāthārthya	Being correspondent to the fact
Yogajapratyakṣa	Clair voyance, extrasensory perception
Yogyatā	Congruity, compatibility

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Professor Shrinivasa Varakhedi is (born 1973) MA (Sanskrit and Darśana), Navya-Nyaya Vidvan, and PhD, presently the Director, Directorate of Karnataka State Sanskrit Education, Karnataka Samskrit University, Bengaluru. He is a promising young scholar, who has been putting his efforts to bridge the gap between traditional and modern academia. He is one of the pioneers in newly emerged interdisciplinary research field Sanskrit Computational Linguistics.

He gained reputation by his research interests in interdisciplinary areas closely working with famous institutions such as IIIT and many central universities. While working as a faculty member in Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, he led many projects such as Sanskrit-net, Ramayana Project and NLP related PG courses. He has edited more than 30 works and published equal number of research papers in Sanskrit as well as in English. He has penned many articles related to Madhva philosophy in Kannada. He has delivered many lectures on invitations from many reputed universities and institutions as a visiting professor.

Dr Varakhedi received Maharshi Badrayan Vyas Samman by the President of India in 2008. He has also been honored by Śrī Vidyāmānyatīrtha, and several Mādhva saints and institutions.

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